Gary T. Trotter

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge wrongly excluded post-arrest utterances that were capable of supporting defence psychiatric evidence on cocaine intoxication and cocaine psychosis, and also erred in refusing to leave provocation with the jury because there was some evidence on which a properly instructed jury could find the partial defence.

The court rejected the argument that a later hospital statement was admissible to rebut recent fabrication, found no reversible error in the intoxication charge, and declined to interfere on motive.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered, making it unnecessary to address sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.

The appellant appealed his convictions on numerous weapons charges, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the conduct of a search was not unreasonable under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder under the constructive murder provisions of the Criminal Code, which were subsequently struck down as unconstitutional.

After exhausting his appeals, the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his continued detention violated the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus cannot be used as a collateral attack on a conviction by a superior court once the accused is no longer in the judicial system, and that the doctrine of res judicata applies.

The appellant was charged with attempted murder as a party after being forced at gunpoint by a drug dealer to lure his friend to the lobby of an apartment building, where the friend was shot.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of aggravated assault.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that duress could negate the mens rea for party liability under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that duress operates as an excuse-based defence rather than negating mens rea, and that the common law defence of duress is unavailable if the accused had a safe avenue of escape, determined on an objective standard that considers the accused's personal circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder at trial.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial based on issues relating to the use of evidence of an attack on a third party and the theft of a bicycle, as well as the propriety of certain questions put by the Crown in cross-examination.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Labrosse J.A. at the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge to the jury was thorough and adequately explained the limited use to which the evidence could be put.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant, convicted of first-degree murder, applied for a reduction in his parole ineligibility period under s. 745 of the Criminal Code after serving 15 years.

At the hearing, the jury refused to reduce the period.

The appellant appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the hearing was unfair due to inflammatory remarks by Crown counsel and errors in the judge's charge.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing, finding that Crown counsel's remarks, which discredited the s. 745 process and improperly referenced the death penalty and unrelated crimes, seriously compromised the fairness of the hearing.

The Court also held that victim impact statements may be admissible at a s. 745 hearing at the discretion of the presiding judge.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly allowed the Crown to reopen its case and then amend the indictment in a child sexual offence prosecution.

The majority held that once the defence had begun to answer the case by disclosing an intended alibi, the discretion to reopen was severely restricted and could be exercised only in the narrowest circumstances.

Reopening to correct the complainant's mother's evidence about the year of the alleged offences effectively changed the case the accused had committed to meet and indirectly violated the principle against self-incrimination.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal on the remaining count stood.

The respondent attacked his parents-in-law while sleepwalking, killing his mother-in-law and seriously injuring his father-in-law.

At trial, he presented a defence of non-insane automatism, supported by uncontradicted expert medical evidence that sleepwalking is a sleep disorder, not a neurological or psychiatric illness.

The trial judge left only the defence of non-insane automatism with the jury, which acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that on the evidence and policy considerations, sleepwalking in this case did not stem from a 'disease of the mind' and was properly classified as non-insane automatism, entitling the accused to an absolute acquittal.