Delmar Doucette

The appellant, an 18-year-old Indigenous man, shot and killed his father and best friend, and attempted to kill his father's girlfriend while highly intoxicated.

Following a trial, he was convicted of two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder.

The trial judge accepted a joint recommendation from counsel and imposed concurrent life sentences with an 18-year parole ineligibility period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal.

The Court held that the stringent Anthony-Cook test for departing from joint submissions does not apply to joint recommendations made after a contested trial.

Finding the 18-year period demonstrably unfit due to the trial judge's failure to properly weigh the appellant's youth, intoxication, immediate remorse, and the systemic impacts of colonization, the Court reduced the parole ineligibility period to 13 years.

The applicants, who were facing separate jury trials, brought a pre-trial 'Kokopenace' application challenging the constitutionality of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll.

They sought a publication ban on the proceedings under s. 648 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, under the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The court granted a partial publication ban to prevent potential jurors from drawing adverse inferences against the applicants, specifically prohibiting the publication of their identities, the facts of the allegations, and the fact that one applicant had previously brought a similar application.

The accused, charged with murder, sought to relitigate a pre-trial ruling that found his police statement voluntary.

The original trial judge retired before the trial commenced, and the accused argued the new trial judge was not bound by the previous ruling under the Criminal Code.

The court held that the situation was analogous to rulings made by a case management judge or after a mistrial, where previous rulings remain binding unless it is in the interests of justice to relitigate.

Finding no new evidence or change in circumstances, the court dismissed the application and upheld the voluntariness ruling.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, brought a pre-trial application challenging the representativeness of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll under ss. 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

They argued the state failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain source lists and deliver jury notices to on-reserve First Nations residents.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework in Kokopenace, the court reviewed the state's efforts, including the creation of an Aboriginal Jury Coordinator position, pilot projects offering compensation to bands for lists and delivery, and follow-ups on returned mail.

The court found that the state made reasonable efforts and provided a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate, dismissing the application.

The accused applied to challenge the representativeness of the 2014 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing that Ontario failed to make reasonable efforts to include Indigenous on‑reserve residents, thereby breaching the right to a representative jury under ss. 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

The court applied the test articulated in R. v. Kokopenace, assessing whether the state made reasonable efforts in compiling source lists, delivering jury questionnaires, and encouraging responses.

Evidence showed continued reliance on inaccurate band electoral lists containing off‑reserve members, inadequate review of those lists, high undeliverable rates for jury questionnaires, and extremely low return rates from on‑reserve residents without meaningful remedial action.

The court concluded that the province failed to exercise reasonable diligence in addressing known systemic problems affecting Indigenous representation on jury rolls.

A Charter breach was established.