Anil K. Kapoor

The appellant appealed jury convictions for two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a triple shooting, and sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that no eyewitness-identification instruction was required because the surviving victim had known the appellant for many years and the real frailties in the evidence concerned memory and reliability, which were adequately covered in the charge.

The court further held that the jury was sufficiently instructed on the proper use of after-the-fact conduct evidence and that the surviving victim's spontaneous post-shooting statements were properly admitted under the res gestae exception to hearsay.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the 25-year parole ineligibility period for the second degree murder convictions was upheld as fit and free of error in principle.

The accused were arrested following a drug trafficking investigation where a youth sold fentanyl to an undercover officer.

Orgen Dorjee was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle with a large quantity of drugs, while Tenzin Dorjee was in the back seat next to a loaded firearm.

The Crown alleged they were engaged in a joint drug trafficking enterprise and were in constructive possession of each other's illicit items.

The court found Tenzin Dorjee guilty of possessing the loaded firearm, as it was in plain view and he fled from police.

However, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove a joint enterprise beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, Orgen Dorjee was acquitted of the firearm charges, and Tenzin Dorjee was acquitted of the drug charges.

The appellant was convicted of possessing child sexual abuse and exploitation material (CSAEM) after a search of his home yielded devices containing over 6,000 images.

On appeal, he challenged the validity of the search warrant, the plain view seizure of a phone on his porch, and his alleged psychological detention during the search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no Charter breaches during the investigation.

However, the Court found that the appellant's ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were breached post-sentencing when he was arbitrarily detained and unlawfully strip-searched at Maplehurst Correctional Complex despite having been granted bail pending appeal.

The Court declined to enter a stay of proceedings but reduced his 12-month sentence to 11 months as a remedy under s. 24(1).

The appellant was convicted of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in the trunk of a vehicle he had rented and was driving.

On appeal, he argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was circumstantial and did not conclusively tie him to the drugs, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the absence of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's control over the rental vehicle and the location of the drugs supported a reasonable inference of constructive possession.

The Court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant was convicted at trial of defrauding the public of over $5,000 after running Ponzi-like schemes that raised approximately $12 million from 41 investors between 2007 and 2009, causing losses of over $10 million.

On appeal, the appellant argued for the first time that the fraud did not constitute a fraud "on the public" because the victims were specifically identified individuals rather than members of the public solicited indiscriminately.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the hallmark of fraud on the public is simply that the victims can rationally be grouped as a whole, which was satisfied by the interconnected nature of the Ponzi scheme victims.

The court also rejected the appellant's challenges to the trial judge's treatment of the Crown's forensic accounting expert report and the defence expert's evidence, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's analysis.

The appeal was dismissed.

Three appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in the 2018 shooting death of Nnamdi Ogba.

The appellants appealed on seven grounds, including challenges to jury instructions on modes of participation, admissibility of expert gang evidence, after-the-fact conduct evidence, firearm videos, W.(D.) instructions, Browne v. Dunn breaches, and jury roll compilation errors.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury instructions on modes of participation under sections 21(1)(b) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were deficient and that there was no air of reality to section 21(2) liability.

The court allowed the appeals, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The court upheld the admissibility of expert gang evidence and other evidentiary rulings.

The appellant, Mustafa Ahmed, was convicted of second degree murder following a judge-alone trial.

The case involved a fatal shooting during a bar altercation, captured on CCTV.

The trial judge rejected Ahmed’s claims of self-defence and provocation, finding his testimony not credible or reliable.

On appeal, Ahmed argued that the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the CCTV evidence and misapplied the law regarding his subjective beliefs.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Riley Kostuk’s appeal from his conviction for second degree murder.

Kostuk argued that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated, that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct, and that evidence of his schizophrenia was improperly admitted or not properly limited.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s rulings, holding that the appellant had an operating mind when consulting counsel, that the prior conduct evidence was properly admitted for motive and identity, and that the references to mental health did not prejudice the trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, Yiu Sun Wong, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a stay of proceedings based on multiple Charter infringements during his arrest and 72-hour detention.

The court found that while the initial arrest warrant was lawful, its execution and the subsequent detention were unlawful and arbitrary.

Specifically, police failed to obtain a Feeney warrant for an in-home arrest, improperly sought and obtained a six-day remand in British Columbia under a misapprehension of facts, and delayed bringing the applicant before an Ontario justice for 72 hours, during which officers took a day off.

The court found these actions breached the applicant's s. 7 and 9 Charter rights and demonstrated a systemic disregard for statutory duties under the Criminal Code, particularly the principle of restraint (s. 493.1) and timely appearance before a justice (s. 503(1)).

Concluding that no alternative remedy could adequately address the systemic police misconduct and protect the integrity of the justice system, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sexual interference following a judge-alone trial.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's and complainant's (S.M.) evidence, specifically regarding the implausibility of the appellant's film project as a ruse and the credibility of S.M. despite his criminal record and the timing of his disclosures.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's credibility findings, emphasizing the deference owed to trial judges in such assessments, and finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning or her reliance on common-sense inferences.

The applicant, an indigenous Justice of the Peace, sought judicial review of a Justice of the Peace Review Council (JPRC) decision recommending her removal from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved a prolonged pattern of inappropriate intervention in her son's traffic ticket prosecution.

The applicant argued the JPRC majority failed to reasonably apply Gladue principles regarding her indigenous heritage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the JPRC majority reasonably concluded that the applicant's lack of insight and failure to accept responsibility meant that public confidence in the administration of justice could only be restored by her removal from office.

The appellant, Alexsander Budimirovic, appealed his conviction for two counts of fraud and one count of attempted fraud.

The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's failure to give a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning between counts, error in admitting videotaped hearsay statements (Hockett Statements) for their truth, failure to caution the jury about relying on the Hockett Statements without corroboration, and refusal to grant an adjournment after the appellant discharged his counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's instructions on propensity reasoning, the admissibility of the Hockett Statements based on procedural reliability, the adequacy of the caution regarding the statements, and the proper exercise of discretion in refusing the adjournment.

The appellant, Stephen Tello, appealed his convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine, trafficking cocaine, and possession of proceeds of crime, and his 15-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The court found no errors in the trial judge's instructions on multiple counts, the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, or the PGP messages.

The court also refused to allow a new Charter issue regarding the PGP messages to be raised on appeal, finding the decision not to raise it at trial was tactical and no miscarriage of justice would result.

The sentence was deemed fit, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation for large-scale drug offences.

Sakab Saudi Holding Company and others brought a motion seeking access to a redacted "proffer" provided by Saad Al Jabri to the Attorney General of Canada for review under section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Sakab argued that Al Jabri's assertion of litigation privilege over the proffer was an abuse of process designed to exclude them from the section 38 proceedings.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, holding that Sakab was not excluded from the process and could still make meaningful submissions on the relevance of the sensitive information without access to the redacted proffer.

The Court emphasized that the section 38 process is flexible and designed to ensure fairness while protecting national security information.

The appellant, Kyle Sparks MacKinnon, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and wounding, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a dying victim's statement as a spontaneous utterance or under the principled hearsay exception, and in the jury instructions regarding its treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement admissible as a spontaneous utterance due to its spontaneity and the victim's state, and that the jury instructions were adequate.

The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that no "special features" undermined the statement's reliability.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace, brought a motion for a stay pending the outcome of her application for judicial review of the Justices of the Peace Review Council's recommendation that she be removed from office.

The respondent took no position on the motion.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the applicant raised serious issues to be tried, would suffer irreparable harm if removed from office pending review, and the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent for second-degree murder, where the trial judge found the respondent acted in self-defence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, making an unsupported factual finding, failing to undertake a contextualized reasonableness inquiry, and not considering the risk to third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of evidence and self-defence factors, despite acknowledging a minor factual error that did not materially impact the verdict.

The court reiterated that appellate courts cannot reweigh evidence or hear appeals from unreasonable acquittals.

The appellant, a Bombardier in the Canadian Armed Forces, was convicted of disgraceful conduct and administering a noxious thing after distributing cannabis-laced cupcakes to soldiers during a live fire artillery exercise.

She appealed her convictions and sentence.

The Court Martial Appeal Court dismissed the appeal.

The court found no breach of section 7 of the Charter regarding allegedly lost cupcake wrappers, as there was no unacceptable negligence or prejudice.

The court also held that the military judge did not misapprehend the circumstantial evidence and that the guilty verdicts were reasonable.

Finally, the court upheld the sentence of 30 days' imprisonment and dismissal from service, emphasizing the extreme danger the appellant's actions posed to the 150 personnel involved in the exercise and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, Brian Glen Kerr, appealed his convictions for attempting to obstruct justice and two counts of counselling to commit murder.

The central issue was the admissibility and scrutiny of evidence provided by a jailhouse informant, Richard Busch, and the validity of a warrant to intercept communications.

The appellant argued the warrant was not based on credible, compelling, and corroborated evidence, and that the trial judge erred in not excluding the intercepted conversation due to the affiant's failure to disclose sentencing considerations given to the informant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the Debot criteria for warrant validity and that the omission in the information to obtain was inadvertent, not an abuse of process.

The appellants, Alton Grant and Shaqwan Kawano, appealed their first-degree murder convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on how to assess exculpatory eyewitness identification evidence, specifically regarding a key witness whose testimony arguably contradicted the Crown's theory of identity.

This error was deemed serious and not curable.

The court dismissed Grant's Charter s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay and found the verdict against him was not unreasonable.

However, due to the misdirection on eyewitness identification, the appeals were allowed, and new trials were ordered for both appellants.