Anil K. Kapoor

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that it was involuntary due to pressure from his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to strike the plea, as the appellant's affidavit lacked credibility and did not demonstrate undue pressure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code regarding credit for pretrial custody.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation following a jury trial.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was inadequate, as it failed to distance reasonable doubt from a balance of probabilities and referred to it as an expression used in ordinary speech.

The Crown argued that defence counsel's closing address cured any defect in the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the charge deficient and concluding that the jury's expressed exasperation with defence counsel made it dangerous to assume they accepted her instructions on the law.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, arising from a fatal high-speed car crash.

She also appealed her sentence of four years' imprisonment and a 15-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the issuance of search warrants for blood samples, concluding the verdict was reasonable, and holding that the failure to preserve a blood sample did not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The sentence was upheld as emphasizing general deterrence.

The applicant, appealing a conviction for second degree murder, brought an application for the disclosure of an affidavit relating to the mental state of the principal Crown witness.

The Crown had put the witness's mental state in issue at trial to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the information in the affidavit suggested a previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder might have been in error, making it necessary for the applicant to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the disclosure of the affidavit subject to conditions.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, challenging the admission of similar fact evidence, the finding that the assault was sexual in nature, and the refusal to exclude seized pornographic material under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, that the assault was objectively sexual in nature based on the words accompanying the force, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting the seized evidence despite an overbroad warrant paragraph.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, the court held that the dangerous offender finding was unchallenged and that the trial judge erred in imposing a determinate sentence without evidence that the offender could be rehabilitated within a fixed period.

The determinate sentence was set aside and replaced with an indeterminate sentence.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, challenging the admission of similar fact evidence, the finding that the assault was sexual in nature, and the refusal to exclude seized pornographic material under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, that the assault was objectively sexual in nature based on the words accompanying the force, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting the seized evidence despite an overbroad warrant paragraph.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, the court held that the dangerous offender finding was unchallenged and that the trial judge erred in imposing a determinate sentence without evidence that the offender could be rehabilitated within a fixed period.

The determinate sentence was set aside and replaced with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the disappearance of a 14-year-old victim whose body was not found until after conviction.

The court upheld the admission of a jailhouse informant's evidence, finding the informant was not acting as a state agent when the initial inculpatory statements were elicited and therefore there was no breach of the appellant's s. 7 right to silence.

The court also rejected the proposed fresh evidence concerning the later discovery and forensic examination of the remains, holding that it did not materially undermine the informant's evidence or the Crown's theory and would not reasonably have affected the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions on the basis of inconsistencies in the evidence and the trial judge's credibility analysis, including a misplaced reference to corroboration.

The court held that the trial judge's treatment of the children's evidence and assessment of credibility were reasonable, and that the guilty verdicts were supported on the whole of the evidence.

On sentence, the court declined to address the validity of a probation term requiring attendance for psychiatric assessment in light of concessions made by both sides.

Leave to appeal conviction was granted but the conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant was acquitted of manslaughter at trial, but the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The Court found that the appellant should have been rewarned of his right to counsel when there was a substantial change in his jeopardy, which occurred when the police officer concluded he had committed the offence and advised him accordingly.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder at trial.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial based on issues relating to the use of evidence of an attack on a third party and the theft of a bicycle, as well as the propriety of certain questions put by the Crown in cross-examination.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Labrosse J.A. at the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge to the jury was thorough and adequately explained the limited use to which the evidence could be put.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and read his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The arresting officer advised him of the right to free legal advice from legal aid but failed to mention the 24-hour toll-free duty counsel number printed on the caution card.

The appellant expressed confusion about contacting a lawyer but eventually took and failed two breathalyser tests.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police breached the informational component of s. 10(b) by failing to advise the appellant of the toll-free duty counsel service.

The Court excluded the breathalyser evidence under s. 24(2), concluding its admission would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal regarding the admission of breathalyzer evidence where the accused was too impaired to understand his right to counsel.

Assuming without deciding that there was a violation of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2).

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was restored.