Anil K. Kapoor

The appellant appealed his conviction for murder and his sentence, which included a 14-year period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on aiding and abetting, recent possession, or other evidentiary issues.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found the trial judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on the appellant's minor criminal record when setting the parole ineligibility period.

The period of parole ineligibility was reduced from 14 years to 12 years.

The Crown appealed the global sentence of ten years (less four years pre-trial custody) imposed on the respondent for aggravated sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm against his six-year-old stepdaughter, and aggravated assault against his five-week-old biological son.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate, noting the trial judge over-emphasized the principle of totality and failed to adequately reflect the gravity of the offences, deterrence, denunciation, and the need to separate the respondent from society.

The global sentence was increased to sixteen years (less four years pre-trial custody).

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt (the W.(D.) test), the assessment of out-of-court confessions, the restriction of cross-examination of a police officer, and the Crown's theories of entry into the victim's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions as a whole were adequate, there was no prejudice from the restricted cross-examination, and there was sufficient evidence to support the Crown's theories of entry.

The appellant was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of robbery due to an error of law, but convicted him of the firearm offence.

A month later, at sentencing, the trial judge realized his error and changed the robbery acquittal to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was functus officio on the robbery count and had no jurisdiction to change the verdict.

Furthermore, the firearm conviction could not stand without a conviction on the underlying robbery charge.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered on both counts.

The member faced allegations of professional misconduct for calling in sick to her primary employer and collecting sick pay, while actually working shifts at another facility.

The member admitted to the allegations and agreed to a statement of facts.

The Discipline Committee found the member committed professional misconduct that would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered the member to appear for a reprimand and pay a $100 fine.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay two charges of sexual interference due to a 31-month delay between the accused's arrest and the proposed trial date.

The trial judge had attributed delays caused by the defence's difficulties in serving third-party record materials to systemic or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in this characterization, determining that approximately 15 months of the delay should not be attributed to the Crown.

The remaining 16 months of systemic delay fell within the acceptable range for matters in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after DNA evidence linked him to the 1986 killing of an eleven-year-old girl.

On appeal, he argued that his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter was violated during an eight-hour police interview following his arrest, and that his statements should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant had an operating mind, understood his rights, and made a strategic choice to speak to the police rather than exercising his right to silence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the first two grounds of appeal, holding there was sufficient evidence that the fire threatened firefighters and was of incendiary origin caused by the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge erred by inferring guilt directly from his rejection of the appellant's evidence without analyzing the Crown's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual assault with a weapon against his former spouse and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to a sentence he was already serving for a separate sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he was a sexual sadist based on expert testimony and that the sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 10-year sentence was fit and appropriate given the brutal, protracted, and horrendous nature of the offences, regardless of the sexual sadism finding.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and trafficking after shooting a police officer during a drug takedown.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions on cross-racial eyewitness identification were inadequate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence, arguing it failed to reflect the principle of parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence overwhelming and the jury charge adequate.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, increasing the sentence to 10 years (6 years net of pre-trial custody) to better reflect the gravity of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the basis that it was involuntary due to pressure from his trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to strike the plea, as the appellant's affidavit lacked credibility and did not demonstrate undue pressure.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code regarding credit for pretrial custody.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation following a jury trial.

He appealed on the basis that the trial judge's charge to the jury on reasonable doubt was inadequate, as it failed to distance reasonable doubt from a balance of probabilities and referred to it as an expression used in ordinary speech.

The Crown argued that defence counsel's closing address cured any defect in the charge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the charge deficient and concluding that the jury's expressed exasperation with defence counsel made it dangerous to assume they accepted her instructions on the law.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her convictions for criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, arising from a fatal high-speed car crash.

She also appealed her sentence of four years' imprisonment and a 15-year driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the issuance of search warrants for blood samples, concluding the verdict was reasonable, and holding that the failure to preserve a blood sample did not violate section 7 of the Charter.

The sentence was upheld as emphasizing general deterrence.

The applicant, appealing a conviction for second degree murder, brought an application for the disclosure of an affidavit relating to the mental state of the principal Crown witness.

The Crown had put the witness's mental state in issue at trial to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the information in the affidavit suggested a previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder might have been in error, making it necessary for the applicant to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the disclosure of the affidavit subject to conditions.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, challenging the admission of similar fact evidence, the finding that the assault was sexual in nature, and the refusal to exclude seized pornographic material under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, that the assault was objectively sexual in nature based on the words accompanying the force, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting the seized evidence despite an overbroad warrant paragraph.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, the court held that the dangerous offender finding was unchallenged and that the trial judge erred in imposing a determinate sentence without evidence that the offender could be rehabilitated within a fixed period.

The determinate sentence was set aside and replaced with an indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed a first degree murder conviction arising from the disappearance of a 14-year-old victim whose body was not found until after conviction.

The court upheld the admission of a jailhouse informant's evidence, finding the informant was not acting as a state agent when the initial inculpatory statements were elicited and therefore there was no breach of the appellant's s. 7 right to silence.

The court also rejected the proposed fresh evidence concerning the later discovery and forensic examination of the remains, holding that it did not materially undermine the informant's evidence or the Crown's theory and would not reasonably have affected the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged convictions on the basis of inconsistencies in the evidence and the trial judge's credibility analysis, including a misplaced reference to corroboration.

The court held that the trial judge's treatment of the children's evidence and assessment of credibility were reasonable, and that the guilty verdicts were supported on the whole of the evidence.

On sentence, the court declined to address the validity of a probation term requiring attendance for psychiatric assessment in light of concessions made by both sides.

Leave to appeal conviction was granted but the conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was denied.

The appellant was acquitted of manslaughter at trial, but the Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated.

The Court found that the appellant should have been rewarned of his right to counsel when there was a substantial change in his jeopardy, which occurred when the police officer concluded he had committed the offence and advised him accordingly.

The respondent was convicted of second degree murder at trial.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction and ordered a new trial based on issues relating to the use of evidence of an attack on a third party and the theft of a bicycle, as well as the propriety of certain questions put by the Crown in cross-examination.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Labrosse J.A. at the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge's charge to the jury was thorough and adequately explained the limited use to which the evidence could be put.

The conviction was restored.