By the Court

Two competing procedural motions arose in litigation concerning control of a corporate bank account following the separation of spouses involved in a family business.

The respondents sought leave to examine a bank employee whose interactions with the applicant were central to allegations about improper changes to corporate signing authority that resulted in the freezing of a corporate account.

The court held that the evidence was relevant and that any delay in seeking the examination resulted from prior counsel’s error, which should not prejudice the parties.

Leave was therefore granted to examine the bank employee.

The applicant’s motion to examine opposing counsel about the authenticity and delivery of a corporate requisition was found premature due to potential solicitor‑client privilege concerns and the availability of alternative avenues for obtaining the information.

The respondent College sought costs following its successful defence of an appeal upholding the revocation of the appellant's dental license.

The appellant argued that the costs claimed were excessive and that the appeal raised novel issues of jurisdiction and natural justice.

The Divisional Court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondent, fixing the amount at $26,000 plus disbursements, noting that costs should reflect a fair and reasonable amount rather than an exact measure of actual costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a municipal animal services official determining that his dog was a pit bull, was unsterilized, and posed a menace, thereby subjecting the dog to the requirements of the Animals for Research Act.

The applicant alleged bias, procedural unfairness, and disputed the breed determination.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding no evidence of bias or procedural unfairness, and concluded that the official's decision was reasonable given her expertise and the evidentiary record.

The application was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's judicial review application, the respondents sought costs against the applicant's counsel, the African Legal Clinic (ACLC).

The respondents argued the ACLC was the real litigant and made extreme allegations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the request, finding no evidence of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct by the ACLC.

The court also noted the matter raised novel issues of public importance, making a costs award inappropriate.

No costs were ordered.

The applicants, dairy farmers, sought judicial review of a decision by the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal confirming their violation of a milk marketing regulation and imposing penalties including quota and licence cancellations.

The applicants argued that an ongoing appeal stayed the regulation's operation.

The Divisional Court held that the stay did not suspend the validly enacted regulation and upheld the finding of liability.

However, the court found the penalty of licence cancellation and forced sale of remaining quota to be disproportionate and unjust, varying the penalty to only a partial cancellation of quota.

The appellant brought a motion before the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion and ordered no costs, as the responding party did not request them.

The self-represented applicant mother sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court order dismissing her appeal of a Crown wardship order.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for granting leave on the grounds raised by the applicant.

However, given the critical effects of a Crown wardship order, the court directed the appointment of amicus curiae to assist in determining whether there are grounds for granting leave to appeal.

The applicants, charged with the second-degree murder of their infant son, sought a review of a decision denying them bail.

The motion judge had denied bail on the secondary ground, citing concerns for the safety of the applicants' surviving child.

The Court of Appeal found that the surviving child, currently in the custody of the Children's Aid Society, could be adequately protected through strict release conditions prohibiting any contact.

The court concluded that detention was not necessary on the secondary or tertiary grounds and ordered the applicants' release subject to conditions.

The appellant appealed an effective sentence of 12.5 years for aggravated assault.

The trial judge had characterized the offence as the worst of its kind, noting the appellant's clear intent to torture the victim and lack of remorse.

The Court of Appeal distinguished the case law relied upon by the appellant and upheld the severe sentence, agreeing with the trial judge's characterization of the circumstances.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal.

The responding party failed to appear despite being advised of the hearing date.

The Court of Appeal proceeded with the motion and held that the appeal was barred by section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and costs of $2,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding he breached a contract by tricking the respondent into signing a Trust Deed and Power of Attorney after promising her one-half ownership of a home.

The appellant argued the agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds as it was not in writing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Statute of Frauds did not apply because the Deed was in writing and there was part performance when the respondent took possession and spent money improving the home.

The appellants brought an action in the Superior Court alleging an unconstitutional exercise of discretion under section 114(2) of the Immigration Act regarding the deportation of a parent.

The motion judge declined jurisdiction in favour of the Federal Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the decision, holding that the Federal Court is the proper forum for immigration matters unless it is shown to be ineffective or inappropriate.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs awarded.

The appellant appealed a decision striking their pleadings for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, citing leading jurisprudence on deep vein thrombosis and air travel.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the division of real estate commissions.

The trial judge had found that the principal of the broker corporation had agreed not to take any part of the appellant's earnings, but held that this waiver did not bind a new shareholder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to distinguish between the corporation and its shareholders.

The corporation remained bound by the agreement regardless of the change in shareholders, and the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act did not entitle the broker to a percentage of commissions it had agreed to waive.

The appellant appealed a decision interpreting a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the word 'net' in section 2.03(a) of the lease applied to 'Taxes', and that the lease did not require the tenant to pay more than its share of the taxes actually paid under a 'Gross up' argument.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondent insurance company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the exclusion clause in the insurance policy was unambiguous and that the appellant's claim fell squarely within it.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed a decision, raising a challenge under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court judge that a previous decision was determinative and that there was no evidentiary base to support the Charter challenge.

Costs were fixed at $12,500.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons of the lower court judge persuasive.

The respondent was awarded costs fixed at $9,000.

The appellants appealed a decision of the motions judge who refused leave to amend the statement of defence and granted summary judgment to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge was required to hear the motion to amend first and had no basis to refuse leave under Rule 26.01.

The Court granted leave to amend the statement of defence and, finding that the amended pleadings raised genuine issues for trial, dismissed the respondent's motion for summary judgment.

The appellant appealed a trial decision that turned entirely on findings of fact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's essential findings.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.