Leslie Mendelson

The appellants, operators of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged the validity of City of Toronto By-Law 1331-2015, which prohibits the use of hookah devices in licensed premises.

The application judge upheld the by-law as a valid exercise of municipal authority to protect public health and safety.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: (1) that the by-law's true purpose was to prohibit hookah lounges rather than protect health; (2) that the by-law impermissibly infringed property and civil rights; and (3) that the by-law conflicted with the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law's purpose was clearly the protection of public health and safety, that any economic impact was incidental rather than determinative of purpose, that the by-law was not confiscatory, and that it did not conflict with provincial occupational health and safety legislation.

The applicants, owners of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged a City of Toronto by-law prohibiting hookah smoking in licensed establishments.

They argued the City lacked the power to pass the by-law, that it was confiscatory, conflicted with provincial legislation (Occupational Health and Safety Act), and was passed in bad faith.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law was validly enacted under the City of Toronto Act's broad health and safety powers, was not confiscatory, did not create an operational conflict with the OHSA, and that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of City Council.

The court emphasized the broad and purposive interpretation of municipal powers and deference to democratic decisions of municipal councils.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of a class action settlement under s. 29(2) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 arising from a Legionnaires’ Disease outbreak at a municipal long‑term care facility.

The settlement created a compensation fund for class members with tiered payments based on hospitalization and permitted challenges to categorization and references for additional damages.

The court applied established factors governing settlement approval and concluded the agreement fell within the zone of reasonable outcomes given litigation risk, delay, and the advanced age of many class members.

The court also approved class counsel fees and modest stipends for representative plaintiffs.

Due to a conflict with counsel and ongoing objections, one representative plaintiff was removed during the administration phase of the settlement.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Toronto Animal Services Manager to destroy their dog under the Animals for Research Act.

The Manager determined that the dog was a restricted pit bull under the Dog Owners Liability Act, had attacked another dog and a person, and was a menace.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Manager's decision reasonable based on licensing records, veterinary certificates, and the dog's physical characteristics.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by a municipal animal services official determining that his dog was a pit bull, was unsterilized, and posed a menace, thereby subjecting the dog to the requirements of the Animals for Research Act.

The applicant alleged bias, procedural unfairness, and disputed the breed determination.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding no evidence of bias or procedural unfairness, and concluded that the official's decision was reasonable given her expertise and the evidentiary record.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner regarding fee estimates and time extensions for producing records.

The Divisional Court held that the decision was procedural in nature and fell squarely within the Commissioner's expertise.

Applying a standard of reasonableness, the court found the decision was not irrational and dismissed the application.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The appellant media organization sought access to exhibits from a concluded murder trial to produce a television program.

The application judge dismissed the request, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant access simply for public access purposes once the open justice requirement had been met and the exhibits had been transferred to the police.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the court's jurisdiction over its own records is anchored in the public policy favouring public access and does not vanish simply because the exhibits were filed in open court or transferred to the police.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a hearing on the merits.

The appellant landowner and the intervening tribunal appealed a Divisional Court decision that had set aside a review decision of the municipal tribunal concerning a ravine control by-law.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 43 of the Ontario Municipal Board Act confers broad review authority, including the power to reconsider and substitute a prior decision, and that the tribunal's internal “manifest error” guideline did not narrow the statute.

The court further held that the review panel acted within jurisdiction in applying longstanding planning policy against effectively sterilizing privately owned land without acquisition or compelling justification.

It also rejected the argument that an express finding of conformity with the official plan under s. 24 of the Planning Act was required.

This was a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal in a municipal election Charter challenge.

The successful respondent did not seek costs either in the Court of Appeal or on the motion for leave to appeal.

Applying the ordinary rule that costs follow the event, the court nevertheless made no order as to costs because the successful respondent did not ask for them.

The costs order in the Divisional Court was left undisturbed.

The appellant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, challenged provincial legislation that rendered him ineligible to be nominated for or hold municipal office while remaining in Parliament.

He argued that the prohibition burdened his democratic rights under s. 3 of the Charter by preventing him from running for mayor without first resigning his federal seat.

The court held that s. 3 protects only voting and candidacy rights in federal and provincial legislatures, not municipal elections.

Because the impugned provisions regulated only eligibility for municipal office and did not impair the appellant's right to remain qualified for membership in the House of Commons, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a sitting member of the House of Commons, attempted to file nomination papers for the office of Mayor of Toronto.

The City Clerk rejected the nomination before nomination day on the basis that provincial legislation rendered members of the House of Commons ineligible to hold municipal office.

The applicant sought mandamus and an order quashing the relevant statutory provisions, arguing they violated his democratic rights under section 3 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the clerk had the discretion to reject the nomination early and that the restriction on holding municipal office did not infringe the applicant's Charter right to be qualified for membership in the House of Commons.