Ryan P. Zigler

The applicant, a café and lounge, was charged with 14 counts alleging breaches of the Durham Region Smoke and Vape By-Law across six separate informations covering a three-year period.

The municipal prosecutor brought a joinder application to have all charges heard together in one trial.

The Justice of the Peace granted the joinder application, relying on a factum filed by the prosecutor without requiring affidavit evidence.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the joinder order, arguing that the decision constituted a denial of natural justice because the JP relied on unsworn submissions.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that the JP had jurisdiction to order joinder and that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice had occurred.

The responding party was granted an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal.

However, the motions for leave to appeal the decision of Trimble J., brought by both the moving party and the responding party, were dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought an anti-suit injunction to restrain the respondent from continuing divorce proceedings commenced in China, arguing that the Ontario court had jurisdiction and was the more appropriate forum.

The respondent opposed, requesting an adjournment pending the outcome of third-party lawsuits in China and claiming potential injustice if unable to pursue adultery-based compensation under Chinese law.

The court granted the anti-suit injunction, affirming its jurisdiction based on the respondent's attornment and a real and substantial connection to Ontario.

It found no unjust deprivation for the respondent, as the alleged claim for adultery-based compensation was not recognized under Canadian no-fault divorce law, and the Ontario court was capable of adjudicating foreign debts for equalization purposes without delay.

The appellant, a hookah lounge, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal smoking and vaping by-law.

The appellant argued that changes to Schedule A of the by-law, which lists set fines and short-form offence wording, after its enactment and municipal consent, invalidated the by-law.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's decision, holding that the changes to Schedule A were made by the Regional Senior Justice under the authority of the Provincial Offences Act to establish set fines, which is a judicial function, and did not alter the substance of the by-law's prohibitions.

The court found Schedule A was a placeholder and its changes did not invalidate the by-law.

The applicant brought a motion alleging the respondent breached a preservation order.

The respondent filed a cross-motion seeking clarification that the preservation order permitted him to sell real property, provided proceeds were held in trust.

The court ordered the respondent to hold net sale proceeds from two properties in trust and to provide a list of assets for his corporations.

The applicant's request to suspend the listings of two other properties was denied due to insufficient evidence, with the court suggesting the respondent recast his cross-motion for leave to sell if parties could not agree.

The appellants, owners of several hookah lounges in the Regional Municipality of Peel, challenged by-law No. 30-2016, which prohibits waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places, enclosed workplaces, and restaurant or bar patios.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires the Region, conflicted with provincial occupational health and safety legislation, and was enacted in bad faith.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the by-law was a valid exercise of municipal authority aimed at protecting public health and safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

In an uncontested trial, the plaintiff sought judgment against the defendant for breach of an agreement to supply a mobile catering vehicle.

The defendant had been noted in default but had not received notice of the Noting in Default or the Trial Record.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 19.02(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to require the plaintiff to serve the defendant with the Trial Record and the endorsement, ensuring proper notice before the trial could proceed.

The appellants, operators of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged the validity of City of Toronto By-Law 1331-2015, which prohibits the use of hookah devices in licensed premises.

The application judge upheld the by-law as a valid exercise of municipal authority to protect public health and safety.

The appellants appealed on three grounds: (1) that the by-law's true purpose was to prohibit hookah lounges rather than protect health; (2) that the by-law impermissibly infringed property and civil rights; and (3) that the by-law conflicted with the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the by-law's purpose was clearly the protection of public health and safety, that any economic impact was incidental rather than determinative of purpose, that the by-law was not confiscatory, and that it did not conflict with provincial occupational health and safety legislation.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final order to require the respondent father to contribute to the post-secondary education (section 7) expenses of their two children.

The court imputed income to the applicant based on full-time employment at her current hourly rate.

The court established a formula for sharing the section 7 expenses, requiring the children to apply for student loans and grants and contribute a percentage (up to 40%) of the remaining costs, with the parents sharing the balance proportionate to their incomes.

The respondent was ordered to pay his proportionate share of the expenses in addition to the table amount of child support.

The applicant mother, residing in Alberta, brought an application to vary child support for post-secondary expenses against the respondent father, residing in Ontario.

The matter was referred to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice for an interjurisdictional hearing via video-conference.

The court adjourned the hearing to allow for further disclosure and cross-examination, and ordered the respondent to pay an interim amount towards tuition.

The applicants, owners of hookah lounges in Toronto, challenged a City of Toronto by-law prohibiting hookah smoking in licensed establishments.

They argued the City lacked the power to pass the by-law, that it was confiscatory, conflicted with provincial legislation (Occupational Health and Safety Act), and was passed in bad faith.

The court dismissed the application, finding the by-law was validly enacted under the City of Toronto Act's broad health and safety powers, was not confiscatory, did not create an operational conflict with the OHSA, and that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of City Council.

The court emphasized the broad and purposive interpretation of municipal powers and deference to democratic decisions of municipal councils.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the parties had a binding settlement agreement, including a mutual release covering all claims, even those not pleaded, specifically regarding a property in Bulgaria.

The plaintiffs argued the release was limited to claims within the litigation.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that the phrase 'and otherwise' in the Minutes of Settlement did not extend to unpleaded claims, particularly those not previously raised, without more precise language.

The court emphasized that a general release requires specific wording to cover unknown claims and that it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite the settlement terms.

The applicant daughter moved for an order for directions under Rule 75.06 to challenge her deceased father's holograph will, which disinherited her and her brother in favour of his second wife.

The respondent wife opposed, arguing the applicant lacked a financial interest and sufficient evidence of suspicious circumstances.

The court found the applicant had a potential financial interest on intestacy and presented sufficient evidence—including the testator's brain cancer, psychiatric issues, and the will's vitriolic language—to support an inference of suspicious circumstances.

The court granted the order for directions and appointed an Estate Trustee During Litigation.

Following a motion in which defendants sought leave to issue a third party claim against two proposed third parties, the court dismissed the motion on the basis that no viable cause of action was disclosed and the claim was barred by the Limitations Act.

The successful proposed third parties sought partial indemnity costs of $16,174.22.

The moving defendants argued the amount was excessive and proposed $5,000 all inclusive.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the relatively narrow issues involved, the court reduced the requested amount and fixed costs payable to the successful parties.

The moving defendants sought leave to issue a third party claim for contribution and indemnity against an architect and related firm in a construction dispute involving alleged deficiencies in a cottage built in the early 1990s.

The proposed third parties argued the claim was unjustified and barred by the Limitations Act.

The court held that any alleged negligence by the architect would have been known years earlier and was therefore statute‑barred.

The court also found no evidentiary basis for a viable negligence claim against the architect on the record.

Leave to issue the third party claim was denied.

A municipal defendant brought a motion seeking leave to amend its statement of defence and crossclaim to add detailed allegations of negligence against co-defendants in a construction dispute involving a cottage.

The responding parties argued that the proposed amendments introduced a new cause of action and were therefore barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act.

The court held that most of the proposed amendments merely particularized the existing claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act and did not constitute a new cause of action.

However, an allegation asserting active concealment of construction defects was excluded because it amounted to an allegation of fraud rather than negligence.

Leave to amend was granted except for that paragraph.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him personally liable for a pre-incorporation lease he signed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the corporation did not signify its intention to be bound by the lease within a reasonable time after coming into existence, as required by s. 21(2) of the Business Corporations Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.