Paul E. Trudelle

This appeal concerned the validity of codicils to a will and the application of the Limitations Act, 2002, to an application seeking purely declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision that an application for a declaration on the validity of codicils, without seeking consequential relief, is not subject to a limitation period under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act.

The court also affirmed the finding that the codicils were invalid due to insufficient evidence of proper execution and suspicious circumstances, and that summary judgment was appropriate.

The children of Stanislaw and Jadwiga Wroblewski disputed the validity of codicils to their parents' wills, which purported to gift properties to Krystyna Romoli.

Helen Piekut, an applicant, sought a declaration on the codicils' validity.

Krystyna Romoli moved for summary judgment to dismiss Helen's application as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, while Helen cross-moved for summary judgment to declare the codicils invalid.

The court dismissed Krystyna's motion, finding Helen's application for declaratory relief was not statute-barred.

The court granted Helen's cross-motion, declaring the codicils invalid due to insufficient evidence of due execution, suspicious circumstances surrounding their preparation by Krystyna, and doubts about the testator's capacity.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's decision denying probate of a 2012 will and dismissing the probate application.

The trial judge found suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation and execution of the will, determined that the appellant failed to prove the testator's testamentary capacity, and held that the appellant failed to establish the testator's knowledge and approval of the will's contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial decision on all grounds, finding that the suspicious circumstances displaced the presumption of testamentary capacity, placing the burden on the appellant to prove capacity.

The court also rejected the appellant's application to admit fresh evidence on appeal, finding the due diligence requirement was not met.

This case concerned the validity of a will dated May 21, 2012, which significantly altered the deceased's estate plan from a prior 1999 will.

The applicant, named executor in the new will, sought to propound it.

The respondent, sole beneficiary of the 1999 will, opposed, alleging suspicious circumstances, lack of testamentary capacity, and lack of knowledge and approval.

The court found numerous suspicious circumstances, including the deceased's questionable mental capacity at the time, the absence of a capacity assessment, and the radical change in beneficiaries without clear rationale.

The applicant failed to discharge the burden of proving testamentary capacity and knowledge and approval.

Consequently, the May 21, 2012 will was not admitted to probate, and the application was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the parties had a binding settlement agreement, including a mutual release covering all claims, even those not pleaded, specifically regarding a property in Bulgaria.

The plaintiffs argued the release was limited to claims within the litigation.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that the phrase 'and otherwise' in the Minutes of Settlement did not extend to unpleaded claims, particularly those not previously raised, without more precise language.

The court emphasized that a general release requires specific wording to cover unknown claims and that it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite the settlement terms.

An estate trustee sought the court’s advice and direction regarding the disposition of three lapsed residuary shares under a will where three of four named beneficiaries predeceased the testatrix.

The court considered whether the residuary gift constituted a class gift or whether a contrary intention in the will prevented intestacy.

The court held that individually named beneficiaries did not constitute a class gift and that the evidence did not establish a contrary intention to avoid intestacy.

Applying s. 47(6) of the Succession Law Reform Act, the lapsed shares passed on intestacy to the closest next of kin.

A Benjamin order was granted permitting distribution of the intestate portion of the estate equally to two identified first cousins.