Richard J. Worsfold

The moving party, Pamela Pal, sought an order for partition or sale of a residential property jointly owned with her daughter, Faythe R. Pal (the responding party), under the Partition Act.

Pamela owns an 80% interest, and Faythe, who resides in the property and operates a business from it, owns 20%.

Pamela sought to sell the property to access her equity and purchase a condominium for independent living.

Faythe opposed the sale, citing financial hardship and alleging bad faith on Pamela's part.

The court granted the partition or sale, finding Pamela had a prima facie right to the sale and was not acting in bad faith.

The court determined that Faythe's personal hardship and inconvenience were not sufficient reasons to deny the order.

The decision also addressed the sale of other jointly held assets (an Aruba timeshare and Milton Lands) and the conditional issuance of a writ of possession.

The defendants moved to set aside an order granting a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the LaSalle Property and to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff had obtained the CPL without notice, claiming a plausible interest in the property via constructive or resulting trust and proprietary estoppel.

The defendants argued no triable interest and material non-disclosure.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding a triable issue existed and no material non-disclosure that would have altered the original CPL grant.

The court also dismissed a third party's motion to intervene.

The plaintiff and defendants brought cross-motions regarding the sufficiency of answers to undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery in a construction lien action.

The court ordered the defendants to provide further and better answers to several undertakings, finding their previous responses incomplete or non-responsive.

The court declined to order the production of the defendants' general ledgers and bank statements at this stage.

The defendants' motion to compel further answers from the plaintiff was dismissed, as the court found the plaintiff had either answered the undertakings or the defendants' follow-up questions exceeded the scope of the original undertakings.

The plaintiff, acting as Estate Trustee, brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property held by the deceased's sister.

The deceased and her sister had taken title as joint tenants following a refinancing arrangement, but the sister had not paid the agreed consideration.

After the deceased's death, the sister registered a survivorship application and further encumbered the property.

The court found that the transfer was gratuitous, raising a presumption of resulting trust, and that the Estate had met the threshold of demonstrating a triable issue regarding its interest in the property.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

Following a trial regarding the validity of codicils to a will, the court determined the allocation and quantum of costs.

The Objectors, who unsuccessfully challenged the codicils on grounds of testamentary capacity and undue influence, argued that costs should be paid out of the estate.

The court applied a blended costs approach, ordering the Objectors to pay the successful parties' costs incurred after a second mediation, at which point the Objectors should have reassessed their position.

The court also significantly reduced the costs claimed by some of the successful parties due to duplication of effort and excessive docketing.

The court held a case management conference in a land dispute action involving a failed real estate transaction and a discharged certificate of pending litigation.

The court issued procedural directions regarding the amendment of pleadings, demands for particulars, and discussions on security for costs, while setting dates for examinations for discovery and the next case management conference.

The applicants, estate trustees of the late Ellen Kates, sought to propound codicils executed in August 2011.

The objectors challenged the codicils on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, citing the testator's diagnosis of moderate Alzheimer's disease.

The court found that despite the cognitive impairment, the testator understood the nature and effect of the codicils, the extent of her property, and the claims of those excluded.

The court also found no evidence of coercion or fraud amounting to undue influence.

The codicils were admitted to probate.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from an order dismissing its appeal of an interlocutory order that discharged a certificate of pending litigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

A case management teleconference was held to schedule a motion for leave to appeal from a decision dismissing an appeal of an interlocutory order discharging a certificate of pending litigation.

The court set a timetable for the written motion to proceed before a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The moving party also indicated an intention to move for a stay, and the court directed the parties to attempt to agree on interim terms to avoid a stay motion, failing which an urgent case management conference could be arranged.

The appellant, 2676547 Ontario Inc., appealed a Master's decision to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) related to a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for land.

The Master had found that the appellant failed to make full disclosure during the ex parte CPL application, that the land was not unique, and that the balance of equities favored discharging the CPL, especially given the delay and the respondents' ongoing construction.

The Superior Court, applying a standard of review for appeals from a Master's decision (palpable and overriding error for facts/discretion, correctness for law), found no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the Master's findings regarding credibility, the nature of the property sale, notice to the respondents, construction costs, uniqueness of the property, or the appellant's failure to make full and fair disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The defendants Tavasys Telecom Inc. and Danny Tavares brought a motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their property by the plaintiff 2676547 Ontario Inc. The CPL was initially obtained ex parte.

The court considered the plaintiff's lack of full disclosure, delay in asserting rights, its nature as a shell corporation without assets, and the moving defendants' status as bona fide third-party purchasers without actual notice of a prior sale.

Balancing the equities and applying the Dhunna Factors, the court found in favor of the moving defendants, granting the motion to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment to enforce a matured mortgage, demanding principal, interest, an additional three months' interest, administrative charges, and legal fees.

The defendant mortgagors conceded principal and interest but disputed the additional three months' interest, administrative fees, and legal fees, relying on s. 17 of the Mortgages Act and s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The court held that s. 17 of the Mortgages Act did not apply to resist the additional interest, but s. 8 of the Interest Act barred the three months' interest as it constituted a fine or penalty.

The administrative charges and legal fees associated with enforcement were deemed permissible as they were not fines or penalties under s. 8.

Summary judgment was granted for principal, interest, and enforcement-related fees, but not for the additional three months' interest.

The appellant mortgagee appointed a receiver over a mortgaged development property following the mortgagor's default.

The receiver sold the property and paid the mortgagee the full mortgage debt plus approximately $351,000 representing three months' additional interest, which the mortgagee claimed was due under a provision in the mortgage.

The mortgagor applied for a declaration that the mortgagee was not entitled to the three months' interest and sought an order requiring repayment.

The application judge granted the relief sought.

On appeal, the mortgagee argued the application judge erred in interpreting the three-month interest provision as mortgagor-centric rather than mortgagee-centric.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision only applied when the mortgagor sought to require the mortgagee to accept payment, and that the receiver, in discharging the mortgage as part of the realization process, was acting as the mortgagee's agent, not the mortgagor's agent.

The applicant was successful on the application and sought costs of $20,000 plus HST.

The respondent argued for reduced costs of $15,000 due to divided success, claiming the applicant abandoned some relief at the hearing.

The court found no evidence that the respondent incurred additional costs due to the abandoned relief.

The court awarded the applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,157.72, all inclusive.

The applicant mortgagor sought a declaration that the respondent mortgagee was not entitled to withhold a three-month interest charge of $351,000 following the sale of the secured property by a privately-appointed receiver.

The court held that section 17 of the Mortgages Act does not allow a mortgagee to claim three months' interest when realizing on security through a forced sale.

Furthermore, the specific terms of the mortgage did not grant the mortgagee the right to impose this charge upon realization.

The application was granted, and the respondent was ordered to account for and transfer the withheld funds to the applicant.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment decision dismissing its motion and granting the respondent's motion, which declared the respondent to be the legal and beneficial owner of CDN$100,000 and US$300,000 in stolen funds that the appellant had paid out under mistake to a third party fraudster.

The appellant had been defrauded of over US$66 million in a sophisticated fraud scheme.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that while the appellant successfully traced the US$300,000 to the respondent, the respondent was a bona fide purchaser for value who had paid valuable consideration in Chinese currency without knowledge of the funds' illicit source and had legitimately changed his position.

The plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant brought cross-motions for summary judgment in an action for breach of a commercial lease agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a binding lease existed for the expansion of the tenant's premises and whether the tenant breached duties of good faith and honest performance by secretly securing an alternative location while delaying the provision of design information.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the case presented a plethora of genuine issues for trial, including serious credibility issues, which could not be fairly and justly resolved using the summary judgment procedure.

The appellant brought an oppression remedy claim against his siblings regarding the sale of shares in a family business and the failure to provide information.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while summary judgment is generally not available for applications under Rule 14, the procedural defect caused no prejudice.

However, the Court found that the respondents' subsequent application for a valuator constituted a new, discrete act of oppression.

Therefore, the oppression claim was not statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed and the matter directed to trial.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing his motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The motion judge had found that there were too many facts in dispute regarding the plaintiff's fitness to return to work to resolve the matter summarily.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the appeal raised issues of public importance beyond the interests of the individual parties.

In an estate dispute, the respondent sought removal of the applicant as estate trustee, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking the respondent’s removal.

The dispute arose from significant conflict between the deceased’s spouse and daughter over the administration of the estate and the disposition of the estate’s principal asset, shares in a nail salon business.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that clear evidence of necessity and risk to the proper administration of the estate is required, and that hostility alone is insufficient.

Given the contradictory affidavit evidence and the absence of clear proof that the estate’s administration was endangered, the court declined to remove either trustee.

Directions were ordered for the sale of the estate’s business interests and for related claims to proceed to trial.