Richard J. Worsfold

The moving party, Pamela Pal, sought an order for partition or sale of a residential property jointly owned with her daughter, Faythe R. Pal (the responding party), under the Partition Act.

Pamela owns an 80% interest, and Faythe, who resides in the property and operates a business from it, owns 20%.

Pamela sought to sell the property to access her equity and purchase a condominium for independent living.

Faythe opposed the sale, citing financial hardship and alleging bad faith on Pamela's part.

The court granted the partition or sale, finding Pamela had a prima facie right to the sale and was not acting in bad faith.

The court determined that Faythe's personal hardship and inconvenience were not sufficient reasons to deny the order.

The decision also addressed the sale of other jointly held assets (an Aruba timeshare and Milton Lands) and the conditional issuance of a writ of possession.

The defendants moved to set aside an order granting a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) against the LaSalle Property and to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff had obtained the CPL without notice, claiming a plausible interest in the property via constructive or resulting trust and proprietary estoppel.

The defendants argued no triable interest and material non-disclosure.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding a triable issue existed and no material non-disclosure that would have altered the original CPL grant.

The court also dismissed a third party's motion to intervene.

Following a trial regarding the validity of codicils to a will, the court determined the allocation and quantum of costs.

The Objectors, who unsuccessfully challenged the codicils on grounds of testamentary capacity and undue influence, argued that costs should be paid out of the estate.

The court applied a blended costs approach, ordering the Objectors to pay the successful parties' costs incurred after a second mediation, at which point the Objectors should have reassessed their position.

The court also significantly reduced the costs claimed by some of the successful parties due to duplication of effort and excessive docketing.

The applicants, estate trustees of the late Ellen Kates, sought to propound codicils executed in August 2011.

The objectors challenged the codicils on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence, citing the testator's diagnosis of moderate Alzheimer's disease.

The court found that despite the cognitive impairment, the testator understood the nature and effect of the codicils, the extent of her property, and the claims of those excluded.

The court also found no evidence of coercion or fraud amounting to undue influence.

The codicils were admitted to probate.

The appellant, 2676547 Ontario Inc., appealed a Master's decision to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) related to a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for land.

The Master had found that the appellant failed to make full disclosure during the ex parte CPL application, that the land was not unique, and that the balance of equities favored discharging the CPL, especially given the delay and the respondents' ongoing construction.

The Superior Court, applying a standard of review for appeals from a Master's decision (palpable and overriding error for facts/discretion, correctness for law), found no legal error or palpable and overriding error in the Master's findings regarding credibility, the nature of the property sale, notice to the respondents, construction costs, uniqueness of the property, or the appellant's failure to make full and fair disclosure.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The defendants Tavasys Telecom Inc. and Danny Tavares brought a motion to set aside a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered against their property by the plaintiff 2676547 Ontario Inc. The CPL was initially obtained ex parte.

The court considered the plaintiff's lack of full disclosure, delay in asserting rights, its nature as a shell corporation without assets, and the moving defendants' status as bona fide third-party purchasers without actual notice of a prior sale.

Balancing the equities and applying the Dhunna Factors, the court found in favor of the moving defendants, granting the motion to discharge the CPL.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment to enforce a matured mortgage, demanding principal, interest, an additional three months' interest, administrative charges, and legal fees.

The defendant mortgagors conceded principal and interest but disputed the additional three months' interest, administrative fees, and legal fees, relying on s. 17 of the Mortgages Act and s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The court held that s. 17 of the Mortgages Act did not apply to resist the additional interest, but s. 8 of the Interest Act barred the three months' interest as it constituted a fine or penalty.

The administrative charges and legal fees associated with enforcement were deemed permissible as they were not fines or penalties under s. 8.

Summary judgment was granted for principal, interest, and enforcement-related fees, but not for the additional three months' interest.

The appellant mortgagee appointed a receiver over a mortgaged development property following the mortgagor's default.

The receiver sold the property and paid the mortgagee the full mortgage debt plus approximately $351,000 representing three months' additional interest, which the mortgagee claimed was due under a provision in the mortgage.

The mortgagor applied for a declaration that the mortgagee was not entitled to the three months' interest and sought an order requiring repayment.

The application judge granted the relief sought.

On appeal, the mortgagee argued the application judge erred in interpreting the three-month interest provision as mortgagor-centric rather than mortgagee-centric.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision only applied when the mortgagor sought to require the mortgagee to accept payment, and that the receiver, in discharging the mortgage as part of the realization process, was acting as the mortgagee's agent, not the mortgagor's agent.

The appellant appealed from a summary judgment decision dismissing its motion and granting the respondent's motion, which declared the respondent to be the legal and beneficial owner of CDN$100,000 and US$300,000 in stolen funds that the appellant had paid out under mistake to a third party fraudster.

The appellant had been defrauded of over US$66 million in a sophisticated fraud scheme.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that while the appellant successfully traced the US$300,000 to the respondent, the respondent was a bona fide purchaser for value who had paid valuable consideration in Chinese currency without knowledge of the funds' illicit source and had legitimately changed his position.

The plaintiff landlord and defendant tenant brought cross-motions for summary judgment in an action for breach of a commercial lease agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a binding lease existed for the expansion of the tenant's premises and whether the tenant breached duties of good faith and honest performance by secretly securing an alternative location while delaying the provision of design information.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the case presented a plethora of genuine issues for trial, including serious credibility issues, which could not be fairly and justly resolved using the summary judgment procedure.

In an estate dispute, the respondent sought removal of the applicant as estate trustee, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking the respondent’s removal.

The dispute arose from significant conflict between the deceased’s spouse and daughter over the administration of the estate and the disposition of the estate’s principal asset, shares in a nail salon business.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that clear evidence of necessity and risk to the proper administration of the estate is required, and that hostility alone is insufficient.

Given the contradictory affidavit evidence and the absence of clear proof that the estate’s administration was endangered, the court declined to remove either trustee.

Directions were ordered for the sale of the estate’s business interests and for related claims to proceed to trial.

Plaintiffs commenced an action alleging fraud, deception, and improper conduct arising from a series of mortgage and financial transactions involving real estate properties and business dealings.

The court held the action turned primarily on credibility and preferred the defendant’s evidence over that of the principal plaintiff.

The court found the plaintiff’s testimony inconsistent and unreliable, and concluded many claims were barred by the Limitations Act, 2002 and further defeated by the corporate veil where the transactions involved corporate entities rather than the individual plaintiff.

The plaintiffs failed to establish any contractual or legal basis for personal recovery.

The action was dismissed and judgment was granted on the defendant’s counterclaim for the outstanding mortgage balance.

Following an earlier order granting comprehensive directions concerning the administration of two related estates, the applicants sought costs.

The applicants had successfully obtained an order requiring, among other things, preservation of estate assets and directions relating to the administration of the estates and the conduct of attorneys acting under a power of attorney.

The court found that the responding estate trustees had taken unreasonable positions by refusing to provide an informal accounting and declining reasonable settlement efforts.

Applying the principles of proportionality and reasonableness under Rule 57.01, the court awarded full indemnity costs to the applicants.

Costs were ordered partly against the respondent trustees personally and partly payable from the capital of one of the estates.

The applicant corporation sought a stay of the respondent’s motion to set aside a 2007 judgment and requested security for costs due to the respondent’s failure to pay prior costs awards.

The respondent argued the costs were not payable by her and opposed security for costs.

The court found that prior orders imposed joint and several liability for the costs and that the respondent had failed to comply with those orders for several years while residing outside Ontario.

The court held that a party should not be permitted to pursue further relief while ignoring outstanding costs obligations.

The proceeding was stayed unless the respondent paid the outstanding costs and posted security for costs.

The applicants brought a motion for an Order for Directions regarding the estates of Enrico and Ida Carfagnini.

They sought to consolidate the two actions, obtain a preservation order, compel the passing of accounts by Ida's attorneys for property, and order the disclosure of third-party solicitor and financial records.

The respondents opposed the consolidation and the preservation order for Enrico's estate.

The court granted the applicants' motion, ordering the consolidation of the actions, a preservation order for both estates, the passing of accounts, and the requested disclosure, finding that the issues in both estates were intertwined and raised significant concerns.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding the valuation of the applicant's shares in a family holding company.

The applicant sought to have an arbitrator appointed or the issues heard in court, alleging oppression and breach of a unanimous shareholders' agreement regarding a 2008 transaction.

The respondents sought the appointment of a valuator, arguing the valuation date was fixed in 2007.

The court held that a valuator is not qualified to deal with oppression or breach of contract claims, and because a non-party to the shareholders' agreement was involved, arbitration was unavailable.

The court ordered that the oppression and breach of contract claims be dealt with by the court before any valuator is appointed.

A dispute arose following a fire at a heritage house unit within a condominium development regarding who had the right to control and conduct repairs to the damaged structure.

The unit owner sought an interlocutory and final injunction preventing the condominium corporation and insurer from proceeding with repairs and sought a declaration granting him exclusive authority over restoration.

The condominium corporation argued the declaration and condominium governance documents imposed the obligation to repair damage on the corporation and that the owner had failed to act within a reasonable time.

The court interpreted the condominium declaration and held the corporation had the right and obligation to carry out exterior and roof repairs to restore the property, while leaving interior renovation decisions to the unit owner.

The request for injunctive relief was denied and the corporation was authorized to proceed with exterior restoration.

The estate of a deceased shareholder brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to vary a prior order requiring the deceased to purchase the other shareholder’s interest in a corporation owning a Hamilton property.

Following the shareholder’s death, the estate argued that the original premise of the order—his intention and ability to develop the property—could no longer be fulfilled.

The court held that the death constituted a new fact arising after the order that could not have been discovered with reasonable diligence.

Given that the estate lacked the capacity or intention to pursue development, the court varied the prior order and directed that the property be listed for sale on the open market.

Requests by the responding shareholders for historical costs and appraisal expenses were denied.

Respondents brought a motion under Rule 59.06(2)(a) and (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to set aside a prior order requiring the purchase of one shareholder’s shares in a closely held corporation.

They argued that subsequent deterioration of a shareholder’s health, reduced developer interest in the company’s property, and litigation delay constituted new facts justifying the order’s reversal and instead requested a sale of the property and winding up of the company.

The court held that the alleged circumstances were not new facts arising after the order but risks that were known or reasonably foreseeable when the order was made.

The court further found that setting aside the order would not expedite resolution and that a subsequent order and appellate direction remained in force.

The motion was dismissed and the prior valuation process ordered by the Divisional Court was to proceed.