Cary N. Schneider

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a 2017 order dismissing his action for delay, arguing he failed to appear due to accident, mistake, or insufficient notice, largely attributable to his prior counsel's failures.

The court considered the "forthwith" requirement for bringing such a motion, the lengthy delay and its reasons, the presence or absence of prejudice to the defendant, and the underlying merits of the plaintiff's case.

The court found that the plaintiff's previous lawyers were primarily responsible for the delay, that the defendant did not suffer actual, non-compensable prejudice, and that the plaintiff had a meritorious case.

The motion was granted, the dismissal order set aside, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This appeal concerned the enforceability and priority of a judgment creditor's writ of seizure and sale against a beneficial interest in land held by a bare trustee under an unregistered trust agreement.

The appellant, a judgment creditor of Fortress Wismer (beneficial owner), sought declarations that its writ was binding on Pace Mark (registered owner/bare trustee) and had priority over subsequent advances under a previously registered construction financing charge held by the respondents (Firm Capital and MarshallZehr).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Execution Act is procedural and does not grant substantive rights to judgment creditors beyond seizing the debtor's interest.

The court held that the writ did not bind the legal owner (Pace Mark) and that actual notice of the writ did not grant priority over prior registered charges under s. 93(4) of the Land Titles Act, as that section does not apply to execution creditors.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought summary judgment to enforce a matured mortgage, demanding principal, interest, an additional three months' interest, administrative charges, and legal fees.

The defendant mortgagors conceded principal and interest but disputed the additional three months' interest, administrative fees, and legal fees, relying on s. 17 of the Mortgages Act and s. 8 of the Interest Act.

The court held that s. 17 of the Mortgages Act did not apply to resist the additional interest, but s. 8 of the Interest Act barred the three months' interest as it constituted a fine or penalty.

The administrative charges and legal fees associated with enforcement were deemed permissible as they were not fines or penalties under s. 8.

Summary judgment was granted for principal, interest, and enforcement-related fees, but not for the additional three months' interest.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation and bad faith.

The plaintiff alleged that the insurer provided an erroneous statement of accident benefits paid during mediation, leading to a lower settlement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

It determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable reliance on the misstatement or that such reliance caused detriment.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of bad faith, as the misstatement was inadvertent.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff's action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was commenced after the two-year limitation period.

The core issue was the discoverability date of the plaintiff's injuries, specifically when she knew or ought to have known her injuries constituted "permanent serious impairment" under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the plaintiff's chronic pain and psychological conditions were diagnosed by May 9, 2008, at which point she ought to have known she had a cause of action.

As the action was commenced on September 27, 2010, it was beyond the two-year limitation period.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action dismissed.