Alissa Pamela Goldberg

The respondent, Framatome Canada, moved to quash the appellant's appeal of an associate judge's order regarding document production, arguing the order was interlocutory and brought in the wrong court.

The appellant cross-moved to transfer the appeal to the Superior Court of Justice.

The court agreed that the underlying order was interlocutory and that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

However, rather than dismissing the appeal, the court granted the cross-motion to transfer the matter to the Superior Court of Justice.

Costs of both motions were reserved to the judge hearing the appeal.

The plaintiff sought damages for wrongful dismissal, arguing that his employment with the defendant municipality was permanent and indefinite despite being hired under a contract with an expected duration of two years.

The defendant maintained that the plaintiff was employed under a fixed-term contract that was extended four times before expiring.

The court found no ambiguity in the employment agreement or the extension notices, concluding that the plaintiff was employed under a fixed-term contract.

As the contract simply expired, there was no wrongful dismissal, and the plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of two summary judgment motions: one by the City of Toronto against the plaintiffs, and another by the Toronto Terminal Railway Company in its cross-claim against the City.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, ordered that the costs of both motions be "in the cause." This decision was based on the principle that the merits of the action had not yet been determined, the work product from the motions would be useful at trial, and the moving parties could still be successful at trial, making an immediate costs award premature.

The defendant, UAP Inc. o/a Napa Auto Parts, appealed a Master's decision that granted the plaintiff, John Turner, an extension to the deadline to set the action down for trial.

The appeal concerned the two-part test for dismissing an action for delay under Rule 48.14, specifically whether the plaintiff provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and rebutted the presumption of prejudice to the defendant.

The court found no palpable or overriding error in the Master's decision, concluding that the Master properly considered the evidentiary matrix and exercised discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs initiated an action against the City of Toronto, Toronto Port Lands Company, and Toronto Terminal Railway Company following a bicycle accident on a path crossing railway tracks.

The City and Toronto Port Lands Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the main action, while the Toronto Terminal Railway Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the City's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity.

The court found that conflicting expert opinions on causation and standard of care presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

Furthermore, the court determined that granting partial summary judgment on the crossclaim would risk inconsistent findings and injustice due to the intertwined nature of the issues.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

This endorsement addresses a personal injury action where counsel failed to adhere to agreed-upon timetables for expert reports and did not proceed with a consent motion to transfer the action.

The plaintiff's solicitor also failed to disclose a subsequent accident with overlapping injuries.

The court found counsel's conduct unacceptable and struck the action from the trial list, imposing conditions for its restoration.

The plaintiff law firm, Wendy Sokoloff Professional Corporation, brought a motion to remove Joseph Falconeri and his firm, Falconeri Munro Tucci LLP, as counsel of record for the co-defendants Wayde Mahoney, Kevin Mahoney, and Carol Mahoney.

The motion arose from a dispute over unpaid legal fees following a personal injury settlement, where the Sokoloff firm had initially represented the Mahoneys.

The Sokoloff firm alleged conflict of interest, champerty, and maintenance, citing an alleged indemnity agreement between Falconeri and the Mahoneys, and Falconeri's involvement in a prior professional negligence claim against Sokoloff.

The court, applying the principles for removing counsel, found that the integrity of the justice system required the removal of Falconeri Munro Tucci LLP as counsel for the Mahoney defendants due to a perceived conflict of interest, as Joseph Falconeri was a named defendant and a likely witness whose evidence would be necessary for controversial matters at trial.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for negligent misrepresentation and bad faith.

The plaintiff alleged that the insurer provided an erroneous statement of accident benefits paid during mediation, leading to a lower settlement.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

It determined that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable reliance on the misstatement or that such reliance caused detriment.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence of bad faith, as the misstatement was inadvertent.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a registrar's Order to Continue to add the deceased's spouse in her personal capacity as a Family Law Act claimant, correcting an accidental omission.

The defendants opposed, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The court applied Rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and granted the amendment nunc pro tunc, finding the delay was reasonably explained, the omission was inadvertent, the plaintiff moved promptly upon discovery, and there was no actual prejudice to the defendants.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence claims against their former lawyer, John Cardill, following a summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had determined that Cardill was retained only to assess the accounts of their previous lawyer, Donald Good, and therefore owed no duty of care regarding a potential negligence action against Good.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by narrowly focusing on the written retainer agreement without examining all surrounding circumstances.

The court held that where a lawyer's duty of care is alleged to extend beyond the retainer, the court must meticulously examine all relevant circumstances, including the nature of instructions and client sophistication.

The appeal was allowed and the action was directed to proceed to trial.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2004 and sought payment for two chiropractic treatment plans (OCF-18 and OCF-21) submitted near the end of the 10-year limitation period.

The insurer denied payment, arguing the treatments were not actually received within the 10-year period.

The arbitrator applied the test from Monks v. ING Insurance, finding that an expense is 'incurred' if its reasonable necessity and amount are determined with certainty before the limitation period expires.

Since the amounts were clearly outlined and reasonably certain before the 10-year mark, the expenses were deemed incurred and payable by the insurer.

The City of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment in a slip and fall case.

The plaintiff alleged the City created a hazard (protruding bolts) on land it owned but leased to Humber College.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove the City created the hazard while it had control of the premises (prior to 2004).

Furthermore, the City was not an "occupier" under the Occupiers' Liability Act at the time of the accident in 2010, as the lease transferred maintenance responsibility to Humber College.

The court also found no common law duty of care owed by the City given the passage of time, the tenant's explicit duties, and the obvious nature of the hazard.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action against the City was dismissed.

The appellant settled a tort claim arising from a motor vehicle accident on the advice of her former lawyer.

Years later, after retaining new counsel for her statutory accident benefits claim, she obtained a psychiatric report indicating her injuries met the catastrophic impairment threshold.

Her new counsel advised her to sue her former lawyer for recommending an improvident settlement.

The former lawyer successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discoverable until the appellant received legal advice that the settlement was improvident, as her former lawyer had never advised her of any error.