Danette Cheryl Cashman

This endorsement addresses costs following the dismissal of two summary judgment motions: one by the City of Toronto against the plaintiffs, and another by the Toronto Terminal Railway Company in its cross-claim against the City.

The court, exercising its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, ordered that the costs of both motions be "in the cause." This decision was based on the principle that the merits of the action had not yet been determined, the work product from the motions would be useful at trial, and the moving parties could still be successful at trial, making an immediate costs award premature.

The plaintiffs initiated an action against the City of Toronto, Toronto Port Lands Company, and Toronto Terminal Railway Company following a bicycle accident on a path crossing railway tracks.

The City and Toronto Port Lands Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the main action, while the Toronto Terminal Railway Company moved for summary judgment to dismiss the City's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity.

The court found that conflicting expert opinions on causation and standard of care presented genuine issues requiring a trial.

Furthermore, the court determined that granting partial summary judgment on the crossclaim would risk inconsistent findings and injustice due to the intertwined nature of the issues.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff brought an action against the municipality and its snow removal contractor after slipping and falling on a snowy sidewalk.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the municipality was not grossly negligent as it had a reasonable general policy for snow removal and responded reasonably to the specific snow event.

The court also found the municipality could rely on statutory defences under the City of Toronto Act, and that the contractor had complied with its contractual obligations.

The plaintiff was injured after striking a concrete curbstone on Steeles Avenue, the border between Toronto and Markham.

The plaintiff sued both municipalities, and Toronto cross-claimed against Markham.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against Markham, finding Toronto had exclusive jurisdiction over the boulevard where the curbstone originated, and ordered Toronto to pay Markham's costs via a Sanderson order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, confirming Toronto's exclusive jurisdiction and finding Markham owed no duty of care to Toronto.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, finding a Sanderson order premature since Toronto's liability to the plaintiff had not yet been determined at trial.

A municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence claim arising from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a curb stone that had moved from a grassy boulevard onto a roadway.

The dispute centered on which municipality had jurisdiction over the portion of the boulevard from which the curb stone originated.

Evidence including a survey established that the relevant land fell within the jurisdiction of another municipality that was responsible for roadway maintenance under the Municipal Act.

The court held that the moving municipality had no legal responsibility for the hazard and therefore owed no duty in respect of the curb stone.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the moving municipality.

The Applicant applied for arbitration regarding statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

Over a period of two and a half years, the Applicant failed to meaningfully participate in the process, missing multiple pre-hearing discussions and ultimately hanging up on the Arbitrator during a rescheduled telephone conference.

The Arbitrator found the Applicant's conduct to be high-handed, contemptuous of the arbitration process, and indicative of an abandonment of the application.

The application was dismissed as vexatious pursuant to Rule 68 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant, an 81-year-old man, was run over by his own vehicle, sustaining orthopaedic injuries.

He subsequently developed significant cognitive impairments.

The insurer denied catastrophic impairment benefits, arguing the cognitive decline was caused by a pre-existing subdural haematoma rather than the accident.

The arbitrator preferred the applicant's medical evidence, finding that the accident likely caused a minor head trauma that, combined with the pre-existing haematoma, resulted in brain edema and catastrophic impairment.

The applicant was awarded ongoing attendant care and housekeeping benefits.