Ryan D. Truax

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that apportioned 35% liability to them for a rear-end motor vehicle collision.

The respondent had rear-ended the appellants' vehicle after it allegedly stopped suddenly.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge made a palpable and overriding factual error by conflating the parties' evidence, leading to an unwarranted adverse credibility finding against the appellants.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the presumption of negligence against the rear driver, as a sudden stop within a lane of traffic does not constitute an unusual circumstance sufficient to rebut the reverse onus.

The appeal was allowed, and the respondent was found 100% liable.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Sudbury (Northeast Region) to the Toronto Region.

The plaintiff opposed the transfer and brought a cross-motion requesting that, if a transfer was necessary, it should be to Gore Bay in the Northeast Judicial Region.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the plaintiff’s choice of venue was reasonable.

The defendants did not establish that their proposed venue was significantly better.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving escaped cattle.

The court found no evidence of negligence, breach of duty of care, or public nuisance on the part of the defendants.

The decision emphasizes the requirement for the responding party to put their best foot forward on a summary judgment motion and clarifies that the mere escape of a farm animal is insufficient to establish liability without evidence of negligent action or inaction.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict from a motor vehicle accident trial where the jury found she suffered injuries but not a loss of competitive advantage.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were irreconcilable and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's verdict, finding it was supported by evidence and met the high standard of appellate review for jury findings.

The plaintiff, Laelana Ali, sought damages for loss of competitive advantage (LOCA) following a bicycle-car collision where liability was admitted.

The defendants brought a non-suit motion and argued that the LOCA claim should not be put to the jury due to insufficient medical evidence.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that despite thin evidence, there was enough for the jury to judicially consider the LOCA claim, as such claims are less amenable to precise calculations and do not strictly require expert medical evidence if corroborated by other testimony.

This motion sought approval of a settlement for a minor plaintiff who sustained a complex elbow fracture in a schoolyard slip and fall.

The defendants denied liability, raising issues of causation and damages.

The court approved the settlement of $32,133.90, finding it reasonable, fair, and in the minor plaintiff's best interests, consistent with Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The decision also approved counsel's fees and disbursements, noting a reduction in the contingency fee and a negotiated reduction of OHIP's subrogated claim.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave under Rule 48.04 to amend their Statement of Claim, move the action to the Simplified Rules, and strike the jury notice.

The action, arising from a motor vehicle accident, had already been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave.

Furthermore, the court held that the right to a jury trial is a substantive right and there was no advantage to moving the action to the Simplified Procedure at this late stage, especially given the plaintiffs' failure to serve expert reports.

The defendant Chris Campbell moved for summary judgment to dismiss the negligence action against him, arising from his dog biting an employee of a kennel.

The court considered whether there was a genuine issue for trial regarding foreseeability of harm and unreasonable conduct, and whether partial summary judgment was appropriate given the ongoing action against the co-defendant kennel.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding Campbell's negligence, as there was no evidence he knew of a prior minor incident, and the incident was unexpected.

The court also determined that granting partial summary judgment was in the interests of justice, as Campbell's liability was readily separable from the co-defendant's employer liability, and the co-defendant had withdrawn its cross-claim and did not oppose the motion.

The applicant, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company (RSA), sought an order compelling the respondent, Intact Financial Corporation (Intact), to contribute its proportionate share to the settlement of an underlying personal injury claim.

The core issue was whether Intact's liability for coverage was estopped by a previous decision by Mew J., which held Intact's policy to be excess coverage.

The court found that while the duty to defend was estopped, the ultimate question of coverage was not, as it was collateral to Mew J.'s earlier decision.

Applying Supreme Court and Court of Appeal guidance, the court determined that RSA's and Intact's policies provided primary coverage for different risks and were complementary, not overlapping, thus making "other insurance" clauses inapplicable.

Intact was ordered to reimburse RSA for its proportionate share of the settlement.

The third party insurer brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants for $50,000 in damages and $38,475.52 in costs, following a settlement with the plaintiff.

The court adjourned the motion for damages to allow the insurer to provide further evidence demonstrating that the $50,000 settlement amount was reasonable.

The court dismissed the request for actual costs, finding no authority or exceptional circumstances to support such an award.

The applicant sought judicial review of an appraisal decision regarding losses from a house fire, arguing the umpire exceeded his jurisdiction in valuing the contents and breached procedural fairness by failing to provide written reasons for the building's depreciation rate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the umpire's valuation of the contents was reasonable and did not determine legal entitlement.

The court also held that the appraisal process met procedural fairness requirements, as oral reasons were provided and written reasons were not requested.

The third party grandmother moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' claim that her negligence contributed to her grandson's injury from the defendants' dog.

The child was injured while walking with his grandmother in the neighbourhood.

The court found that even accepting the dog owner's version of events, the grandmother was not negligent as it was reasonable for her to rely on the owner's control of the dog.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the third party claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought an action against the municipality and its snow removal contractor after slipping and falling on a snowy sidewalk.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the municipality was not grossly negligent as it had a reasonable general policy for snow removal and responded reasonably to the specific snow event.

The court also found the municipality could rely on statutory defences under the City of Toronto Act, and that the contractor had complied with its contractual obligations.

The plaintiff tripped at the entrance of a store, sustaining injuries.

She sued the tenant (Swirls) and the landlord (Anastasios) under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial.

The court found no breach of the duty of care, noting the entrance was properly constructed and a warning sign was present, which the plaintiff admitted seeing.

The plaintiff's expert opinion on warning sign specifics (capitalization, color) was deemed illogical and moot.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against all defendants and Swirls' cross-claim against Anastasios were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, with the plaintiff bearing the majority.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking the production of various documents from the defendant insurer, including an independent claims adjuster's file, the Peel Mutual Insurance Company file, and the Dutton Brock LLP file, along with a further and better Affidavit of Documents.

The defendant claimed solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege over many of the requested documents.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the Dutton Brock file was protected by solicitor-client privilege and the Peel Mutual claims notes were protected by an enlarged definition of litigation privilege, as the current action against the insurer was considered to be "essentially the same legal combat" as the prior action against the insured, as per the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice).

The defendant appealed a Master's order granting leave to amend the statement of claim to add proposed contractor defendants in a trip and fall action after the limitation period.

The court held that the applicable appellate standard was correctness for legal error, with deference on factual and mixed findings absent palpable and overriding error.

Applying the add-party framework under Rule 5.04(2), the court found the Master properly identified and applied the governing principles, including the discretionary nature of the remedy and the plaintiffs' due diligence evidence.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.

On a summary judgment motion in a negligence action arising from two motor vehicle collisions and an alleged commercial host claim, the moving defendant sought dismissal of a co-defendant's crossclaim for contribution and indemnity after the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their direct claim against it.

The court rejected a technical argument that no valid crossclaim existed, holding that the insurer added under s. 258(14) of the Insurance Act had introduced the insured defendant's crossclaim into the main action.

Applying the Hryniak framework and Rule 20, the court held there was a genuine issue requiring a trial because the intoxicated driver's inconsistent but live evidence about alcohol service at the restaurant had to be weighed.

The court also declined to use enhanced summary judgment fact-finding powers or order a mini-trial, finding that doing so would not fairly and proportionately resolve the litigation as a whole.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that permitted a student-at-law to be present as a passive observer during a defence in-home future care costs assessment of the plaintiff, and that denied the defence expert's request to conduct a functional capacity evaluation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the motions judge properly exercised his discretion under Rule 33.

The court held there were no conflicting decisions on the matter and no reason to doubt the correctness of the order to warrant granting leave under Rule 62.02(4).

A third party in a motor vehicle negligence action brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a contribution and indemnity claim against him.

The motion arose from a collision involving two drivers where the only witnesses were the occupants of the vehicles and their versions of events were directly contradictory.

The court applied the test for summary judgment articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch and held that the case required the benefits of the trial process to properly assess credibility and draw factual inferences.

Given the absence of independent witnesses and physical evidence, credibility determinations could not be made on the motion record.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the third party claim was allowed to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on consent and awarded costs of $4,000 to each respondent.