Ryan D. Truax

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Sudbury (Northeast Region) to the Toronto Region.

The plaintiff opposed the transfer and brought a cross-motion requesting that, if a transfer was necessary, it should be to Gore Bay in the Northeast Judicial Region.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the plaintiff’s choice of venue was reasonable.

The defendants did not establish that their proposed venue was significantly better.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff’s action arising from a motor vehicle accident involving escaped cattle.

The court found no evidence of negligence, breach of duty of care, or public nuisance on the part of the defendants.

The decision emphasizes the requirement for the responding party to put their best foot forward on a summary judgment motion and clarifies that the mere escape of a farm animal is insufficient to establish liability without evidence of negligent action or inaction.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict from a motor vehicle accident trial where the jury found she suffered injuries but not a loss of competitive advantage.

The appellant argued the jury's answers were irreconcilable and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's verdict, finding it was supported by evidence and met the high standard of appellate review for jury findings.

The plaintiff, Laelana Ali, sought damages for loss of competitive advantage (LOCA) following a bicycle-car collision where liability was admitted.

The defendants brought a non-suit motion and argued that the LOCA claim should not be put to the jury due to insufficient medical evidence.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that despite thin evidence, there was enough for the jury to judicially consider the LOCA claim, as such claims are less amenable to precise calculations and do not strictly require expert medical evidence if corroborated by other testimony.

This motion sought approval of a settlement for a minor plaintiff who sustained a complex elbow fracture in a schoolyard slip and fall.

The defendants denied liability, raising issues of causation and damages.

The court approved the settlement of $32,133.90, finding it reasonable, fair, and in the minor plaintiff's best interests, consistent with Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The decision also approved counsel's fees and disbursements, noting a reduction in the contingency fee and a negotiated reduction of OHIP's subrogated claim.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking leave under Rule 48.04 to amend their Statement of Claim, move the action to the Simplified Rules, and strike the jury notice.

The action, arising from a motor vehicle accident, had already been set down for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances to justify granting leave.

Furthermore, the court held that the right to a jury trial is a substantive right and there was no advantage to moving the action to the Simplified Procedure at this late stage, especially given the plaintiffs' failure to serve expert reports.

The defendant Chris Campbell moved for summary judgment to dismiss the negligence action against him, arising from his dog biting an employee of a kennel.

The court considered whether there was a genuine issue for trial regarding foreseeability of harm and unreasonable conduct, and whether partial summary judgment was appropriate given the ongoing action against the co-defendant kennel.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding Campbell's negligence, as there was no evidence he knew of a prior minor incident, and the incident was unexpected.

The court also determined that granting partial summary judgment was in the interests of justice, as Campbell's liability was readily separable from the co-defendant's employer liability, and the co-defendant had withdrawn its cross-claim and did not oppose the motion.

The applicant, Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company (RSA), sought an order compelling the respondent, Intact Financial Corporation (Intact), to contribute its proportionate share to the settlement of an underlying personal injury claim.

The core issue was whether Intact's liability for coverage was estopped by a previous decision by Mew J., which held Intact's policy to be excess coverage.

The court found that while the duty to defend was estopped, the ultimate question of coverage was not, as it was collateral to Mew J.'s earlier decision.

Applying Supreme Court and Court of Appeal guidance, the court determined that RSA's and Intact's policies provided primary coverage for different risks and were complementary, not overlapping, thus making "other insurance" clauses inapplicable.

Intact was ordered to reimburse RSA for its proportionate share of the settlement.

The third party grandmother moved for summary judgment to dismiss the defendants' claim that her negligence contributed to her grandson's injury from the defendants' dog.

The child was injured while walking with his grandmother in the neighbourhood.

The court found that even accepting the dog owner's version of events, the grandmother was not negligent as it was reasonable for her to rely on the owner's control of the dog.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the third party claim was dismissed.

The plaintiff tripped at the entrance of a store, sustaining injuries.

She sued the tenant (Swirls) and the landlord (Anastasios) under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial.

The court found no breach of the duty of care, noting the entrance was properly constructed and a warning sign was present, which the plaintiff admitted seeing.

The plaintiff's expert opinion on warning sign specifics (capitalization, color) was deemed illogical and moot.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against all defendants and Swirls' cross-claim against Anastasios were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, with the plaintiff bearing the majority.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking the production of various documents from the defendant insurer, including an independent claims adjuster's file, the Peel Mutual Insurance Company file, and the Dutton Brock LLP file, along with a further and better Affidavit of Documents.

The defendant claimed solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege over many of the requested documents.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the Dutton Brock file was protected by solicitor-client privilege and the Peel Mutual claims notes were protected by an enlarged definition of litigation privilege, as the current action against the insurer was considered to be "essentially the same legal combat" as the prior action against the insured, as per the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling in Blank v. Canada (Minister of Justice).

A third party in a motor vehicle negligence action brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a contribution and indemnity claim against him.

The motion arose from a collision involving two drivers where the only witnesses were the occupants of the vehicles and their versions of events were directly contradictory.

The court applied the test for summary judgment articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch and held that the case required the benefits of the trial process to properly assess credibility and draw factual inferences.

Given the absence of independent witnesses and physical evidence, credibility determinations could not be made on the motion record.

The motion was therefore dismissed and the third party claim was allowed to proceed to trial.