No one appeared

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and awaited sentencing and a dangerous offender application.

His retained counsel was suspended by the Law Society and failed to communicate with the accused or assist in transferring the file.

Given the serious consequences facing the in-custody accused, the court appointed amicus curiae to assist the court and protect the accused's rights, and adjourned the matter.

The Supreme Court clarified bail principles under s. 515 of the Criminal Code, including strict adherence to the ladder principle and the limited role of cash bail.

It held the bail review judge erred by insisting on a combined cash-plus-surety release and by relying on speculation rather than evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal, reversed the constitutional declaration against s. 515(2)(e), and replaced the release order with a cash-only release on the same terms.

A judgment creditor sought disclosure of a mortgage discharge statement to enforce a writ of seizure and sale against debtors' property.

The appeal addressed whether federal privacy legislation barred disclosure absent express consent.

The Court held disclosure could be ordered under the court-order exception and that implied consent arose in the enforcement context once judgment and seizure steps were completed with notice.

The Court emphasized access to justice and rejected requiring additional formalistic motions where substantively identical relief was sought.

The appeal was allowed and the mortgagee was ordered to produce the statement.

On a statutory interpretation appeal concerning reserve land taxation, the appellant argued that a bylaw clause permitting consideration of restrictions placed on land use “by the band” excluded a lease restriction created in a Crown lease.

The Court held that the assessor could consider the golf-club use restriction when valuing the leased reserve lands for assessment purposes.

Reading the bylaw text, purpose, and legislative context together, the Court found the 1996 amendment narrowed qualifying restrictions but did not bar this restriction.

The Court also held the Crown’s historical statutory role in reserve leasing did not negate that the restriction was placed by the band in context.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In an insolvency appeal, the Court considered whether provincial farm-protection preconditions conflicted with the national receivership regime under the federal bankruptcy statute.

The majority held there was no operational conflict and no frustration of federal purpose, emphasizing a restrained paramountcy analysis and cooperative federalism.

The purpose of the federal receivership provision was read narrowly as creating a national appointment mechanism, not guaranteeing a uniformly rapid timeline free from provincial conditions.

The provincial 150-day process and mediation framework therefore remained operative when a secured creditor sought appointment of a receiver over farm-related assets.

A dissent would have found the provincial scheme frustrated federal objectives of timeliness, flexibility, and emergency responsiveness.

The plaintiff brought an undefended action against her former employer and its manager for wrongful dismissal, sexual assault, battery, and harassment.

The manager repeatedly sexually assaulted and harassed the plaintiff, who was a vulnerable single mother.

Following the assaults, the plaintiff was terminated without cause in a harsh and vindictive manner.

The court found the manager liable for battery, breach of fiduciary duty, and human rights violations, and held the corporate employer vicariously liable.

The court awarded substantial general, aggravated, and punitive damages, as well as damages for wrongful dismissal and a Family Law Act claim for the plaintiff's daughter.

Following a successful commercial application for the return of a deposit, the applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis relying on a pre‑litigation letter requesting the return of the deposit.

The respondents opposed costs, arguing the case was uncertain, settlement options had been offered, and the application procedure was unusual.

The court held that the applicant was entirely successful and that the June 30, 2014 letter constituted a valid offer to settle within the meaning of Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because the judgment obtained was more favourable than the offer, the cost consequences of Rule 49.10 applied.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded but reduced from the amount claimed to reflect that Rule 49 provides substantial indemnity, not full recovery.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

The plaintiffs, senior members of the government of Bermuda, brought a motion to strike certain paragraphs of the defendant's Statement of Defence in a defamation action.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendant architect falsified cheques to make it appear they received kickbacks from a construction project.

The impugned paragraphs detailed the history of the construction project, including the selection of the contractor and ongoing payment disputes.

The court dismissed the motion for the most part, finding the paragraphs were relevant and had potential probative value in defending against the allegations of fraud, though two specific portions were struck on consent.