Property Tax Assessment

The court considered costs following the resolution of four building permit appeals brought by Rothmar Holdings Inc. against the City of Cornwall.

After the City issued permits for all properties before the hearing, the parties argued only costs.

Rothmar sought substantial indemnity costs, alleging bad faith by the City, while the City sought partial indemnity costs or no costs.

The court declined to award costs to either party, finding it inappropriate to investigate the merits, apply costs factors, or determine relative success in the absence of findings on the substantive issues.

The court also declined to award costs of a preliminary evidentiary motion.

The applicant challenged the City of Mississauga's Nuisance Weed and Tall Grass Control By-law, arguing it was ultra vires and unconstitutional as an infringement of his right to free expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the by-law did infringe on freedom of expression, it was justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The by-law's objectives of public safety, health, and aesthetics were pressing and substantial, and its restrictions were minimally impairing and proportionate.

The court also rejected claims of improper by-law enforcement, lack of qualified inspectors, and insufficient appeal processes.

This case is an appeal under s. 25 of the Building Code Act, 1992, concerning five compliance orders issued by the chief building official.

The appellant challenged two of the orders, arguing that the official erred in finding a "dwelling" on the premises.

The court affirmed all orders, holding that the official was only required to determine if the structures were "buildings" under the Act, not necessarily "dwellings," and found no reversible error.

The decision also clarified the applicable standard of review for statutory appeals and the court's limited jurisdiction regarding tort claims.

The applicant, Luke Vitale, sought costs after successfully appealing a City of Toronto Order to Comply regarding his property's dwelling units.

Although Vitale's application was granted on terms, the court found a fatal flaw in the City's order.

Despite Vitale's technical victory, the court noted his unnecessary maligning of the City and mutual miscommunications.

The City sought no costs.

The court ultimately ordered no costs, deeming it a technical victory for Vitale but satisfying the City's concerns, concluding that no order as to costs was appropriate.

Claude Laporte appealed his conviction for failing to comply with an Order to Comply under the Building Code Act.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding his testimony, incorrect interpretation of "build" and "owner" under the Building Code Act, improper judicial interference by raising the principle of collateral attack, and an erroneous consideration of the defence of officially induced error.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, confirming the applicability of the collateral attack principle to administrative orders, and rejecting the officially induced error defence.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b), 25.06, and 25.11, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous or vexatious.

The self-represented plaintiff did not appear.

The court found the claim incomprehensible, lacking material facts, and failing to plead a viable cause of action, particularly against individual municipal employees without bad faith allegations.

The motion was granted, and the statement of claim was struck.

However, the plaintiff was granted one final opportunity to bring a motion to file a fresh, compliant statement of claim within 30 days, failing which the action would be dismissed.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant, Lynn Larabie, as executrix of her parents' estate, appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her application to quash a zoning by-law passed by the Township of Moonbeam.

The by-law rezoned an adjacent property to permit expansion.

The appellant argued the Township failed to provide proper statutory notice under the Planning Act and regulations, and acted in bad faith.

The application judge found the by-law procedurally illegal due to notice failures but exercised discretion not to quash it, finding no bad faith and negligible broader consequences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding no error in the bad faith analysis or the exercise of discretion not to quash the by-law, despite the procedural illegality.

The respondent sought to re-open a previous hearing to advance a constitutional challenge to the Township's zoning by-law, asserting the property is unceded Indigenous territory.

The initial application by the Township for demolition of buildings on the respondent's property had been granted, but the order had not yet been signed, issued, or entered.

The respondent had been self-represented at the original hearing.

The court granted the motion to re-open, finding it was in the interests of justice given the respondent's prior unfamiliarity with court rules, the novelty of the constitutional issue, the lack of prejudice to the applicant (as no enforcement steps had been taken), and the fact that the original order was not yet finalized, allowing for broader judicial discretion.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.

The applicant, the Integrity Commissioner, was found substantially successful in the underlying application, despite not succeeding on all allegations.

The court considered the applicant's claim for partial or substantial indemnity costs and the respondent's arguments regarding excessive time and junior counsel fees.

The court awarded the applicant $25,000.00 for fees plus $2,125.42 for disbursements, including HST, finding the respondent's conduct intentional and persistent, which warranted more than a nominal costs order.

The applicant sought a declaration that his property's seasonal use as a "camping and recreational compound" with a travel trailer constituted a legal non-conforming use under the Planning Act.

The respondent, an adjacent landowner, counter-applied for a declaration that the use was not lawful.

The court found the relevant zoning by-law clear and unambiguous, permitting only "park" or "open pavilion" uses in the "Hazard Land Zone," thereby prohibiting the applicant's recreational vehicle use.

The applicant failed to establish a legal non-conforming use or that the municipality was estopped from enforcing the by-law due to "officially induced error," as the municipal officials who provided advice lacked the authority to bind the municipality on zoning matters.

The application was dismissed, and the counter-application was granted.

A private prosecution was brought against the defendants for erecting a fence that violated height restrictions under the Township of South Stormont Fence By-Law.

The defendants claimed the fence replaced a pre-existing hedge under section 9.2 of the by-law or was exempt under section 9.3 by council resolution.

The court found neither exemption applied.

The defendants were convicted of four counts relating to fence height violations in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the by-law.

Two counts were dismissed.

The court rejected defenses of officially-induced error and due diligence, finding the defendants had clear notice of non-compliance and failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation despite numerous warnings and opportunities to comply.

The appellant sought a declaration that a zoning by-law provision limiting gross leasable commercial floor area for a "community shopping centre" to 4,645 m² (50,000 ft²) did not apply to developments with five or fewer separate spaces for lease or occupancy.

The appellant argued that "community shopping centre" must be a type of "shopping centre" as defined in the by-law, which requires six or more separated spaces.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that "community shopping centre" was a distinct term from "shopping centre" and that the provision applied regardless of the number of units.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the application judge's contextual interpretation of the by-law in light of the Official Plan.

The plaintiff, Marie Bagoo, sued the City of Toronto for negligence after a slip and fall on an unrepaired sidewalk on Centre Island.

The City failed to defend the action and was noted in default.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment under Rule 19.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the City liable for failing to maintain the sidewalk and prevent the trip hazard, which caused the plaintiff's injuries.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff for special and general damages, along with costs.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The applicants sought a declaration that a by-law banning waterpipes was invalid.

At the outset of submissions, the applicants moved for leave to file a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations were completed.

The respondents opposed.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the document attached to the affidavit was not a "public document" under common law or the Evidence Act, and the applicants failed to meet the high threshold under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The evidence was not responsive to matters raised on cross-examination, and no reasonable explanation for the late filing was provided.

The appellant corporation sought to demolish a heritage-designated building it owned.

The City of Hamilton rejected the application and sent written notice of rejection to the sole director of the corporation at his residential address rather than to the corporation's registered address.

The appellant argued that the notice was improperly served under section 67(1)(b) of the Ontario Heritage Act, which requires service to the "last known address" of the person.

The appellant contended that the failure to serve at the registered address meant the municipality failed to comply with the statutory service requirement, triggering a deeming provision that would constitute deemed consent to the demolition application.

The application judge found that the city had taken positive steps to give notice and that the notice was actually received by the sole directing mind of the corporation.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision on the unique facts of the case.

A utility company and rural municipality disputed cost-sharing for gas pipeline relocation necessitated by municipal drainage works.

The utility sought 35% cost contribution from the municipality under a franchise agreement, while the municipality argued the utility should bear the full cost under section 26 of the Drainage Act.

The application judge held that section 26 of the Act overrode the franchise agreement's cost-sharing provisions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not prohibit contracting out of its cost-allocation provisions and that the franchise agreement's cost-sharing mechanism applies to drainage works undertaken by the municipality.