Property Tax Assessment

The Town of Caledon sought a declaration that the respondents failed to comply with a consent order requiring removal of structures, trucks, trailers, and equipment from their property.

The respondents argued substantial compliance and requested more time.

The court interpreted the order as requiring removal of all such items, not just those associated with a transportation depot, and found the respondents in breach.

The respondents were given 60 days to comply, after which the Town may remove the items at the respondents’ expense.

The City of Toronto sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, relying on section 42(4)(b) of the City of Toronto Act, which bars actions for damages caused by the condition of an "untravelled portion of a highway." The court found that the area where the plaintiff was injured was not intended for ordinary or normal use, nor commonly or additionally used by the public, and therefore fell within the statutory bar.

The action against the City of Toronto was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

The Township of Georgian Bay applied, without notice, for an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act permitting its Council members to participate in decision-making on certain matters despite declared conflicts.

The court granted the order, subject to judicial oversight for settlement approvals and indemnification issues, due to the impossibility of forming a quorum.

The decision discusses the statutory remedy of necessity and the appropriate controls to address conflicts in small municipalities.

The trial concerned a third-party claim by the defendant, Cristy Mitton, against the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and its contractor, Carillion Canada Inc., alleging negligent winter maintenance of Highway 41.

Mitton had previously settled the main action with the plaintiff, Ronald Busch, admitting 1% liability.

The court found that Highway 41 was in a state of non-repair due to being partially snow-packed, and this condition caused Mitton to lose control.

However, the MTO successfully discharged its onus by proving its winter maintenance operations were reasonable, including the decision to use salt despite low temperatures, as it was a judgment call aimed at achieving bare pavement.

The court dismissed the third-party claim, finding no liability on the MTO.

The Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami brought a motion seeking leave to file an additional affidavit (Picard Affidavit) after cross-examinations were completed, pursuant to Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The affidavit contained evidence regarding the historical land use of the property, discovered during an additional search requested by the respondents.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing it was fresh evidence and would cause non-compensable prejudice.

The court granted leave, finding that the proposed evidence was relevant, responded to matters raised during cross-examinations, would not result in non-compensable prejudice, and the applicant provided a reasonable explanation for its late discovery.

The applicants, who purchased a residential property, sought declaratory relief against the City of Cambridge after the City denied municipal services, asserting the property's transfer violated the Planning Act due to a 1950 by-law.

This by-law deemed the original plan of subdivision not to be a registered plan for subdivision control purposes and was registered in the Registry office but not noted on the Land Titles parcel register after conversion.

The court found that the applicants were entitled to rely on the Land Titles register's "mirror" and "curtain" principles, as the 1950 by-law directly affected title and thus constituted an encumbrance requiring registration on the Land Titles register to be effective against bona fide purchasers without actual notice.

Furthermore, the by-law, as a "claim" under the Registry Act, had expired due to the City's failure to register a notice of claim within the statutory period.

The City's "floodgates" argument was rejected.

The application for declaratory relief was granted, affirming the validity of the applicants' title and transfer.

The Municipality of Mississippi Mills brought an application seeking a declaration that Steven Maynard is a vexatious litigant under ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

C.43, due to his persistent and groundless court proceedings and vexatious conduct.

The Municipality sought orders to stay pending actions and prevent further proceedings without leave.

Maynard denied his actions were vexatious, claiming to act as a responsible citizen ensuring municipal compliance with planning laws.

The court granted the application, finding Maynard to be a vexatious litigant, and imposed orders to stay existing proceedings and require leave for future actions, with a specific exclusion for a slip-and-fall small claims case.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent their neighbours from removing an existing fence and constructing a new one on a municipal laneway.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions (serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

The court found no serious issue to be tried as the respondents had no current intention to interfere with the fence, especially after the City clarified its policy against new encroachments.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed, though leave to amend the Statement of Claim was granted.

The applicant sought a determination on whether an "air parcel" constitutes assessable "land" under section 1(1) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

A.31.

The court concluded that an air parcel, as defined in a strata plan, is not "land" for the purposes of the Act until a physical structure is affixed to the ground.

The decision emphasized that the statutory definition of "land" is paramount, not common law or conveyancing practices, and that legislative amendment would be required to include air parcels for taxation.

The applicant's request for an order was granted, and costs were awarded.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Regional Municipality of Waterloo By-Law 16-023 (as amended by By-Law 18-023): offering tow truck services within 200 metres of an accident scene and positioning a tow truck within 200 metres of an accident scene.

The defendant challenged the validity of the amended by-law as inconsistent with the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that the amended by-law conflicted with section 177(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, which provides an exception for towing services in emergencies.

The court determined that an accident constitutes an emergency and that the by-law's complete prohibition on tow truck presence within 200 metres of an accident scene eliminated the provincial emergency exception.

The court found the amended by-law invalid and dismissed both charges.

The appellants, owners of several hookah lounges in the Regional Municipality of Peel, challenged by-law No. 30-2016, which prohibits waterpipe smoking in enclosed public places, enclosed workplaces, and restaurant or bar patios.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires the Region, conflicted with provincial occupational health and safety legislation, and was enacted in bad faith.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the by-law was a valid exercise of municipal authority aimed at protecting public health and safety.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

The applicant sought an order declaring the City's removal of a rooftop sign illegal and a referral to a Master for damages.

The City argued the removal was lawful due to the sign's conversion to an "Off Premise Sign" without proper permits under provincial and municipal by-laws, and that the sign was not "lawfully erected" for grandfathering purposes.

The court found the application raised complex issues of statutory interpretation, Charter rights concerning commercial expression, and evidentiary needs that were unsuitable for an application.

The court ordered the application to be converted into an action to allow for full discovery, expert evidence, and a proper adjudication of liability and damages.

The Corporation of the Town of Caledon brought a motion for directions regarding an appeal by Joseph Michael Bozzelli and Amanda Bozzelli under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The motion sought clarification on the proper procedural rule (Rule 61, 38, or 62 of the Rules of Civil Procedure) and whether the appeal would be a de novo hearing allowing viva voce evidence.

The court determined that Rule 62 was the appropriate procedural rule, supplemented by Rule 38 by analogy, and that the appeal would proceed as a hearing de novo.

However, the court ruled that the hearing would be on a paper record, without viva voce evidence, limiting additional evidence to affidavits concerning compliance time for the underlying property standards order.

The appellant, a vendor of undeveloped land, appealed a Superior Court judgment requiring it to pay $407,582 in development-related costs as a condition of obtaining a severance consent from the municipality.

The Agreement of Purchase and Sale contained a clause permitting the vendor to refuse onerous or unreasonable severance conditions.

The application judge decided the case on the basis of a zoning clause not raised by the parties, constituting a denial of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that requiring a non-developing vendor to pay development costs was unreasonable under the contract, and that the respondent purchaser bore the obligation to satisfy such conditions or terminate the agreement.

The applicant sought declarations that the City of Hamilton was deemed to have consented to a demolition application under the Ontario Heritage Act due to insufficient notice, and orders for the Chief Building Official to process a demolition permit application.

The core issue was whether the City's notice of refusal, sent to a director's residence rather than the corporation's registered office or the address on the second application, constituted sufficient notice.

The court, relying on Supreme Court of Canada precedent, found that Section 67 of the OHA does not provide an exhaustive list of notice methods and that the City had taken a "positive step" to give notice, which was actually received and acted upon by the applicant's sole director.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The appellants sought an injunction against the respondent to prevent the operation of a restaurant at a neighbouring property.

The appellants contended that the property was not zoned for commercial use and that the City of Toronto had acted improperly in issuing a building permit.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that the appellants' objection was based on confusion regarding the property's municipal address.

The legal address was zoned to permit restaurants.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the application judge erred in allowing Toronto to appear as amicus curiae because Toronto had been an adverse party in previous proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was proper for the application judge to allow Toronto to make submissions and that there was no merit to the underlying zoning issue.

Hard Luck Inc., operating as a live music venue bar, was charged with five provincial offences under the City of Toronto Municipal Code: operating an entertainment establishment without a licence (counts 1 and 3), causing noise likely to disturb residents (counts 2 and 5), and permitting sound from electronic devices to project beyond the property (count 4).

The prosecution relied on testimony from a resident living approximately one city block away who documented extensive noise complaints over several months, and a provincial offences officer who observed and heard noise emanating from the premises.

The defendant presented evidence of soundproofing efforts and expert acoustic testing suggesting minimal noise projection.

The court found the defendant guilty on counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, but acquitted on count 3 based on a due diligence defence.

The court rejected the defendant's acoustic expert evidence as having little probative value given the temporal gap between testing and the alleged offences, and found the resident's testimony credible and compelling.

The Corporation of the City of Guelph was charged with failing to ensure that a wall in a workplace was capable of supporting all loads to which it may be subjected, contrary to section 25(1)(e) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The charge arose from the collapse of a privacy wall in a women's washroom at a municipal park in 2009, which resulted in the death of a fourteen-year-old student.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt because the charging section incorporated the outdated concept of "allowable unit stresses," which had been superseded by limits states design methodology in 1997.

The court also found that even if the actus reus had been established, the City had exercised due diligence in issuing the building permit by reasonably relying on the professional stamps of the architect and engineer, and that the City was not required to conduct further investigation based on the engineer's involvement in a prior unrelated project.