Donald Gregory Mitchell

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicants sought leave to appeal decisions of the Assessment Review Board that applied issue estoppel to dismiss their property tax assessment appeals.

The applicants attempted to re-open the 2016 valuation of their land based on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their profitability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, holding that subsequent market changes to business results do not constitute a change in the 'state and condition' of the land and are not a valid basis to re-open an assessment.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax classification of lands used for gravel pit operations.

The Board had classified more of the licensed land as 'industrial' rather than 'residential', interpreting the relevant regulation to include lands used for activities integral to extraction, such as processing, stockpiling, and movement of machinery.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly interpreted the legislation in a manner consistent with the operational realities of mining and properly applied the statutory classification day based on the land's function.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory decision of the Assessment Review Board that denied its request to withdraw its property tax appeals.

After the applicant appealed its 2017 and 2018 assessments, it sold the property for significantly more than the assessed value.

The respondents subsequently gave notice of their intention to seek a higher assessment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision that the applicant could not withdraw its appeal as of right once notice of a higher assessment was provided.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the valuation of a residential property.

The Board had found that MPAC failed to meet its burden of proving the property's current value and, as a result, fixed the assessment at the last uncontested value rather than determining the current value.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's approach was contrary to the Assessment Act, which strictly requires the Board to determine the current value of the property.

The matter was remitted back to the Board.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying thirty-two natural gas gate station properties as Industrial Property Class rather than Commercial Property Class.

The Board found that adding a legally required odorant to natural gas constituted 'processing' because it changed the product's character and made it more marketable.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that a legal requirement to add an odorant to permit the gas to be legally sold renders the gas more marketable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that it was exempt from municipal taxes on certain railway lands under s. 315 of the Municipal Act.

The appellant argued the lands were leased to a third party for valuable consideration.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the agreements between the parties created a business relationship akin to a joint venture, not a lease, as they did not grant exclusive possession.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the assessment of a commercial office building.

The Board had reduced the property's current value to achieve equity with similar lands in the vicinity pursuant to s. 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court determined that the appropriate standard of review for the Board's interpretation of its home statute is reasonableness, departing from older jurisprudence that applied correctness.

The Court found the Board's methodology and interpretation were reasonable given the evidence presented, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant railway company sought a declaration that its railway right‑of‑way lands were exempt from municipal taxation under s. 315(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, on the basis that the lands were leased to another entity for valuable consideration.

The court examined the contractual arrangements between the railway owner, a rail users’ consortium, and a licensed rail operator governing the operation and maintenance of the railway line.

Applying principles distinguishing leases from licences, the court held the agreements did not grant exclusive possession or create a landlord‑tenant relationship but instead resembled a joint venture or operational arrangement.

The court further found that the consortium did not pay rent or other valuable consideration within the meaning of the statute.

As a result, the railway lands were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a property tax exemption for premises it leases in four buildings.

The appellant argued that section 10 of the YMCA Act, which exempts 'buildings, lands... of the said association', should be interpreted broadly to include leased premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a leasehold interest is not 'land' or 'property of' the association within the meaning of the Assessment Act and the YMCA Act.

The exemption requires an ownership interest, and the plain meaning of the statute does not extend to leased properties.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the court addressed costs submissions from the defendants.

The Township of Puslinch sought costs previously fixed at $23,400, which the plaintiff challenged as excessive and duplicative.

The court accepted that a portion of the Township’s costs duplicated a prior motion award and reduced the amount accordingly.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the award should be limited due to the plaintiff’s financial circumstances.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation also sought costs for the action and motion, which the court found reasonable in light of the extensive materials and history of the proceeding.

The appellant, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, appealed a decision exempting certain machinery and equipment at hydro-electric generating stations from real property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by applying the rejected 'integration test' to characterize penstocks and surge tanks as equipment rather than structures, and by finding that maintenance and safety items were used for producing electric power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the holistic approach from Metals Alloys and Nabisco, and correctly concluded that items need not be directly involved in the transformation of water to electricity to qualify for the exemption.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision directing a rehearing of a property tax assessment appeal.

The Divisional Court held that the matter should proceed as an appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act rather than a judicial review, to preserve the court's gate-keeping function.

Converting the application to an appeal, the court granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by concluding there was a procedural fairness violation.

The Board had admitted the landowner's evidence but gave it no weight, which is a matter of evidentiary weight, not procedural fairness.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that premises occupied by the Hospital for Sick Children Foundation were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings that the Foundation was a tenant under the Assessment Act and that there was no shared patrimony between the Hospital and the Foundation that would extend the hospital's tax exemption to the Foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

In an application concerning hydro-electric property tax exemptions under section 3(1), paragraph 18 of the Assessment Act, the court determined that most disputed station components qualified as machinery and equipment used for producing electricity for sale to the general public.

The court rejected a narrow interpretation requiring direct transformation use and held all power produced at the stations met the sale-to-general-public requirement.

The court also held the applicant could not rely on paragraph 17 as an alternative exemption route.

Due conflicting expert evidence, the scope of exempt foundations required further expert process and a trial on that issue.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board dismissing her property assessment appeals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is discretionary and the applicant failed to pursue the statutory right of appeal in a timely manner without explanation.

Furthermore, the application lacked merit as the Board reasonably dismissed the appeals after the applicant repeatedly failed to comply with rules regarding the Statement of Issues despite receiving proper notice.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision invalidating assessments made under s. 33(1) of the Assessment Act.

MPAC had assessed a fully-occupied residential property as 'vacant land' and later re-assessed it to add the 'omitted' building.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that no land liable to assessment had been omitted.

MPAC had identified 293 individual apartment units and assigned each a unique roll number, meaning the building was not omitted simply because MPAC failed to put a current value on it.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision declaring that properties leased by the Crown to non-profit Harbour Authorities for nominal rent were exempt from property taxation.

MPAC argued the Harbour Authorities paid valuable consideration through services and maintenance obligations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the services did not constitute a profit to the Crown.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Harbour Authorities shared an identity of patrimony with the Crown, entitling them to the same tax exemption.

Following a successful appeal regarding the interpretation of 'fee simple, if unencumbered' for property assessment purposes, the appellants (Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto) sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued the claimed fees were excessive and that the appellants should have coordinated their submissions.

The court found the issues complex, the amounts at stake substantial, and no unnecessary overlap in arguments.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs at $70,500 for fees and counsel fees for each appellant, plus their respective disbursements.