David Gordon Fleet

The appellant, a religious organization, appealed a decision affirming that its properties, primarily used for tai chi classes, were not exempt from property tax as "places of worship" under the Assessment Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the tai chi classes, while integral to the organization's religion, were not primarily "worship" from the perspective of the participants, and that a contemplative garden and sales area were also not tax-exempt.

The court emphasized an objective "primary purpose" test for tax exemptions, considering the intentions of participants, not solely the organizers.

The appellants appealed a decision quashing a property assessment against the respondent for advertising displays at Pearson International Airport.

The lower court had found that the respondent was not an occupant and that the assessment was arbitrary and discriminatory.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent was an occupant under the Assessment Act as it had actual occupation, exclusive possession, value, and permanence.

The court also held that the doctrine of paramount occupancy did not apply, or alternatively, that the respondent was the paramount occupier.

Finally, the court found no evidence that the assessment corporation acted arbitrarily or discriminatorily.

The applicant, Clear Channel, held a non-exclusive licence to install and maintain advertising displays at Pearson Airport.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) assessed Clear Channel as a taxable tenant of the Crown under section 18(1) of the Assessment Act.

Clear Channel brought an application arguing it was a licensee, not a tenant.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Greater Toronto Airports Authority (GTAA) retained total control over the premises and paramount occupancy, while Clear Channel merely provided a service.

The court concluded Clear Channel was not a tenant and quashed the assessments.

The City of Mississauga, MPAC, and GTAA appealed a decision declaring that Exchange Corporation Canada Inc. was not a tenant of land owned by the Crown and therefore not liable to pay realty taxes for its space at Pearson International Airport.

Exchange cross-appealed the finding that its space was not an 'eligible property' under the Municipal Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in concluding Exchange was a licensee rather than a tenant, and dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding that the property was not an 'eligible property'.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision of the Assessment Review Board classifying a gas gate station property as industrial rather than commercial under Ontario Regulation 282/98.

The applicant argued that its primary business at the property was the distribution of natural gas and that the addition of odorant to the gas did not constitute “processing” within the meaning of the regulation.

The court held that the Board reasonably concluded that the addition of odorant constituted a significant qualitative change necessary for the gas to be legally distributed and therefore amounted to processing connected with production of a saleable product.

Applying the deferential standard applicable to leave applications under the Assessment Act, the court found no sufficient reason to doubt the correctness of the Board’s decision and no issue of sufficient legal importance to warrant review by the Divisional Court.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application to quash a new construction notice and recalculated property tax bills issued by the respondent municipality.

The municipality had failed to issue the notice within the 60-day period prescribed by s. 331(9) of the Municipal Act, 2001, delaying the billing by several years due to software limitations.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's finding that the word 'shall' in s. 331(9) is directory, not mandatory.

A mandatory interpretation would frustrate the statutory purpose of taxing comparable properties equally and grant the appellant a perpetual tax holiday, whereas a directory interpretation fulfilled the legislative intent without causing significant prejudice.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the interpretation of property class regulations.

The moving party argued the ARB ignored the clear wording of the regulations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the ARB's decision, as the ARB properly applied a teleological approach to statutory interpretation consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The appellant acquired an existing hotel and spent $39 million to gut and redevelop it, leaving only the structural elements intact.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation increased the property's current value assessment, treating the redevelopment as an 'alteration, enlargement or improvement' under the Municipal Act rather than the 'erection' of a new building.

The appellant appealed, arguing the retrofit should be considered an 'erection' to benefit from a statutory cap on property taxes for new properties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that based on the ordinary meaning of the words and the appellant's own characterization of the project for building permit purposes, the retrofit was an alteration and not the erection of a building.

A stated case was brought before the Divisional Court regarding whether a municipality's Property Negotiator/Appraiser had the authority to file assessment complaints without prior specific authorization from the Municipal Council.

The Court held that while the act of filing the complaint was purely administrative and authorized by by-law, the decision to pursue the appeal required authorization or ratification by Council within a reasonable time.

Because the Council's resolution attempted to delegate the decision-making power rather than ratify the administrative action, the Court found the process deficient and concluded there were no valid complaints before the Assessment Review Board.

The appellants, anchor tenants in shopping centres, challenged the constitutionality of shortfall recovery provisions in the Municipal Act.

These provisions allowed commercial landlords to recoup property tax shortfalls from tenants.

The appellants argued this constituted indirect taxation, which is ultra vires the Province under section 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions merely regulate the pre-existing transferability of a true land tax, which remains a valid direct tax.