Diana W. Dimmer

The appellant municipality challenged provincial legislation that reduced Toronto City Council's ward structure from 47 to 25 wards mid-election campaign, arguing it violated the Charter's freedom of expression guarantee and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

The majority held that the appellant's claim was a positive rights claim governed by the Baier framework, requiring demonstration of radical frustration of expression effectively precluding meaningful expression, a threshold not met where candidates had 69 days to re-orient their campaigns under the new structure.

The majority further held that unwritten constitutional principles cannot serve as independent bases for invalidating legislation, and that the democratic principle cannot be used to narrow provincial authority over municipalities under s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the timing of the legislation violated s. 2(b) and that Ontario offered no pressing and substantial justification for making the changes during an ongoing election.

The applicants, commercial real estate developers, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Toronto Council to deny their applications for property tax rebate grants under a community improvement plan by-law.

The applicants argued that because their projects met the threshold eligibility criteria, the City was required to approve the grants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the by-law and governing legislation conferred broad discretion on the Council to consider other factors, including whether the grants were economically necessary for the projects to proceed.

The Court also found no denial of procedural fairness and awarded costs to the City.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeals did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with standard practice, no reasons were provided.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The Ontario legislature enacted the Better Local Government Act, 2018, which reduced Toronto City Council from 47 to 25 councillors and changed ward boundaries in the middle of a municipal election campaign.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing it violated section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (freedom of expression) and unwritten constitutional principles.

The application judge found the Act violated section 2(b) and allowed the application.

On appeal, the majority (D.M. Miller J.A., with Tulloch and Harvison Young JJ.A. concurring) allowed the appeal and upheld the Act as constitutional.

The majority held that section 2(b) does not guarantee effective expression, does not require government to maintain platforms for expression, and does not incorporate the right to vote from section 3 of the Charter.

The majority also rejected arguments based on unwritten constitutional principles and jurisdictional limits in section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

MacPherson J.A. (with Nordheimer J.A. concurring) dissented, finding the Act infringed section 2(b) by interfering with freedom of expression during an active election and that the infringement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed a Superior Court decision that declared provisions of Bill 5 (Better Local Government Act, 2018) unconstitutional for violating freedom of expression rights under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Bill 5 reduced Toronto's municipal wards from 47 to 25 mid-election.

The application judge found that the mid-campaign change substantially interfered with candidates' ability to communicate their political messages and violated voters' right to effective representation.

The Court of Appeal granted a stay of the lower court's order pending appeal, finding a strong likelihood that the application judge erred in law and that the appeal would succeed.

The court held that Bill 5 does not limit or restrict candidates' messages and that the right to effective representation falls under s. 3 (democratic rights), not s. 2(b) (freedom of expression), and s. 3 does not apply to municipal elections.

The province enacted Bill 5, reducing Toronto wards from 47 to 25, mid-municipal election.

Applicants challenged its constitutionality.

The court found Bill 5 violated candidates' and voters' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as it substantially interfered with campaign communication and denied effective representation due to increased ward sizes.

The violation was not justified under s. 1, as the legislative objectives (better decision-making, voter parity) were not pressing and substantial enough to warrant mid-election implementation, nor was minimal impairment demonstrated.

The impugned provisions were declared unconstitutional and set aside, requiring the election to proceed with 47 wards.

The City of Toronto and its Clerk brought an application for declaratory relief regarding the coming into force of by-laws establishing a 47-ward structure for the 2018 municipal election and the resulting composition of city council.

The respondents had previously raised concerns about a potential 'legal vacuum' in their unsuccessful motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, declining to exercise its discretion to grant declaratory relief because there was no live legal dispute between the parties, affected voters had not been given notice, and the application effectively sought an inappropriate advisory opinion.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision approving a 47-ward structure for the City of Toronto's municipal elections.

They argued the Board erred in law by failing to prioritize voter parity and by not requiring a corresponding by-law changing the composition of City Council.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's application of the Carter principles for effective representation.

The court held that the moving parties were improperly challenging findings of fact and that the Board lacked jurisdiction to determine council composition.

The City of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to shut down several medical cannabis dispensaries operating in violation of its zoning by-laws.

The dispensary operators brought a cross-motion seeking an interlocutory exemption from the by-laws and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, arguing that the existing regulatory scheme failed to provide reasonable access to medical cannabis.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the City, as there is a presumption that validly enacted laws serve the public interest.

The court granted the City's injunction but declined to issue an order directing police enforcement, noting the lack of statutory authority for such an order in a civil proceeding.

The operators' cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment finding it owed a duty of care to a class of tenants to provide statutory notices of rent reductions following property tax decreases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the municipality's specific interactions with the tenants through a pilot project created sufficient relational proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care.

The court further found no residual policy reasons to negate this duty, as the claim was limited to a specific group and did not conflict with the municipality's statutory obligations.

The municipality's failure to send the required notices breached the standard of care.

The applicant sought to quash a municipal by-law repealing a heritage designation affecting its hotel property and sought related relief concerning heritage property tax rebates.

The municipality had approved demolition of the original designated heritage building in 1996 but did not repeal the designation by-law until 2012, when it enacted a repealing by-law retroactive to the demolition approval date pursuant to the Ontario Heritage Act.

The applicant alleged illegality and bad faith, arguing that the municipality failed to provide prior notice and enacted the repeal retroactively to defeat its tax rebate claims.

The court held that prior notice was not required where the Act mandated repeal following approval of demolition, and that the retroactive repeal was a reasonable step to comply belatedly with statutory requirements.

The applicant failed to establish bad faith or illegality, and further failed to meet additional eligibility criteria for the heritage tax rebate program.

The appellant challenged the validity of a municipal election in Ward 9 of the City of Toronto, arguing that 275 Voters' List Change Request Forms (VLCRFs) were invalid because they lacked an election official's signature.

The application judge declared the election invalid, but the Divisional Court overturned this decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the substantive approach from the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Opitz.

The Court held that the omission of the election official's signature was a procedural irregularity that did not compromise the voters' underlying entitlement to vote, and therefore did not affect the result of the election.

During an appeal, an added party sought to raise a Charter challenge to provisions of the Municipal Elections Act.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the constitutional question, noting that the evidentiary record was woefully inadequate.

Furthermore, the order adding the party explicitly stated that it was not to unduly widen the scope of the appeal.

The court held that a Charter application could be brought at any time on a proper record, but it would not be heard in the current appeal nor referred back to the motions judge.

The Legislative Assembly of Ontario sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision approving a residential development that would allegedly interfere with the public's view of the Legislative Building.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test for leave to appeal and found that while the proposed appeal raised a question of law, there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB's decision regarding the interpretation of the Official Plan and Secondary Plan.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following a successful appeal regarding the interpretation of 'fee simple, if unencumbered' for property assessment purposes, the appellants (Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto) sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued the claimed fees were excessive and that the appellants should have coordinated their submissions.

The court found the issues complex, the amounts at stake substantial, and no unnecessary overlap in arguments.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs at $70,500 for fees and counsel fees for each appellant, plus their respective disbursements.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the properties should be valued as if vacant, treating all leases as encumbrances under the definition of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation was incorrect in law.

The Court found that a leasehold interest is an interest in land for assessment purposes, and the whole of the land must be assessed by valuing the totality of interests, including the value of leases in place, rather than just the owner's interest.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of six large office complexes in Toronto.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the statutory phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant, ignoring existing leases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's interpretation was wrong in law.

The Court held that the whole of the land must be assessed, and in the context of income-producing properties, 'fee simple, if unencumbered' means value calculated using market rents rather than actual rents, ensuring all interests in the land are valued.

The applicants, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto, brought motions for leave to appeal an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board concerning the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The central issue was the Board's interpretation of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' under the Assessment Act, which led the Board to value the properties as if vacant and untenanted.

The Divisional Court found there was reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's interpretation, noting it may be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and prior case law.

Leave to appeal was granted.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board which quashed its complaints regarding the property assessments of two properties.

The Board had found the City failed to comply with the notice provisions in s. 40(3) of the Assessment Act because it mailed the notices to the previous owner's address on the assessment roll despite knowing the properties had been sold.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the City acted reasonably and in good faith by using the address on the roll, which had not been revoked.

The Court found the Board erred in imposing a higher standard of inquiry on the municipality, set aside the decision, and remitted the complaints for a hearing on the merits.

The appellant was unsuccessful at trial, where the trial judge made no order as to costs due to her impecuniosity.

The appellant subsequently pursued an appeal and was again entirely unsuccessful.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the respondents, holding that they should not be deprived of their costs a second time despite the appellant's financial circumstances.