Richard P. Stephenson

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeals did not meet the three-part test for granting leave.

In accordance with standard practice, no reasons were provided.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (now LPAT) which adjourned the hearing of appeals regarding Official Plan Amendment 258 (OPA 258) until the City enacted a Development Permit System (DPS) by-law.

The City argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to effectively order the passage of a by-law and denied the City its statutory right to a hearing under the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board did not order the passage of a by-law but reasonably exercised its procedural discretion to adjourn the hearing to ensure it had the necessary evidence to properly assess the planning merits of OPA 258.

The Municipality of Port Hope was wholly successful on appeal and cross-appeal.

The applicants sought to avoid a costs award by arguing the matter was brought in a representative capacity on a matter of public interest involving novel legal issues.

The Court of Appeal rejected this submission, finding that the applicants acted to vindicate private financial interests and that the issues lacked significant societal impact.

The court awarded costs to the Municipality in the agreed-upon sum of $93,319.11, all inclusive.

The applicant sought to enforce an agreement between Canada and three municipalities regarding the storage of low-level radioactive waste.

The applicant alleged that the municipality had misused income earned on a $10 million payment by failing to apply it exclusively to defray lower-tier municipal taxes for ratepayers of the former Hope Township.

The application judge found that Schedule 8 of the agreement created a non-charitable purpose trust and that the municipality had breached its trustee duties.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the agreement was a contract and did not create a trust over the payment or the fund.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of Barbados participating policyholders, brought an action against Manulife following the transfer of their policies to Life of Barbados (LOB) in 1996 and Manulife's subsequent demutualization in 1999.

The plaintiffs claimed that Manulife owed them a duty of care and a fiduciary duty to protect their rights to participate in the demutualization.

The court found that while it was reasonably foreseeable that Manulife would demutualize, no duty of care or fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs because their rights as policyholders were lawfully extinguished by the transfer agreement, which was approved by regulators in Barbados and Canada.

The action was dismissed.

The appellants, including Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG) and two unions, appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) that disallowed $145 million of OPG's forecast nuclear compensation costs for the 2011-2012 test period.

The appellants argued the OEB was required to presume the collective agreements were prudent when entered into and could not use hindsight to assess their reasonableness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the OEB was not restricted to a retrospective prudence review for forecast costs and was entitled to consider current market comparators to ensure rates were just and reasonable for consumers.

The court also found the OEB's reasons were adequate and its decision did not violate section 2(d) of the Charter.

The applicant, Labatt, brought an application seeking an interpretation of a renewal provision in a previous sponsorship agreement with the respondent, NHL.

The application judge found that the parties had reached a new, binding sponsorship agreement, a position that Labatt had not pleaded or advanced during the hearing.

The NHL and Molson appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was procedurally unfair and contrary to natural justice for the application judge to base his decision on a novel theory of liability that was never pleaded and to which the respondents had no opportunity to respond.

The judgment was set aside and the matter remitted to a different judge.

The CRTC ordered telecommunications carriers to create deferral accounts from urban residential telephone service revenues.

It later directed that these funds be used to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities, expand broadband coverage, and distribute remaining amounts to subscribers as credits.

Bell Canada, TELUS, and consumer groups appealed the CRTC's authority to make these allocations.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the CRTC's creation and use of the deferral accounts was a reasonable exercise of its rate-setting authority under the Telecommunications Act, which requires it to balance the interests of consumers, carriers, and competitors while implementing national telecommunications policy objectives.

The appellant commenced an action alleging the respondents conspired to falsely accuse him of fraud, while criminal proceedings against him for that fraud were ongoing.

The motion judge struck the claim, characterizing it as malicious prosecution lacking the essential element of a favourable determination in the criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that even if framed as conspiracy to injure, the claim could not proceed in the face of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed and the claim struck in its entirety.

The appellant and respondent entered into a consensual arbitration over a commercial dispute arising from a share purchase agreement containing an earn-out provision.

The arbitrator found in the respondent's favour.

The appellant brought a judicial review application to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the application.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in principle by failing to determine the standard of review before deciding the application.

However, applying either a reasonableness or patent unreasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the arbitrator's award, concluding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was not unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. appealed a decision of the Ontario Energy Board that disallowed the recovery of $11 million in costs related to new pipeline routes.

The Board had found that Enbridge did not act prudently in incurring the costs, but Enbridge argued the Board erred by using hindsight in its prudence analysis.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that while hindsight can be used to rebut the presumption of prudence, the Board committed an error of law by considering hindsight factors in the actual prudence analysis.

The decision was quashed and remitted to a differently constituted tribunal.

The appellants, two major gas distributors in Ontario, appealed a decision of the Divisional Court upholding the Gas Distribution Access Rule (GDAR) issued by the Ontario Energy Board.

The GDAR permitted gas vendors to determine how customers are billed for gas commodity sales and distribution services.

The appellants argued the Board lacked jurisdiction under the Ontario Energy Board Act to make such billing rules and failed to follow the required rule-making process.

The Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for subordinate legislation is correctness.

Applying this standard, the Court found that the Board had ample jurisdiction to make the billing provisions, as they regulated an important part of the gas distribution business.

The Court also found the Board complied with the statutory notice and comment process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash an arbitration award that ordered it to pay the respondent $5 million pursuant to a share purchase agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Arbitration Act and the parties' agreement, which explicitly prohibited appeals, barred the application.

Furthermore, the applicant failed to pursue any potential statutory appeal rights within the prescribed time limits.

On the merits, the court found the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement was not patently unreasonable and the process was procedurally fair.

The appellant entered into a mortgage agreement that included a profit-sharing scheme.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision that the scheme constituted a criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that s. 347 is intra vires the Parliament of Canada and does not unconstitutionally infringe on provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.