John B. Laskin

The Court held Yukon breached the Chapter 11 modern treaty land-use planning process by making major final-stage changes not properly proposed earlier and not grounded in changing circumstances.

Yukon’s approval was quashed, and the parties were returned to the s. 11.6.3.2 stage.

The Court rejected the Court of Appeal’s approach of resetting the process to an earlier stage and emphasized judicial restraint with robust legality review in modern treaty implementation.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal decision dated June 30, 2017.

The appellants (Iranian government entities) appealed orders from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most appeals but allowed appeals in actions commenced by certain respondents, striking those actions.

The court awarded costs to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the appellants' argument that no costs should be awarded due to novel issues and declining to award substantial indemnity costs or costs to respondents whose actions were struck.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the City of Burlington against Burlington Airpark Inc. The parties agreed to fix the costs of the appeal at $40,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

However, they disagreed on the costs of the underlying application.

The respondent Airpark sought partial indemnity costs of $149,917.90, while the application judge had awarded the successful City substantial indemnity costs of $118,327.53.

The Court of Appeal determined that while Airpark was entitled to costs of the application despite adverse findings, an award of partial indemnity costs 25% higher than the substantial indemnity costs incurred by the successful applicant was unreasonable.

The Court fixed Airpark's costs at $80,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants (Iran and related entities) appealed orders of the Superior Court of Justice recognizing and enforcing U.S. judgments obtained by victims of terrorism against Iran for its sponsorship of terrorist attacks.

The respondents sought to enforce these judgments in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA) and amendments to the State Immunity Act (SIA).

Iran challenged the recognition and enforcement of the judgments on multiple grounds, including arguments regarding state immunity, the temporal scope of the JVTA, proof requirements, limitation periods, jurisdiction, public policy, diplomatic immunity, and the appropriateness of costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Iran's appeal, save for judgments arising from terrorist attacks that occurred prior to January 1, 1985, which could not be enforced under the JVTA.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion for approval of a settlement and class counsel fees in a class action regarding a data breach on the defendants' online photocentre website.

The settlement provided for credit monitoring and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses up to a maximum exposure of $1.25 million.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and approved the settlement along with class counsel fees of $250,000.

An aerodrome operator appealed an order requiring it to file a permit application under a new municipal by-law for fill and site alteration work performed before the by-law was enacted.

The court considered whether the by-law could be applied retroactively to work completed under a prior regulatory regime.

The appeal was allowed on the basis that the by-law had no retroactive effect and could not be applied to work performed before its enactment.

Following the dismissal of Iran's motions to set aside default judgments and a Mareva injunction, the plaintiffs sought costs.

Iran argued it was immune from costs orders under the State Immunity Act and the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.

The court held that Iran was not immune from costs and awarded the plaintiffs costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the claimed amounts reasonable given the complexity and high stakes of the proceedings.

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The applicant sought to set aside an order quashing its application for judicial review of a renewable energy approval for a wind project.

The motions judge had quashed the application on the grounds of prematurity because the applicant had appealed the approval to the Environmental Review Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to set aside, agreeing that the application was premature as the administrative appeal process under the Environmental Protection Act had not yet been completed.

This endorsement addresses the approval of class counsel fees, plaintiffs' costs, defendants' costs, and the Law Foundation of Ontario's levy following a decade-long class action concerning the legality of Par account transactions (PATs) by London Life and Great-West Life.

The court approved class counsel fees of $16.4 million, found the plaintiffs entitled to $4 million in partial indemnity costs from the defendants, and denied the defendants' claim for costs.

It also determined that the Law Foundation of Ontario was entitled to a levy of $1,520,346.50 (repayment of disbursements) plus 10% of the net monetary award ($4,030,000), totaling $5,550,346.50, to be paid from the participating accounts.

The court clarified that a "monetary award" for the purposes of the Class Proceedings Act and the Law Society Act includes funds paid to the benefit of class members through participating accounts, even if not directly distributed to individuals.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind turbine project, the successful respondent sought costs of $20,000.

The appellant argued no costs should be awarded as he was a public interest litigant and the appeal raised a novel issue.

The Divisional Court rejected these arguments, noting that private landowners challenging REAs are not public interest litigants and the appeal did not raise a novel issue.

The court fixed costs payable by the appellant to the respondent at $10,000.

The appellants appealed decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal confirming the director's issuance of renewable energy approvals for two wind turbine projects.

They argued that section 145.2.1 of the Environmental Protection Act requires a two-step process shifting the onus to the approval-holder, that the tribunal erred in rejecting the material contribution test for causation, and that they were denied procedural fairness when an adjournment was refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding that the statute imposes a single onus on the appellants to prove harm, the material contribution test was properly rejected, and the tribunal reasonably exercised its discretion in denying the adjournment.

This appeal considered whether a municipal notice of reserve that blocked construction at a federally approved antenna site was constitutionally valid.

The majority held the notice’s pith and substance was the siting of radiocommunication infrastructure, an exclusive federal matter, making it ultra vires.

The Court also held the measure significantly impaired the federal core protected by interjurisdictional immunity.

The appeal was allowed and the notice was unconstitutional and inapplicable to the appellant.

The plaintiffs, victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, sought to enforce U.S. judgments against Iran in Ontario under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (JVTA).

Iran brought motions to set aside or stay the default judgments and a Mareva injunction, arguing state and diplomatic immunity, limitation periods, and public policy.

The court dismissed Iran's motions, finding that the State Immunity Act and JVTA removed Iran's jurisdictional and enforcement immunity, the actions were not statute-barred, and the U.S. judgments met the criteria for recognition in Canada.

The court also granted summary judgment to the Bennett plaintiffs to enforce their U.S. judgment against Iran's non-diplomatic property in Ontario.

The applicants, International Steel Services Inc. (ISSI), sought an interim injunction to restrain the respondent, Dynatec Madagascar S.A. (Dynatec), from interfering with ISSI's contractual rights under a Sulphuric Acid Plant Operation and Maintenance Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether the agreement was extended to September 27, 2018, as ISSI contended, or if it terminated on May 1, 2016, as Dynatec argued.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test for injunctions, finding a serious issue to be tried regarding the agreement's extension and Dynatec's termination notice.

It determined that ISSI faced a meaningful risk of irreparable harm to its business reputation and employee relations if Dynatec proceeded with its takeover plans.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured ISSI, noting Dynatec's "hardball tactics" and delay in facilitating arbitration.

The interim protective order was granted to ISSI, prohibiting Dynatec from interfering with ISSI's contractual rights and operation of the Acid Plant pending an arbitral decision.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of the Director's issuance of a renewable energy approval, while simultaneously pursuing an appeal before the Environmental Review Tribunal (ERT).

The respondents brought a motion to quash the judicial review application on the basis of prematurity.

The court granted the motion and quashed the application, applying the doctrine of exhaustion.

The court found that the ERT had the power to provide an effective remedy (revocation of the approval) and there were no exceptional circumstances justifying early recourse to the courts.

The Approval Holder brought a motion to adjourn the proceeding in an appeal of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind park, to allow time to adduce evidence on remedy after the Tribunal found the project would cause serious and irreversible harm to a significant woodland.

The Director consented, but the Appellant opposed.

The Tribunal granted the adjournment, finding it necessary to secure a fair and just determination of the proceeding on its merits, and excluded the adjournment period from the six-month statutory deadline.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order requiring the disclosure of Change Notices and edited Detailed Feasibility Notices related to a government contract.

The applicant argued the records contained confidential commercial information and their disclosure would cause competitive harm.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commissioner reasonably concluded that the Change Notices were negotiated rather than 'supplied' by the applicant, and that the applicant failed to provide detailed and convincing evidence that disclosure of the edited Detailed Feasibility Notices would result in a reasonable expectation of probable harm.

The approval holder brought a motion for an adjournment of the proceedings regarding a renewable energy approval for a wind park.

The Environmental Review Tribunal granted the motion pursuant to s. 59(2)1.ii of O. Reg. 359/09.

The adjournment was ordered to run until the commencement of the remedy hearing.

The Ontario Energy Board appealed a decision that had required it to apply a mandatory prudence framework when assessing Ontario Power Generation compensation costs in rate-setting.

The majority held tribunal participation in defending its own decision was proper in this regulatory context and found no impermissible bootstrapping on appeal.

The Court held the governing statute did not require a single prudence methodology and permitted the Board to use a mixed approach for costs that were partly committed and partly subject to managerial discretion.

The Board’s disallowance of $145 million in compensation costs was found reasonable, and its original decision was reinstated.