Rory Alexander Patrick Mc Leod Mc Gillis

The City of Hamilton appealed a decision declaring its equipment installation by-law inoperative against Canada Post's installation of community mailboxes.

The by-law imposed a moratorium and permit fees on Canada Post.

The Court of Appeal found that while the by-law's pith and substance—regulating municipal rights of way—was within provincial jurisdiction, it conflicted with the federal purpose of the Canada Post Corporation Act and its regulations, which grant Canada Post sole decision-making power over the location of mail receptacles.

The appeal was dismissed under the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellants commenced a medical negligence action in 2015 against the respondents, which was dismissed on summary judgment as res judicata because it duplicated a 2011 action that had been struck as statute-barred.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissal.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 considering dismissal of the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Receiving no submissions from the appellants, the court dismissed the appeal, finding it was a clear attempt to relitigate claims, including fraudulent concealment, that were finally disposed of in the prior proceeding.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay, which arose from a 2001 commercial transaction where the plaintiff sued the defendants for alleged negligence in securing deferred payments.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, finding that much of the delay was attributable to both parties or solely to the defendants.

The sole period of delay attributable to the plaintiff (16 months) was not deemed inordinate or inexcusable.

The defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice or rebut the presumption of prejudice, as any memory deterioration occurred before the relevant delay period, and the defendants themselves had not taken steps to preserve evidence.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical negligence action on the basis that it was res judicata and statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced an essentially identical action arising from the same death, which had been dismissed as out of time and unsuccessfully appealed through the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the present action, the plaintiffs again alleged negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the allegations had already been fully considered in the prior proceedings and raised no triable issue.

Allowing the claim to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and the limitation period under the Trustee Act applied.

The plaintiffs sought indemnity under an executive liability insurance policy for losses arising from litigation alleging wrongful acts connected to a corporate subsidiary.

The insurer argued that a specific entity exclusion and coordination-of-limits endorsement limited or eliminated coverage and that payments under a separate run‑off policy should be set off against the policy limits.

The court examined the surrounding negotiations and the wording of the policies, including the meaning of the term “claim,” and found the exclusion did not remove coverage for directors acting in their capacity as directors of the parent corporation.

The court also held that the coordination-of-limits endorsement was not triggered because the two policies covered different wrongful acts committed in different capacities.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiffs for the full policy limits.

A physician applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for remedies following an unlawful police search of his home computer that uncovered child pornography.

The criminal charges were withdrawn due to an invalid search warrant, but the physician’s professional regulator obtained a copy of the hard drive and commenced disciplinary proceedings.

The applicant sought orders requiring destruction of the copied hard drive and prohibiting the regulator from relying on the evidence in the discipline hearing.

The court assumed serious Charter breaches, including possible bad faith by police, but held that neither destruction nor prohibition was appropriate or just in the circumstances.

The Discipline Committee was best positioned to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) in the administrative proceeding.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their medical negligence action as statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The action was commenced more than two years after the deceased's death.

The appellants argued the limitation period should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment by the respondent hospital and doctors regarding the deceased's INR results.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim and affidavit evidence did not plead facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment, but rather attempted to assert discoverability, which does not apply to s. 38(3).

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) Chair dismissing their Request for Review of a Hearing Officer's decision.

The Hearing Officer had approved an Official Plan amendment allowing residential development on lands, parts of which were designated as a cultural heritage landscape.

The moving party argued the OMB erred by not giving deference to the factual findings of the Conservation Review Board (CRB) regarding the extent of the heritage landscape, raising issue estoppel and abuse of process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no question of law, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the OMB decision, and that the matter was not of sufficient general importance.

The appellant, a primary insurer, sought a declaration that the respondent, an excess insurer, had a duty to contribute to defence costs incurred on behalf of their common insured.

The primary policy contained a duty to defend, while the excess policy did not and stipulated that defence costs eroded its policy limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the doctrine of equitable contribution did not apply because the primary and excess policies did not cover the same risk.

The primary insurer was held to its bargain with the insured, and the excess insurer was not required to contribute to defence costs.

Following earlier reasons dismissing most applicants’ requests for interim advancement of legal expenses from a corporation, the court addressed the costs of the applications.

The respondent corporation sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $559,000 or alternatively partial indemnity costs, while the applicants argued that costs should remain in the cause of the underlying indemnity issue.

The court held that although the respondent was largely successful, payment of costs should be contingent on the outcome of the trial determining entitlement to indemnity.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs of $25,000 for a related motion and $165,000 for the applications, subject to specific allocations among applicants and exceptions for one successful applicant and another who withdrew participation.

The Niagara Escarpment Commission applied for judicial review of a Joint Board decision granting conditional approval to Walker Aggregates Inc. to develop a quarry in the Niagara Escarpment Plan area.

The applicant argued the Board failed to properly apply the Niagara Escarpment Plan, improperly delegated approval of an Adaptive Management Plan to the Minister of Natural Resources, and erred in assessing noise impacts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision reasonable, as it correctly applied the relevant planning documents, did not improperly delegate its authority, and reasonably assessed environmental and noise impacts.

The appellant former directors and officers of Look Communications Inc. sought advance funding for their legal costs to defend an action brought against them by the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.

The corporation resisted the claims under s. 124(4) of the Canada Business Corporations Act, arguing the appellants had not acted in good faith.

The application judge refused advance funding, finding the corporation had established a strong prima facie case of bad faith regarding equity cancellation payments and legal retainers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 124(4) applies to actions brought by the corporation and that the strong prima facie case standard is the appropriate test for denying advance funding.

The defendant, Viridian Inc., brought a motion for a declaration of forum non conveniens, seeking to transfer the plaintiff insurer's action to Manitoba or stay the proceedings.

The underlying dispute involved insurance coverage for historic environmental remediation at Manitoba mine sites.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a related action involving multiple insurers was already proceeding in Toronto.

Transferring this single action to Manitoba would risk a multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent verdicts, making Ontario the more appropriate forum.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a medical negligence action arising from the death of a patient in hospital.

The plaintiffs commenced the action more than two years after the deceased’s death and argued that discoverability and fraudulent concealment should extend the limitation period because the alleged negligence was not discovered immediately.

The court held that s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act imposes a strict two‑year limitation period running from the date of death with no discoverability exception.

As the action was commenced outside that period, the estate’s claim was statute‑barred.

The derivative claims under the Family Law Act were also barred.

The appellant insurer appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay US$15 million for defence costs under a directors' and officers' liability policy.

The dispute centered on whether an exclusion clause (Endorsement #14) unambiguously excluded coverage for claims against the insured's directors and officers acting in their capacity as executives of a bankrupt former subsidiary.

The Court of Appeal found the exclusion clause ambiguous, as it could reasonably be interpreted to either exclude or preserve coverage depending on the capacity in which the executives were sued.

Because the factual matrix did not resolve the ambiguity and the motion judge had not made findings regarding the parties' reasonable expectations, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and returned the matter to the Superior Court for trial.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action against the directors, officers, and advisors of a Delaware-incorporated company for alleged misrepresentations and failures to disclose under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act.

The defendants brought motions to strike the claim for punitive damages, strike the claim against a former director for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and stay the action against the foreign financial advisors on jurisdictional grounds.

The court granted all motions, striking the punitive damages claim as inconsistent with the statutory scheme, striking the claim against the former director without leave to amend, and permanently staying the action against the foreign advisors as the court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

Former directors, officers, and consultants of Look Communications Inc. sought interim advancement of their legal fees to defend against an action brought by Look alleging breach of fiduciary duty regarding bonus and equity cancellation payments.

The court held that s. 124(4) of the CBCA applies to actions brought directly by the corporation, requiring court approval for advancement.

The court found Look established a strong prima facie case of mala fides against the directors and officers, rebutting the presumption of good faith.

Advancement was denied for all applicants except one employee, Dolgonos, whose entitlement arose under an indemnity agreement not subject to s. 124(4).

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged negligent delay in diagnosing breast cancer, which later recurred and became terminal.

The court considered the discoverability principle and the requirement that a claim be based on material facts including causation and actionable damage.

It held that although the cancer was diagnosed in 2007, the plaintiff’s condition went into remission and actionable injury only became apparent when the cancer recurred in 2009.

The court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the limitation period necessarily began earlier, and that the issue required a trial.