Dr. Holloway

The applicant father sought a transfer of primary care and decision-making responsibility for the parties' two young children.

The respondent mother had engaged in a severe and prolonged campaign of parental alienation, including making multiple false allegations of physical and sexual abuse to the police and children's aid societies, and sabotaging court-ordered reunification therapy.

The court found that the mother's conduct caused significant emotional harm to the children and that she was incapable of supporting their relationship with the father.

The court transferred primary care and decision-making to the father, ordered a 90-day period of no contact for the mother (save for supervised therapeutic time), and found the mother in contempt of a previous access order.

At a Trial Management Conference for a family law dispute involving custody and mobility issues, the court reviewed the parties' extensive witness lists which estimated 24 to 25 days of trial time.

The court had previously set a tentative 15-day trial date.

To ensure the trial proceeds efficiently and maximizes judicial resources, the court exercised its discretion under the Family Law Rules to impose strict time limits, allocating 37.5 hours per party, and ordered counsel to reduce oral evidence.

The trial date remained tentative pending a supplementary TMC.

The father brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' teenage son and to obtain specified access pending trial.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to modify the father's access and require family counselling before access resumed.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the long-standing status quo of the child residing primarily with the mother should be maintained pending trial.

The court held that there were no compelling reasons to disturb the status quo, particularly given the untested nature of competing expert reports on parental alienation and the proximity of trial.

The defendant physicians brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a medical malpractice claim on the basis that it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action alleged negligent delay in diagnosing breast cancer, which later recurred and became terminal.

The court considered the discoverability principle and the requirement that a claim be based on material facts including causation and actionable damage.

It held that although the cancer was diagnosed in 2007, the plaintiff’s condition went into remission and actionable injury only became apparent when the cancer recurred in 2009.

The court concluded that the defendants failed to establish that the limitation period necessarily began earlier, and that the issue required a trial.