Geoffrey John Carpenter

The appellants, a husband and his brother, appealed a trial judge's equalization payment order to the wife, arguing errors in weighing factors under s. 10.1(4) of the Family Law Act regarding an immediate lump sum transfer from the husband's pension, and incorrect prejudgment interest calculation.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, upholding the trial judge's findings that the wife's pension waiver was under duress, the husband and his brother acted in bad faith, and the husband fraudulently conveyed property.

The trial judge's holistic review of financial circumstances and the decision to order an immediate lump sum transfer for equalization were affirmed as fair.

The prejudgment interest calculation from the date of separation was also upheld.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement following a 3-day trial where most issues were settled.

The Applicant sought full recovery costs, arguing the Respondent acted unreasonably and that his January 10, 2024 offer to settle was as favourable as the outcome.

The Respondent sought no costs or a significant reduction, citing the Applicant's unreasonable behavior, lack of bill detail, and undue hardship.

The court found the Applicant's January 10 offer not as favourable, but his January 26 offer was successful.

The court determined the Applicant was largely successful on settled issues, particularly regarding parenting time and child support, and the pension division.

While the Respondent's income position was unreasonable, her overall behavior was not so unreasonable to warrant full indemnity costs from the outset.

Due to the Applicant's insufficiently detailed bill of costs, the court estimated a reasonable and proportionate amount.

The Respondent's ability to pay was considered but not a shield.

The court ordered the Respondent to pay the Applicant $40,000 in costs.

The court heard a three-day trial primarily to resolve the division of the applicant's pension and costs, as other family law issues were settled by consent.

The central dispute was whether the applicant's pension should be divided by an immediate lump sum transfer to the respondent or paid in cash.

Applying s. 10.1(4) of the Family Law Act, the court ordered the immediate lump sum transfer, finding it would create a more equitable balance of liquid assets and retirement savings for both parties.

The court also determined that requiring a cash payment for an underfunded pension would be unfair to the applicant.

The "best interests of the children" was considered but deemed not a proper factor in this financial context, and in any event, would not have changed the decision.

The Applicant sought full recovery costs of $297,615.08 following a successful trial where the Respondents were found to have acted in bad faith and lied under oath.

The court found that full recovery costs were warranted under Rule 24(8) of the Family Law Rules due to the Respondents' bad faith conduct, and alternatively under Rule 18(14) due to the Applicant's favourable offers to settle.

However, the court reduced the quantum of costs to $150,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, finding the requested amount disproportionate to the financial outcome and considering the Applicant's partial success on some issues.

Both Respondents were held jointly and severally liable for the costs.

This is a decision on costs arising from three motions in a family law matter concerning custody and access of a child.

The applicant sought to change the primary residence of the parties' son from the mother to the father, while the mother sought to modify the father's access and require family counselling.

The court dismissed both motions heard on August 31, 2015, finding no compelling reasons for an immediate change to the status quo pending trial.

The court also addressed costs of an urgent motion heard on July 10, 2015, which the mother brought due to the father's misleading conduct regarding the resumption of access.

The court found the father's conduct amounted to bad faith and awarded the mother costs on a full recovery basis for the July 10 motion, while dismissing both parties' costs claims for the August 31 motions.

The father brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' teenage son and to obtain specified access pending trial.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to modify the father's access and require family counselling before access resumed.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the long-standing status quo of the child residing primarily with the mother should be maintained pending trial.

The court held that there were no compelling reasons to disturb the status quo, particularly given the untested nature of competing expert reports on parental alienation and the proximity of trial.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking temporary care and custody of two young children (ages 3 and 4) based on allegations of emotional harm caused by the mother's approach to the older child's gender expression.

The mother had begun socially transitioning the child to a female identity based on the child's expressed gender variant preferences.

The father opposed the placement and alleged the mother was forcing the child to be a girl against his wishes.

The court found that while there was a risk of emotional harm, it was caused by parental conflict rather than either parent's conduct alone.

The court determined the children could be adequately protected under a supervision order in the mother's care and returned the children to both parents under the custody and access regime that existed prior to intervention, subject to strict supervision and compliance with expert recommendations.

In a family law dispute following separation, the parties disagreed about which school their two young children should attend for grade one.

The mother, who had primary weekday residence of the children under an interim order, sought to enroll them in a school near her residence in Grimsby, while the father sought to keep them in their previous school in Hamilton.

The court considered the best interests of the children, including the existing parenting schedule, the children’s primary weekday residence, and the practical impact of daily travel.

The judge found that maintaining attendance at the Hamilton school would require an onerous daily commute and disrupt the children’s routine.

The court concluded that it was preferable for the children to attend school near their weekday residence.

A motion to change a separation agreement dated August 31, 2003, wherein the applicant sought to reduce child support and terminate spousal support following his termination from employment.

The respondent sought retroactive child support from 2009 and prospective child and spousal support.

The court found a material change in circumstances warranting variation of support obligations.

The applicant was not found to be intentionally underemployed despite his termination for breach of company code of conduct.

The court dismissed the retroactive support claim, reduced prospective child support based on the applicant's actual income, and maintained spousal support at the original contractual amount.

Child support was calculated on a five-month basis reflecting the dependent child's university attendance away from home.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that a family law application was not validly issued, a change of venue, and leave to file an answer.

The court held that any irregularities in the issuance of the application were merely technical and did not invalidate the proceeding.

The request for a change of venue was denied due to the respondent's failure to comply with a prior court order requiring financial disclosure.

Leave to file an answer was not granted immediately; instead, the court imposed a condition that the respondent first comply with the disclosure order within 30 days, failing which a further motion would proceed to determine whether leave should be granted.