Catherine A. Haber

This costs endorsement addresses a bitter parenting dispute between Jonathan Delbert Grant and Lindsay Marie Runciman regarding their two young daughters.

The court reviews the parties' conduct, the offers to settle, and the principles governing costs in family law, ultimately awarding the father $2,000 in costs due to his greater success on important issues and the mother's unreasonable positions, despite overall divided success.

The applicant father and respondent mother brought competing proposals for an interim parenting schedule for their two young children, aged 22 months and 6 months.

The father sought equal time and immediate overnights for the infant, while the mother sought to reduce the father's time with the older child and delay overnights for the infant.

The court strongly criticized the parents' high-conflict litigation approach.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act, the court maintained the father's existing overnight schedule for the older child and ordered a gradual implementation of overnights for the infant, commencing in February 2025.

The Father brought an urgent motion to add his girlfriend, L.H., to the list of approved parenting supervisors, as his parenting time was supervised due to concerns about alcohol abuse.

The Mother opposed, arguing that the girlfriend's new relationship with the Father could compromise her objectivity as a supervisor, especially given the Father's denial of his alcohol issues and his lack of candour regarding the relationship.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the Mother's refusal to be reasonable and in the children's best interests.

The judge noted the Father's manipulative conduct, his failure to utilize other already-approved supervisors, and his misrepresentation of L.H.'s role.

The applicant father and respondent mother both brought motions regarding parenting time for their two young children.

The mother sought supervised parenting time or the use of a Soberlink device due to allegations of the father's alcohol abuse, which the father opposed.

The court found sufficient evidence of an alcohol problem to warrant temporary supervised parenting time out of caution.

The court ordered a schedule of alternate weekends and every Tuesday, which was more time than the mother proposed but less than the father sought, with all time to be supervised by a mutually approved person or the paternal grandmother.

Following cross-motions regarding child and spousal support, imputing income, and life insurance, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The court found divided success on the issue of the applicant's income for support purposes, but noted the respondent was successful in resisting the imputation of income to her and on the life insurance issue.

Applying principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $5,085.

Following a 22-day parenting trial and a withdrawn motion for contempt, the successful respondent father sought full recovery of his costs totaling $668,930.

The court found the applicant mother's litigation conduct to be unreasonable, including her misuse of a contempt motion and failure to accept a reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $611,637, representing full recovery for the period after his offer to settle and for defending the contempt motion, and a partial recovery for the pre-offer period.

The court declined to order the applicant's counsel to pay the costs personally but granted the applicant leave to bring a motion against her counsel under Rule 24(9).

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a final consent order to terminate the respondent father's parenting time and relocate the child to Montreal.

The father sought sole decision-making and an equal parenting schedule.

The court found the mother had engaged in a pattern of high-conflict litigation, terminated the child's therapy, and failed to act in the child's best interests.

Relying on the 13-year-old child's strong views and preferences, the court granted the father sole decision-making responsibility and took the unusual step of leaving parenting time with the mother entirely to the child's discretion.

The mother's motion was dismissed, and she was ordered to pay child support.

The applicant wife brought a motion for the production of expert business valuation and income reports, and for an order requiring the respondent husband to maintain life insurance as security for spousal support.

The parties had signed a marriage contract in 1991 waiving property and spousal support rights.

The court held that to order cost-prohibitive expert reports, the applicant must show it is more likely than not the contract will be set aside or overridden.

The court dismissed the request for business valuations, finding it equally possible the property provisions would be upheld.

However, the court ordered the production of an income report, finding it likely the spousal support waiver would be overridden under a Miglin analysis.

The request for life insurance was dismissed due to lack of evidence on insurability, but alternative security was ordered.

The applicant sought an interim restraining order against the respondent, citing past abuse, criminal convictions for assault and threats, and continued controlling behaviour since separation.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for unsupervised access and sought to adjourn the applicant's motion.

The court granted an interim restraining order against the respondent regarding communication, contact, and proximity to the applicant, finding a legitimate basis for her fear based on his past conduct and controlling actions post-separation.

However, the court refused to grant a restraining order in relation to the children, finding no cogent evidence of ongoing risk to them, especially given supervised access.

The respondent's cross-motion for unsupervised access was not addressed, and his request for adjournment was denied.

The father brought an urgent motion to enforce a final order granting him bi-weekly in-person access to his daughter, which the mother had unilaterally suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court established a three-part test for such suspensions, holding that there is a presumption that court-ordered access should continue, the suspending parent bears the onus to rebut this presumption, and cogent medical evidence is required to do so.

Finding that the mother failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to justify a complete suspension of access, the court ordered that in-person access resume with strict adherence to health precautions.

During the COVID-19 suspension of court operations, the respondent father brought an urgent motion seeking a change in parenting arrangements for the 12-year-old child, A.P., requesting primary residence.

The Triage Judge acknowledged the potential urgency due to concerns about the child running away and police involvement but declined to make an immediate formal parenting order.

The matter was referred to a backup judge for further determination, with an order for the applicant mother to provide responding materials.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the appointment of a Therapeutic Reunification Therapist for his 13-year-old daughter, whom he had not seen for four months.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing that therapy should wait until an ongoing section 30 assessment was completed.

The court granted the motion, finding that immediate intervention was necessary to prevent long-lasting damage to the father-daughter relationship and that the therapist's involvement would assist the assessor.

The moving party brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a settlement agreement reached during a settlement conference.

The responding party opposed, arguing there was no meeting of the minds and that enforcing the agreement would be unconscionable due to the subsequent increase in the value of the matrimonial home.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the parties had reached a binding agreement and executed the terms, and there was no evidence of unconscionability or vulnerability during negotiations.

This interim motion addressed parental alienation in a custody dispute involving two children.

The court found clear evidence that the children had been alienated from the respondent mother through the combined efforts of the applicant father and Caroline Hay, a former nanny with a close bond to the children.

The court emphasized the need for immediate action in parental alienation cases.

It ordered the parties and children to forthwith attend reintegration therapy with Andrea Barclay, with costs shared, and prohibited Caroline Hay from having any contact with the children.

The court rejected the applicant's proposal to continue therapy with Melissa Healy, finding her approach to reintegration inappropriate.

A judicial review was scheduled to determine the necessity of a s.30 assessment and a residential schedule after the therapy report.

A trial concerning child support obligations for a child with autism spectrum disorder and chromosome 1 deletion.

The father, self-employed and previously bankrupt, sought to establish child support based on an imputed income of $30,000 per annum.

The mother sought support based on an imputed income of $40,850 per annum, retroactive child support from the child's birth, and the father's proportionate contribution to special and extraordinary expenses.

The court imputed income at $37,000 per annum, ordered ongoing child support of $325 per month, a contribution to section 7 expenses of $312 per month commencing March 1, 2016, and fixed retroactive child support arrears at $10,000 payable at $100 per month.

The moving party mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of the parties' two children.

The responding party father opposed the motion and sought sole custody.

The court found that the children had resided with the mother since separation and were doing well.

The father, who suffered from significant medical and mental health issues, failed to provide specific evidence or a parenting plan to demonstrate a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court granted summary judgment, awarding sole custody to the mother.

This is a decision on costs arising from three motions in a family law matter concerning custody and access of a child.

The applicant sought to change the primary residence of the parties' son from the mother to the father, while the mother sought to modify the father's access and require family counselling.

The court dismissed both motions heard on August 31, 2015, finding no compelling reasons for an immediate change to the status quo pending trial.

The court also addressed costs of an urgent motion heard on July 10, 2015, which the mother brought due to the father's misleading conduct regarding the resumption of access.

The court found the father's conduct amounted to bad faith and awarded the mother costs on a full recovery basis for the July 10 motion, while dismissing both parties' costs claims for the August 31 motions.

The father brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' teenage son and to obtain specified access pending trial.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to modify the father's access and require family counselling before access resumed.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the long-standing status quo of the child residing primarily with the mother should be maintained pending trial.

The court held that there were no compelling reasons to disturb the status quo, particularly given the untested nature of competing expert reports on parental alienation and the proximity of trial.

On an application to remove a family mediator/arbitrator, the court held that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to determine disputes over the child's residence and access under the amending separation agreement, which excluded only joint custody from arbitration.

However, the arbitrator's pre-arbitration statements indicated he had already concluded the mother was undermining the father-child relationship and that the residential arrangement should change.

His insistence on a rushed one-day hearing on short notice, despite counsel's unavailability, also breached the fairness requirements in the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application was allowed and the arbitrator was removed and replaced.

On a motion to change a prior support order, the applicant sought orders requiring the respondent to contribute to the post‑secondary educational expenses of the parties’ adult children, including a master’s program in the United States.

The court held that the daughter pursuing a master’s degree remained a “child of the marriage” within the meaning of the Divorce Act, as she had not withdrawn from parental charge and her educational plan was rational and consistent with the family’s expectations regarding higher education.

The court also found no material change in circumstances justifying variation of the base child support previously agreed to by the parties.

The respondent was required to contribute proportionately to the children’s educational expenses under the existing order, including the U.S. graduate program, and base support was reduced only by the applicant’s consent.

The respondent’s request for retroactive variation of support based on alleged income changes was dismissed.