Chloe van Wirdum

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application to set aside a separation agreement on the basis of duress under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant's vulnerabilities were compensated by independent legal advice.

On the respondent's cross-appeal regarding costs, the Court found the application judge erred in principle by using a 'cost equalization' methodology rather than applying the proper purposes of a costs award.

The cross-appeal was allowed, and the respondent was awarded $80,000 in costs for the proceeding below, plus $12,500 for the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order and a trial decision upholding a separation agreement.

The motion judge had found the agreement was signed but directed a trial on whether an escrow condition requiring corporate counsel's approval was met.

The trial judge found the appellant waived the condition by her conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was out of time to appeal the motion judge's order and that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding waiver by conduct.

The Applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement on grounds of duress, alleging blackmail by the Respondent and his girlfriend.

The court conducted a bifurcated trial on this issue.

The court found that while the Applicant felt pressured and vulnerable, her vulnerabilities were compensated by her lawyer's professional assistance, and the alleged blackmail by the girlfriend occurred after the agreement was signed.

The application to set aside the agreement on grounds of duress was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion to enforce a family law settlement agreement that the self-represented respondent father accepted via email.

The father opposed the motion, arguing he signed under duress and that the agreement was one-sided.

The court found that the father's email stating 'Accept in full' constituted valid acceptance under Rule 18 of the Family Law Rules, and that consideration was exchanged when funds were released from the matrimonial home sale.

The court rejected the father's claim of duress, finding no evidence of coercion or illegitimate pressure, and concluded that both parties would be prejudiced if the agreement were not enforced.

The motion was granted and the settlement agreement was enforced.

At the commencement of a family law trial, the applicant brought a motion to adjourn the trial and strike the respondent's pleadings due to the respondent's failure to provide court-ordered disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion to adjourn and strike, noting the extensive procedural history, previous orders mandating the trial proceed, and the primary objective of the Family Law Rules to resolve matters efficiently.

The court granted the applicant's request for a non-dissipation order regarding the respondent's shares in certain companies.

The Applicant sought an adjournment of trial and an order striking the Respondent's pleadings due to alleged non-disclosure and breaches of prior court orders.

The Applicant also requested a non-dissipation order regarding the Respondent's shares in certain companies.

The court denied the adjournment and the request to strike pleadings, emphasizing the long procedural history, previous judicial directives for the trial to proceed, and the primary objective of the Family Law Rules.

The court found that late disclosure could be addressed through negative inferences and costs at trial.

A non-dissipation order was granted, but only as it affected the Respondent's shares, not third parties.

The respondent mother brought a motion to strike the applicant father's pleadings for alleged non-compliance with multiple financial disclosure orders spanning over four years.

The father argued substantial compliance and provided explanations for outstanding documents.

The court reviewed the father's history of non-compliance, including missed deadlines and delayed submissions, which was deemed "unreasonable litigation behaviour." Despite the father's significant delays and partial non-compliance, the court declined to strike his pleadings, emphasizing the high threshold for such a remedy and the need to consider the materiality of missing disclosure.

Instead, the court ordered the father to provide specific outstanding disclosure by a new deadline, stipulated that the trial judge would determine the extent of his participation if he failed to comply, and prohibited him from initiating any further steps in the proceeding pending trial.

The court awarded the mother $15,000 in all-inclusive costs due to the father's litigation conduct.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking income imputation and retroactive and ongoing spousal support from the respondent husband.

The court declined to conduct a detailed income imputation inquiry or grant retroactive support on an interim motion, given the imminent trial and the complexity of the financial issues.

However, the court ordered the husband to pay ongoing temporary spousal support, including maintaining the wife's property expenses and an additional monthly sum, with tax efficiencies, until the final disposition of the proceedings.

The decision criticized both parties for their litigation conduct and the husband's failure to provide timely financial disclosure, emphasizing the need for efficiency and proportionality in family law cases.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The applicant sought an urgent case conference or motion date at TBST Court to remove the respondent from his home, claiming they were only together for four months and were not spouses.

The respondent's brief revealed they had lived together since 2013, were engaged, and the applicant was currently living with his daughter as a surety after being charged with assaulting the respondent.

The court found the matter was not urgent, noting the applicant's brief was selective to the point of being misleading and misused the TBST Court process.

The request was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay $1,500 in costs to the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child and spousal support, retroactive support, and the sale of the matrimonial home.

The respondent opposed spousal support, relying on a marriage contract that waived it.

The court found a serious triable issue regarding whether the marriage contract complied with the objectives of the Divorce Act, allowing an interim spousal support award of $25,500 per month and child support of $9,918 per month.

The court deferred the issue of retroactive support to trial but granted the applicant's request to order the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The parties made written submissions regarding costs following two motions: the applicant's motion for interim spousal support and the respondent's motion regarding mortgages on the matrimonial home.

The court noted that neither party succeeded on their own motion, resulting in divided success.

The applicant's offer to settle was not considered a better outcome than the status quo maintained by the court's order.

Applying the principles of costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to award no costs to either party, ordering each to bear their own costs.

The applicant sought interim spousal support and security for support.

The respondent sought orders regarding the renewal of a first mortgage and the registration of a proposed second mortgage on the matrimonial home, and characterization of payments.

The court determined the respondent's income for support purposes, attributed some pre-tax corporate income, and set a spousal support range.

However, no periodic spousal support order was made as long as the respondent continued to pay the applicant's salary and benefits and maintain matrimonial home expenses.

The respondent's motion to register a second mortgage was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction under the Family Law Act for jointly owned property.

The court preserved the respondent's right to seek credit for matrimonial home expenses at trial.

The respondent husband brought an interim motion to stay the enforcement of a separation agreement and temporarily reduce his spousal support obligation from $10,000 to $3,000 per month, pending a Motion to Change.

He argued his income had significantly decreased due to a partial retirement and business losses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the husband failed to establish a strong prima facie case for the reduction, as his reduced employment income was voluntary and the losses stemmed from a speculative new business venture.

The respondent sought leave for an urgent motion regarding parenting issues, specifically make-up time, alleging the applicant intermittently withheld their children.

The applicant opposed, providing evidence of the respondent's breaches of agreed-upon COVID-19 social distancing protocols and a unilateral reduction of child support.

The court found that the request for make-up time did not meet the threshold for an urgent or pressing issue, emphasizing the children's best interests and the moving parent's disregard for agreements and children's concerns.

The motion for leave was dismissed, and parties were encouraged to negotiate or mediate a temporary parenting plan and consider a Rule 15 Motion to Change.

The applicant husband sought to stay the child and spousal support provisions of an arbitration award pending leave to appeal.

The respondent wife opposed the stay.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test, finding that while a serious issue for appeal existed, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favored a stay.

The court emphasized the arbitrator's findings of the applicant's financial non-disclosure and the "no automatic stay" policy for support orders.

The motion to stay was dismissed.

The applicant sought spousal support after the end of a 14-year relationship with the wealthy respondent.

The respondent argued they were not spouses because they maintained separate residences in Toronto.

The court found that the parties lived together in a conjugal relationship, noting they spent summers together at a cottage, wintered in Florida, and the respondent treated the applicant as his wife and financially supported her.

The court awarded the applicant indefinite spousal support of $53,077 per month and retroactive support of $421,795.12, finding a strong pattern of economic dependency.

The applicant, a former spouse, sought preservation and non-depletion orders under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act, respectively, to restrain the respondent from dissipating assets.

These orders were contingent on setting aside a comprehensive separation agreement due to alleged misrepresentation and non-disclosure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant lacked standing for a section 40 order as a divorced spouse and failed to meet the stringent Mareva injunction test, which was deemed applicable given the contingent nature of her claims for equalization and support.

The court found no strong prima facie case to set aside the agreement, no evidence of asset dissipation to avoid judgment, and no undertaking as to damages.

The respondent, Michael Kitt, brought a motion to compel the applicant, Amy Benson, to answer four questions refused during questioning and to produce related documents.

The questions pertained to a reporting letter from Benson's former solicitor, the mediator's file from a prior mediation, Benson's therapist's file, and a private investigator's file.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the solicitor's reporting letter was protected by solicitor-client privilege and res judicata, the mediator's file by settlement privilege and contractual confidentiality, the therapist's file by patient-therapist privilege (applying the Wigmore test due to marginal relevance and high intrusiveness), and the private investigator's file was irrelevant to the issues in dispute.