Sharon Shore

The appellants, who provided negligent legal services to the respondent despite not being licensed to do so, appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent $41,000 in damages.

The appellants argued the motion judge decided the case on a novel theory of liability—failure to advise—that was not pleaded, denying them a fair opportunity to respond.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the issue was clearly raised in the pleadings and motion materials.

The court also dismissed the appeal of the costs award, noting leave to appeal costs had not been sought.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision summarily dismissing her complaints of discrimination against a canoe club.

The HRTO had found most complaints were out of time and all had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO adequately accommodated the applicant's disability-related needs, the hearing was procedurally fair, there was no reasonable apprehension of bias, and the summary dismissal was reasonable.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Papageorgiou J. The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and ordered that the terms directed by Matheson J. continue pending resolution of the appeal, specifically that the moving party suspend providing tax receipts for donations and the respondent not publish a notice of intention to revoke the moving party's charitable registration.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the decision of Koehnen J. dated October 6, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated December 17, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $5,000 inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory parenting order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were ordered as the responding party did not make submissions on costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decisions and orders of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal and fixed costs at $5,000, to be awarded at the discretion of the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her application for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant alleged the respondent breached a 2011 settlement agreement.

The HRTO found the application was filed well beyond the six-month limitation period under the Human Rights Code and that the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court held that the HRTO's decision was reasonable and that the HRTO did not breach procedural fairness by deciding the jurisdictional issue in writing.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal the decision of Lemay J. dated September 25, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the respondents.

The applicant sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision finding she violated a Termination Agreement with her former employer by commencing an Unfair Labour Practice claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding first that the applicant lacked standing to bring the judicial review independent of her union, as she did not meet any of the exceptional circumstances.

Furthermore, the court held that the arbitrator had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, his findings regarding the validity and breach of the Termination Agreement were reasonable, and there was no reasonable apprehension of bias or procedural unfairness.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the respondent's Complaints Committee not to refer his complaint against a member to the Discipline Committee.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering dismissal of the application.

The court found that the applicant, as a complainant in a professional discipline matter, lacked standing to challenge the substantive reasonableness of the decision.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision terminating her tenancy in supportive housing and subsequent orders dismissing her requests for review.

The tenant argued the LTB erred by not considering her inability to attend the hearings due to incarceration and health issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the LTB's determinations regarding the tenant's ability to participate were findings of fact, not errors of law, and therefore outside the court's jurisdiction under section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that dismissed her human rights application as abandoned.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the application sought relief the court could not grant and failed to raise proper grounds for judicial review.

After reviewing the applicant's written submissions, which continued to argue the substantive merits rather than addressing the HRTO's procedural dismissal, the court found the application devoid of merit.

The application for judicial review was dismissed as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing their application for alleged landlord harassment and interference with reasonable enjoyment.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the tenant's grounds of appeal related entirely to findings of fact, not questions of law, contrary to section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that the licensing regime for temporary help agencies under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 is constitutionally invalid.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction to grant such declaratory relief.

The court held that under section 2(1) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, it only has jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief in relation to the exercise of a statutory power, which does not include the enactment of statutory amendments.

The application was transferred to the Superior Court of Justice.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $4,000 all-inclusive.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal the decisions of Hooper J. dated March 15, 2024, and C. MacLeod J. dated October 9, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the total amount of $5,200.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Leiper J. dated October 23, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000 all inclusive.

The applicant sought judicial review of three Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) decisions regarding his entitlement to benefits following two workplace injuries.

The tribunal had allowed his appeal in part for a temporomandibular joint injury but denied benefits for headaches, post-concussion syndrome, and psycho-traumatic disability, finding they were unrelated to the workplace incidents.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, concluding that the tribunal's decisions were coherent, transparent, and firmly based on the medical evidence.

The appellant, a nurse practitioner, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee of the College of Nurses of Ontario.

The Committee found she had improperly issued 396 COVID-19 vaccine medical exemption letters to clients who merely watched an informational slide presentation.

The appellant argued she was acting as an educator providing informed consent and relying on public health directives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Committee's conclusion that the letters were medical exemptions and that the appellant breached multiple standards of practice.

The court also dismissed allegations of procedural fairness and bias.