Brendan Gray

The applicant sought a declaration under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act that the respondent was a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had initiated numerous actions against medical professionals, regulatory investigators, and opposing counsel, including re‑litigating a medical malpractice claim previously dismissed on summary judgment.

The court found the respondent’s conduct exhibited multiple indicators of vexatious proceedings, including repeated litigation of decided issues, actions lacking a cause of action, and litigation against opposing counsel.

Considering the pattern of abusive litigation and the need to protect the court’s process and potential defendants, the court declared the respondent a vexatious litigant.

The respondent was prohibited from commencing further proceedings without leave of the Superior Court of Justice.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against two defendants in a medical negligence action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful defendants sought costs after the self‑represented plaintiff failed to deliver responding submissions within the allotted time.

Although the defendants had incurred significantly higher legal costs, each requested a reduced amount.

The court found the proposed amounts reasonable and fixed costs at $7,500 for each successful defendant.

The plaintiff alleged wrongful psychiatric detention and negligence against a hospital and psychiatrist after being held as an involuntary patient for approximately two weeks and reported to the Ministry of Transportation, which led to suspension of his driver's licence and alleged financial losses.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because the plaintiff had produced no expert evidence establishing breach of the medical standard of care.

The defendants filed expert reports concluding that the psychiatrist’s clinical decisions and the nursing care met the applicable standards and that the report to the Ministry of Transportation was appropriate.

The court held that medical malpractice claims generally require expert evidence and that without such evidence the plaintiff had no reasonable prospect of success.

Statutory protections under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 and the Highway Traffic Act also shielded the physician for actions taken in good faith and for mandatory reporting.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the hospital and physician.

At a contested status hearing under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff sought to continue a civil action alleging misfeasance in public office, negligence, and related claims arising from a professional opinion that led to suspension of her nursing licence.

The court considered whether the plaintiff met the two-part test requiring an acceptable explanation for litigation delay and proof that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

Although the court accepted that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice, the plaintiff failed to adequately explain lengthy delays in documentary production, failure to bring an intended motion, and failure to comply with a previously approved timetable.

The plaintiff also failed to provide a clearly articulated plan to advance the litigation.

As the plaintiff did not satisfy both elements of the test, the action was dismissed for delay.