Ryan Stewart Breedon

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal and cross-appeal concerning a trial judge's decision on fraudulent conveyance and oppression claims.

The trial judge had found oppression but did not rule on fraudulent conveyance, basing the oppression finding on a theory not pleaded or argued.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons legally insufficient, internally inconsistent, and procedurally unfair, as the decision was based on an unpleaded "reasonable expectation" of a reserve fund.

The court determined it could not conduct a de novo analysis or substitute findings due to credibility issues and the record not inevitably yielding a particular outcome.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the trial judgment set aside, and the matter remitted for a new trial.

The plaintiff sought a contempt order against the defendant corporation and its director for repeated failure to comply with court orders to answer undertakings from a judgment debtor examination.

Despite multiple adjournments and assurances, the undertakings remained incomplete.

The court declared the defendant in breach of the orders but, exercising restraint, deferred an immediate contempt finding.

It granted the defendant one final opportunity to comply by a specified date, failing which the contempt motion would proceed.

The court also ordered the defendant and its director to pay costs to the plaintiff.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The appellant, Dr. Colin Ward, appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for negligence in performing a laparoscopic colectomy on the respondent, Karen Armstrong, in February 2010.

The trial judge found that Dr. Ward breached the standard of care by bringing a LigaSure device within one to two millimetres of the respondent's left ureter, causing a thermal injury that resulted in stricturing of the ureter and eventual removal of the kidney.

The majority of the Court of Appeal (Paciocco and Juriansz JJ.A.) allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by defining the standard of care as a goal or result (avoiding injury) rather than as the means a prudent surgeon would employ.

The majority held that since the trial judge found Dr. Ward took the steps a prudent surgeon would take, he should have been exonerated.

Van Rensburg J.A. dissented, finding the trial judge's findings on standard of care were fully supported by the evidence and that staying at least two millimetres away from the ureter was a necessary step, not merely a goal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The appellant's counsel withdrew one month prior to the appeal hearing, and the appellant requested an adjournment to retain new counsel.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment request, finding no basis to grant it.

The respondent argued the appeal lacked merit, noting that the summary judgment was granted after the appellant failed to comply with court-ordered indulgences regarding payment of costs and filing of material, and that the material would not have raised a genuine issue for trial.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This is a costs endorsement following a partial appeal of a trial judgment concerning adverse possession and prescriptive easements.

The appellants successfully set aside the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to a prescriptive easement over a cedar trail, but the appellants' appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Court of Appeal reduced the trial judge's costs award from $42,954.63 to $32,000, finding that although the respondent lost on the cedar trail issue, he still bettered the offer to settle and his claims to adverse possession of the house lands and a prescriptive easement over the laneway were more significant than the cedar trail claim.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between neighbouring property owners near Markdale, Ontario.

The respondent claimed possessory title to a portion of the appellants' land where his house and outbuildings were situated, and prescriptive easements over a cedar trail and laneway.

The trial judge found in favour of the respondent on all claims.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the findings regarding possessory title and prescriptive easements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the possessory title finding and the laneway easement but set aside the cedar trail easement, finding insufficient evidence of continuous use for a utility purpose as required by law.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a failed residential subdivision development project in Fort Erie, Ontario.

The central issues were whether the parties had entered into an enforceable written agreement dated December 13, 2005, whether there was a breach or repudiation of that agreement, and the validity of a construction lien filed by Ravenda Homes.

The motion judge had dismissed Ravenda Homes's breach of contract action, vacated its certificate of pending litigation, allowed its lien action, and allowed the respondent's counterclaim in part.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld most of the motion judge's findings but set aside the award of damages under section 35 of the Construction Lien Act, referring that issue to trial.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motion judge's decision finding that an unknown driver caused or contributed to a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant challenged the motion judge's credibility findings regarding a witness and argued the judge engaged in speculation rather than rational inference.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's approach, noting that the judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings based on the whole of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This costs endorsement pertains to a motion brought by 1372708 Ontario Inc. to compel Ravenda Homes Ltd. and its principal, John Ravenda, to answer undertakings and questions refused during discovery in three complex proceedings.

The moving party achieved substantial success, as most outstanding discovery issues were resolved in their favour, either by court order or consent after the motion was initiated.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the moving party, reducing the amount due to some unsuccessful aspects of the motion, such as the attempt to examine an expert on a Deloitte LLP report.

The court emphasized that costs "in the cause" are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, which were not present here, and fixed costs at $19,000.00 inclusive of HST.

This addendum clarifies and amends a previous summary judgment ruling.

The court addressed five requests for amendment, largely granting those related to the scope of claims not pursued on summary judgment, legal costs for vacating a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and utility/maintenance costs for model homes.

The court affirmed its power to amend a ruling before it is finalized and rejected attempts to re-litigate factual findings.

Following a medical negligence trial in which the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in establishing a causal connection between breaches of the standard of care and a patient’s death following a caesarean section, the defendant hospital sought costs of $272,000.

The plaintiffs included the deceased’s spouse and minor children represented by a litigation guardian.

Although the plaintiffs had declined a settlement offer and the defendants had succeeded at trial, the court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to deny a costs award.

Considering the plaintiffs’ circumstances, the public nature of the defendant institution, and broader access to justice concerns, the court held that imposing the full costs sought would be inequitable.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a medical negligence action arising from the death of a patient in hospital.

The plaintiffs commenced the action more than two years after the deceased’s death and argued that discoverability and fraudulent concealment should extend the limitation period because the alleged negligence was not discovered immediately.

The court held that s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act imposes a strict two‑year limitation period running from the date of death with no discoverability exception.

As the action was commenced outside that period, the estate’s claim was statute‑barred.

The derivative claims under the Family Law Act were also barred.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of a mother from postpartum hemorrhage and disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) hours after a caesarean section.

The plaintiffs alleged that the nurses, anaesthesiologist, and obstetricians breached the standard of care by failing to recognize and treat the bleeding earlier.

The court found that while the anaesthesiologist breached the standard of care by delaying notification to the obstetricians of the patient's deteriorating condition, this delay did not cause the patient's death.

The court concluded that even if the decision to operate had been made earlier, the patient would still have developed DIC and the fatal blockage would not have been prevented.

The action was dismissed without costs.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved for a determination that the plaintiff’s claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court considered whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical function, the statutory threshold required to recover such damages.

After reviewing medical evidence, credibility findings, and the plaintiff’s post‑accident activities, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a permanent impairment and, in any event, any impairment was neither important nor serious.

The judge also noted the modest jury award for pain and suffering as consistent with the evidentiary record.

The plaintiff was therefore barred from recovering non‑pecuniary damages.