Ryan Stewart Breedon

Appeal from the Consent and Capacity Board arising from a finding that the appellant met the criteria for involuntary patient status under the Mental Health Act.

The appellant no longer challenged the involuntary admission criteria but sought Charter relief based on an alleged non-consensual injection administered while detained, including a declaration under s. 7 and rescission of a certificate of renewal nunc pro tunc.

The court held the declaration could not be granted because it had not been properly raised before the Board or in the notice of appeal and would be procedurally unfair on the existing record.

The rescission issue was moot because the appellant had been discharged and the certificate had expired.

In any event, the requested remedy lacked the necessary nexus to the statutory issue before the Board.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their medical negligence action as statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The action was commenced more than two years after the deceased's death.

The appellants argued the limitation period should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment by the respondent hospital and doctors regarding the deceased's INR results.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the statement of claim and affidavit evidence did not plead facts sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment, but rather attempted to assert discoverability, which does not apply to s. 38(3).

Following a medical negligence trial in which the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in establishing a causal connection between breaches of the standard of care and a patient’s death following a caesarean section, the defendant hospital sought costs of $272,000.

The plaintiffs included the deceased’s spouse and minor children represented by a litigation guardian.

Although the plaintiffs had declined a settlement offer and the defendants had succeeded at trial, the court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to deny a costs award.

Considering the plaintiffs’ circumstances, the public nature of the defendant institution, and broader access to justice concerns, the court held that imposing the full costs sought would be inequitable.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking dismissal of a medical negligence action arising from the death of a patient in hospital.

The plaintiffs commenced the action more than two years after the deceased’s death and argued that discoverability and fraudulent concealment should extend the limitation period because the alleged negligence was not discovered immediately.

The court held that s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act imposes a strict two‑year limitation period running from the date of death with no discoverability exception.

As the action was commenced outside that period, the estate’s claim was statute‑barred.

The derivative claims under the Family Law Act were also barred.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the death of a mother from postpartum hemorrhage and disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) hours after a caesarean section.

The plaintiffs alleged that the nurses, anaesthesiologist, and obstetricians breached the standard of care by failing to recognize and treat the bleeding earlier.

The court found that while the anaesthesiologist breached the standard of care by delaying notification to the obstetricians of the patient's deteriorating condition, this delay did not cause the patient's death.

The court concluded that even if the decision to operate had been made earlier, the patient would still have developed DIC and the fatal blockage would not have been prevented.

The action was dismissed without costs.

During a jury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved for a determination that the plaintiff’s claim for non‑pecuniary damages was barred under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act.

The court considered whether the plaintiff sustained a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical function, the statutory threshold required to recover such damages.

After reviewing medical evidence, credibility findings, and the plaintiff’s post‑accident activities, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not establish a permanent impairment and, in any event, any impairment was neither important nor serious.

The judge also noted the modest jury award for pain and suffering as consistent with the evidentiary record.

The plaintiff was therefore barred from recovering non‑pecuniary damages.

The appellant orthopaedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in his post-operative treatment of the respondent's fractured femur.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by scheduling a follow-up appointment six weeks later instead of monitoring the patient closely, which led to the femur healing in a deformed position requiring invasive surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and the assessment of damages for future loss of income.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their medical malpractice claim.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent doctor met his disclosure obligations before the appellant elected to have heel surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the doctor provided sufficient information for informed consent was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The applicant, the president of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, brought an application for judicial review of a decision by the Association's Council to accept the resignation of a councillor.

The councillor had submitted an unequivocal resignation via email but later attempted to retract it.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that at common law, the resignation of a director of a corporation without share capital is effective upon delivery and does not require acceptance by the corporation.

Furthermore, once delivered, the resignation cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the remaining directors.

The appellant appealed a costs decision of the Discipline Committee of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario.

The Committee had dismissed a complaint regarding the appellant's election campaign material but denied his request for costs, finding the commencement of proceedings was not unwarranted.

The Divisional Court held that although the Committee erred in its view of what the Complaints Committee knew, this error did not render the decision unreasonable, as the election material could still reasonably be viewed as crossing the line into unprofessional conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the respondent's Discipline Committee denying them the costs of a hearing.

The appellants argued that the Complaints Committee's referral of the matter to a hearing was unwarranted because it relied on an expert opinion that should have been rejected upon more careful investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Discipline Committee reasonably concluded the referral was not unwarranted based on the information before the Complaints Committee at the time.

The respondent suffered a Colles' fracture and underwent closed reduction surgery performed by the appellant emergency room doctor.

The appellant failed to take a post-cast x-ray and failed to inform the respondent of the high risk of displacement and the need for weekly x-rays.

The respondent's wrist did not heal properly, requiring multiple corrective surgeries.

The trial judge found the appellant negligent and awarded $90,000 in general damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of negligence and causation regarding the failure to inform, but found the trial judge erred in assessing general damages by holding the appellant responsible for all consequences of the fracture rather than just the incremental harm caused by the delayed detection of displacement.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing general damages to $30,000.

The appellant lawyer was found guilty of professional misconduct by a Law Society Hearing Panel for sexually harassing a client and an employee.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the appellant denying all allegations.

The Hearing Panel's decision was overturned by the Appeal Panel but reinstated by the Divisional Court.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Hearing Panel's reasons were so inadequate as to foreclose meaningful appellate review.

The reasons consisted of generic generalities, unexplained conclusory observations, and failed to articulate any analysis of the appellant's evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant psychologist provided treatment to the respondent, an injured worker, beyond the sessions approved by the WSIB.

The appellant provided the services based on assurances from the respondent's paralegal that the WSIB would pay.

When the WSIB did not pay, the appellant sued the respondent in Small Claims Court for her unpaid account.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding no contract and no unjust enrichment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding that the respondent had made it clear he could not pay, and that the appellant had assumed the risk of non-payment by the WSIB.

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which ordered costs as a condition of an interim decision to adjourn a hearing.

The Divisional Court granted the application and set aside the decision, holding that the Discipline Committee lacks the express statutory authority required to order costs on an adjournment.

The Law Society appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's finding that the respondent lawyer committed professional misconduct through sexual harassment.

The Appeal Panel had ordered a new hearing, finding the Hearing Panel erred by failing to strictly apply the credibility assessment test from R. v. W. (D.).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that strict application of W. (D.) is not required in administrative disciplinary proceedings provided the correct civil standard of proof is applied.

The court restored the finding of professional misconduct but upheld the Appeal Panel's conclusion that the penalty of disbarment was unreasonable, substituting a 12-month suspension.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim that the steam rate under a 1994 Steam Sale Agreement should be based solely on nuclear-generated steam, rather than including oil-fired steam.

The trial judge interpreted the phrase 'full reasonable cost recovery principle' to allow the respondent to recover its actual costs, including those from an oil-fuelled back-up boiler.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the factual matrix or her application of contract interpretation principles.

The respondent owner built four rental buildings that were approved and inspected by the appellant municipality.

It was later discovered the buildings lacked required firewalls, leading to the tenants vacating and a mortgage shortfall.

The municipality admitted liability for negligence at trial.

On appeal, the municipality argued the owner was contributorily negligent for the defective plans submitted by its contractor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this ground, finding no evidence the contractor breached the standard of care and upholding the trial judge's finding that the owner and contractor were not joint venturers.

The judgment amount and set-off were corrected on consent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, assault causing bodily harm, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing proposed evidence of the complainant's propensity to inflict injuries on herself as collateral, as it was relevant to a central fact in issue.

The convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm were quashed and a new trial ordered.

However, the appeal from the breach of recognizance convictions was dismissed, as there was ample evidence that the appellant knowingly breached the conditions.