David Quayat

The accused was charged with dangerous driving and related offences after allegedly hitting a police officer with a motorcycle.

During the trial, the Crown attorney berated a police witness in the courthouse hallway for providing testimony that contradicted the Crown's theory, stating 'we protect our own'.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an abuse of process.

The court found that the Crown's conduct, which included yelling, using profanity, and improperly aligning with the victim officer, compromised police independence and undermined the integrity of the justice system.

Concluding that no other remedy could address the ongoing harm to the administration of justice, the court granted the motion and stayed the charges.

The appellant appealed his convictions for production of methamphetamine, possession for the purpose of trafficking of methamphetamine, and possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the pre-trial application judge erred in finding that the Crown had justified a no-knock entry to the appellant's home during the execution of a search warrant, and whether this constituted a violation of s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings, concluding that the no-knock entry was justified based on reasonable police concerns for safety, including the simultaneous execution of multiple search warrants, potential presence of weapons, the volatile nature of methamphetamine laboratories, and evidence preservation concerns.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants laid a private Information against an organization for allegedly recruiting volunteers for a foreign armed force.

The Crown intervened and withdrew the charge, citing no reasonable prospect of conviction.

The appellants applied for certiorari, alleging abuse of process.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding a lack of standing and jurisdiction, and alternatively, that the appellants failed to meet the evidentiary threshold for abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superior Court does have jurisdiction and private informants do have standing to seek certiorari in these circumstances, the application judge correctly concluded that the appellants failed to meet the high evidentiary threshold to show abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of a loaded prohibited firearm after police found a large quantity of drugs, a loaded gun, and $40,000 in cash in a hidden compartment in the trunk of his car.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The accused testified that he had no knowledge of the hidden compartment or the contraband, suggesting that his former intimate partner or her associates planted the items to frame him.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unbelievable and found that the only reasonably plausible inference on the totality of the evidence was that the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police, without a warrant, used an arrested drug dealer's seized cellphone to impersonate him and continue a text message conversation with the appellant, luring him to deliver heroin laced with fentanyl.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text message conversation, the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because the police faced an urgent situation calling for immediate action to prevent the imminent trafficking of fentanyl to protect public safety and it was impracticable to obtain a warrant.

Karakatsanis, Martin and Moreau JJ. dissented, finding no exigent circumstances and that the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay drug trafficking charges against the respondent, Angelo Kirkopoulos, on the grounds of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge had found a net delay of 35.5 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence delay and 14 months attributed to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance.

The Crown argued that an additional 8-month period, which the application judge classified as institutional delay due to court backlogs, should also be considered an exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the application judge's characterization of the 8-month period as institutional delay.

The court emphasized that while the pandemic caused exceptional circumstances, the Crown must still demonstrate reasonable efforts to mitigate delay, and deference is owed to a trial judge's factual findings and local knowledge regarding delay attribution.

The applicant was arrested for domestic assault.

Police subsequently discovered evidence of drug trafficking, leading to a search warrant for his residence and vehicle, where drugs, cash, and a firearm were found.

The applicant brought preliminary motions alleging multiple Charter breaches, including unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8) and denial of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)), seeking exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2) and to quash the search warrant.

The court found breaches of s. 8 (warrantless entry into the vehicle and residence) and s. 10(b) (delay in facilitating access to counsel).

However, the court held that the search warrant remained valid after excising unconstitutionally obtained information and that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Treyshawn Duffy pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, and possession of an overcapacity magazine while prohibited.

The court considered aggravating factors, including his criminal record and the commercial nature of the drug operation, alongside significant mitigating factors such as his guilty plea, demonstrated remorse, strong family support, efforts towards rehabilitation, and the impact of a difficult childhood marked by poverty and violence, including the effects of anti-Black racism.

The Crown sought a 4.5-year global sentence, while the defence proposed 4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years, granting credit for pre-sentence custody, including enhanced credit for lockdown days, and considering restrictive bail conditions.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition, a DNA order, and forfeiture of seized items.

The defendants, Victoria Manna-Silva and Ralph George, brought applications under sections 24(1) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude evidence (drugs and a firearm) and for a stay of proceedings, alleging violations of their section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The court found that police lawfully entered the apartment under exigent circumstances (911 domestic violence call) and observed drugs in plain view.

However, the court found section 8 violations for police remaining in the apartment after Ms. Manna-Silva was removed and for minor unlawful searches by a supervising officer.

A section 10(b) violation was also found due to delay in facilitating Ms. Manna-Silva's access to counsel.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the breaches was low to moderate, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was not sufficiently serious to warrant exclusion given the independent discoverability of evidence and lack of self-incrimination, and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious drug and firearm charges on their merits.

Consequently, both the applications for exclusion of evidence and a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

During the execution of a search warrant at a residence, the applicant, a Black man who was not the target of the warrant, was ordered to the ground and handcuffed by tactical officers pursuant to a general police policy.

He was subsequently arrested for drug possession by another officer who mistakenly believed he was already under arrest and who lacked objective reasonable grounds.

The applicant brought a motion to exclude the seized fentanyl under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found flagrant violations of the applicant's s. 9 and s. 10(b) rights, noting the systemic issues and the heightened impact of the breaches on a racialized individual in his own home.

The evidence was excluded.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after 1.8 kilograms of the drug were found hidden in his suitcase.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions on circumstantial evidence by failing to explicitly state that exculpatory inferences need not arise from proven facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was adequately and sufficiently instructed in accordance with the principles in Villaroman, and that the charge as a whole did not shift the burden of proof to the accused.

The applicant, having been convicted of importing cocaine and awaiting sentencing, brought an application to vary his bail conditions to permit him to travel to Spain with his son.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant posed a flight risk given the likelihood of a lengthy penitentiary sentence, and that permitting international travel for a convicted drug importer would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicants sought certiorari and mandamus to overturn the Public Prosecution Service of Canada's (PPSC) decision to terminate a private prosecution against Sar-El Canada under the Foreign Enlistment Act.

The applicants alleged the termination was influenced by partisan interests and constituted an abuse of process, arguing there was a reasonable prospect of conviction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing to challenge the Crown's exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

The court affirmed that prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to withdraw charges based on no reasonable prospect of conviction, is reviewable only for egregious abuse of process, which was not demonstrated in this case.

Courtney Dennis was charged with importing cocaine and resisting arrest.

The Crown alleged Dennis knew the suitcases contained cocaine, not cash, which Dennis denied, claiming he was importing cash for his cousin.

The court admitted evidence of Dennis's prior drug dealing to prove knowledge and motive, applying principles of discreditable conduct evidence.

The judge found Dennis's testimony regarding his cousin and his unawareness of a suitcase switch unbelievable.

For the resisting arrest charge, the court concluded Dennis knew the individuals were police officers despite his denial.

Dennis was found guilty on both counts.

The appellant, convicted of importing methamphetamine, appealed his conviction and 12-year sentence.

His grounds of appeal included alleged Charter violations (detention, search, voluntariness of statements) due to a particularized drug lookout at the border, and a flawed jury selection process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, affirming that routine border inspections, even with a specific lookout, do not trigger Charter detention until a highly intrusive search or communicated subjective intent to detain occurs.

The court also found the appellant's statements voluntary and the jury selection process valid.

The 12-year sentence for importing 25 kg of methamphetamine was deemed fit and within the appropriate range for large-scale drug couriers.

The appellants, Daye, Isaac, and Saunders, appealed their drug-related convictions.

Isaac also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals from conviction, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings regarding Charter breaches (s. 10(b), s. 9, s. 11(b)), refusal to permit cross-examination of the affiant, or the issuance of search warrants.

The court also found Saunders' conviction for constructive possession reasonable.

However, Isaac was granted leave to appeal his sentence, and his six-year global sentence was reduced to four years, as the trial judge failed to adequately consider his de facto guilty plea.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking and possession of fentanyl and heroin, and his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal against conviction was an alleged s. 8 Charter infringement when police impersonated a drug dealer via text messages to facilitate a drug transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that there was no s. 8 Charter breach, finding that while the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his electronic communications, the police actions were justified by exigent circumstances related to public safety due to the presence of fentanyl.

The court also dismissed appeals regarding the reasonableness of the verdicts (continuity of evidence) and the sentence, affirming that the presence of fentanyl is an aggravating factor regardless of the offender's specific knowledge of its proportion.

The appellant, Thomas Zakos, appealed his convictions for cocaine trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment.

The core issue was whether Detective Constable Green provided an opportunity to traffic before forming reasonable suspicion.

The Court of Appeal distinguished between exploratory questions and an actual opportunity to commit an offence.

It found that the question "U good for powder?" was merely exploratory, and reasonable suspicion was formed when the appellant responded "How much were you looking for?".

The subsequent question "How much for a b?" constituted the opportunity to traffic, by which point reasonable suspicion existed.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no entrapment and distinguishing the facts from R. v. Williams (SCC), where the opportunity was provided without prior reasonable suspicion.

The appellant, James Hawryluk, sought leave to appeal his sentence, specifically challenging an automatic s. 109(1) firearm prohibition order and a forfeiture order, arguing his s. 35 Métis right to hunt for sustenance under s. 113(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

He also requested the firearm be transferred to a family member or that the dismissal be without prejudice to a future s. 113(1) application.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge for not considering s. 113 when imposing the s. 109 order, noting that the appellant could bring a s. 113 application before the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed on the firearm issues, but the victim fine surcharge of $200 was set aside due to its unconstitutionality as per R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for a stay of convictions for trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime, arguing police entrapment in "dial-a-dope" operations.

The appeal centered on the application of the Supreme Court's R. v. Ahmad framework for entrapment, specifically regarding the "reasonable suspicion" test.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge applied an incorrect analytical approach by relying on "bona fide investigation" as a standalone justification, her ultimate conclusion of no entrapment was correct.

The Court determined that reasonable suspicion was formed during the initial and subsequent communications with the appellant before the opportunity to commit the crime was presented.

The appeal was dismissed.