Abraham Irvin Schein

The plaintiff, Kaboom Fireworks Inc., brought a motion to compel several defendants (Vulcan Fireworks International Inc., Joseph Wan, Mystical Distributing Company Ltd., and Mystical Distributing International Ltd.) to answer undertakings and refusals from examinations for discovery.

The action concerns an alleged breach of an Exclusive Supply Agreement.

The court addressed various categories of refusals and undertakings, largely finding the questions relevant to the pleadings, particularly regarding the relationships between defendant entities, damage calculations, and the sale of Vulcan.

Most outstanding discovery obligations were ordered to be answered, with some resolved by consent or adjourned.

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitral award under s. 46(1)(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, arguing the arbitrator treated them unfairly by refusing to allow an amendment to their statement of defence to plead negligent misrepresentation shortly before the peremptory hearing.

The respondent cross-applied to enforce the award.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator acted within his authority and did not treat the applicants unfairly, as the late amendment would have required further discovery and evidence.

The respondent's cross-application to enforce the award was granted.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The action arose from tweets published by the defendant accusing the plaintiff of fraud and misappropriation of funds raised for victims of the Fort McMurray wildfires.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had demonstrated substantial merit to his defamation claim and that the defendant's defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication did not have a real prospect of success.

The court also found that the public interest in permitting the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The Court of Appeal heard two appeals concerning defamation actions dismissed under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP legislation).

The motion judge had dismissed the actions, finding no valid defence in one case and a potentially valid defence in the other, and in both cases, the public interest in protecting expression outweighed the harm to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the dismissal of the defamation actions.

However, it allowed the cross-appeals on costs, finding that the motion judge erred in not awarding full indemnity costs to the successful defendants, as the actions bore the hallmarks of SLAPP lawsuits.

Al Jazeera Media Network brought a motion under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action commenced by Rebel News Network Ltd. as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

Rebel News alleged three defamatory statements in an internet article and YouTube video published by Al Jazeera.

The court found that Al Jazeera satisfied its initial burden that the proceeding arose from an expression relating to a matter of public interest.

The burden then shifted to Rebel News to show substantial merit, no valid defence, and that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court found Rebel News established substantial merit for its defamation claim.

However, Rebel News failed to show that Al Jazeera had no valid defence, specifically regarding the defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest, as the record raised credibility issues precluding a "deep dive" into the evidence at this stage.

Furthermore, Rebel News failed to provide specific evidence of harm and causation, leading the court to conclude that the public interest in free expression and public debate outweighed the public interest in permitting the action to continue.

Consequently, Al Jazeera's motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, Ezra Levant and Rebel News Network Ltd., commenced a defamation action against Brendan Demelle and The Narwhal News Society.

Demelle brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The court found that Demelle's expression related to a matter of public interest.

While the plaintiffs established grounds to believe their defamation claim had substantial merit and that Demelle had no valid defences (justification, fair comment, responsible communication), they failed to provide sufficient evidence of specific harm suffered as a direct result of Demelle's publication.

Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action, as they did not clear the threshold of showing harm and causation required for the public interest in continuing the proceeding to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The parties made written submissions regarding the costs of the appeal and a related motion for leave to adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal ordered no costs as between the respondent and the Nealon appellants.

The respondent was awarded costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $40,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, against the Garber appellants.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a dock they constructed on Lake Simcoe constituted a private nuisance to the neighbouring respondent.

The trial judge had ordered a mandatory injunction for the dock's removal, punitive damages of $100,000, and substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of nuisance and the mandatory injunction, noting the dock substantially and unreasonably interfered with the respondent's ability to use their boat.

The Court also upheld the punitive damages against the property owners (Garber) due to their refusal to remedy the nuisance.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the punitive damages against the contractor (Nealon) and reducing the costs awarded against him to a partial indemnity scale, finding his conduct did not warrant such exceptional penalties.

The plaintiff, Crawford Packaging Inc., brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction against its former salesperson, Orazio Dorata, and corporate defendants, alleging breach of non-competition, non-solicitation, and employee poaching clauses in Dorata's employment contract, as well as failure to return company property.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the high threshold for a quia timet injunction, as no actual harm had occurred, and any future harm was speculative.

The court also noted that contractual provisions deeming fiduciary duty or irreparable harm are ineffective if not supported by legal standards.

The defendant appealed the dismissal of an anti-SLAPP motion and sought leave to appeal a costs order.

The defendant had posted tweets alleging that the plaintiff's fundraising campaign for Fort McMurray forest fire victims was fraudulent.

The motion judge dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the tweets related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the defendant had no valid defences and that the harm was sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the anti-SLAPP motion but varied the costs award due to procedural unfairness and the defendant's delay in bringing the motion.

The defendant's anti-SLAPP motion and a subsequent motion to introduce fresh evidence were dismissed.

The plaintiff sought costs for defending these motions.

The court, applying s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act and recent Court of Appeal guidance (Veneruzzo, Platnick v Bent), determined that an award of costs was appropriate.

The court found the impugned expressions were defamatory personal attacks, not matters of public interest, and none of the indicia of a SLAPP suit were present.

The defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff partial indemnity costs totaling $19,731.64.

The defendant in a defamation action brought an urgent motion to adduce fresh evidence—a secret recording of the plaintiff—while the court's decision on an anti-SLAPP motion was under reserve.

The defendant argued the recording proved the lawsuit was a SLAPP suit brought for ulterior motives.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the snippet of the recording was not reliable, could not be definitively linked to the specific lawsuit, and would not probably change the result of the main motion, which relies on specific statutory tests rather than the plaintiff's subjective intention.

The defendant brought a motion under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action arising from a series of tweets.

The tweets accused the plaintiff of conducting a fraudulent fundraising campaign for victims of the Fort McMurray fires.

The court found that the tweets were not on a matter of public interest but were thinly veiled personal attacks.

Furthermore, the court held that the claim had substantial merit, there were no valid defences of fair comment, and the Libel and Slander Act notice provisions do not apply to Twitter posts.

The motion was dismissed and the action was ordered to proceed to trial.

The landlord, 7Marli Limited, sought costs following a partial summary judgment for unpaid rent against its tenant, Pet Valu Canada Inc. The landlord claimed $8,742.91, including a portion for pleadings, productions, and discoveries.

The tenant argued the claim was excessive and proposed $4,500, limited to the motion's costs.

The court agreed with the tenant, awarding $4,500, all inclusive, for the motion only, deferring other costs to the main cause.

The plaintiff, Solar Income Fund Inc. (SIF), sued Jennifer Jackson (its former President and COO), Emerging Power Inc. (EPI), and 2427672 Ontario Inc. (242) for $1,000,000 in damages, alleging misrepresentation, breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss SIF's action and grant their respective counterclaims.

Jackson counterclaimed for indemnification under SIF's by-laws, while EPI and 242 counterclaimed for outstanding invoices, termination pay, expenses, and commissions.

The court dismissed SIF's claims, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding Jackson's alleged bad faith or breach of duty as an officer/director, nor any evidence of damages.

The court granted all defendants' counterclaims, confirming Jackson's right to indemnification, EPI's entitlement to unpaid fees and termination pay, and 242's right to outstanding commissions, rejecting SIF's arguments of waiver or technical non-compliance.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis due to the inflammatory nature of SIF's unproven allegations of intentional misconduct.

The landlord, 7Marli Limited, brought a motion for partial summary judgment against its commercial tenant, Pet Valu Canada Inc., for unpaid rent after the tenant vacated the premises.

The tenant resisted, arguing that partial summary judgment was an inefficient use of judicial resources and inconsistent with Supreme Court of Canada guidance on summary judgment.

The court granted the partial summary judgment, affirming the landlord's right to sue for rent arrears while keeping the lease alive, without a duty to mitigate, and distinguishing the case from those where partial summary judgment is inappropriate.

The respondent successfully brought an application to enforce payment of $263,600 on a promissory note.

The appellant appealed, arguing the application judge erred by refusing to consider the broader factual matrix, including a side-agreement that allegedly converted the demand note into one payable from future profits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the matter involved material facts in dispute regarding the interpretation of the broader transaction and could not be resolved by application under Rule 14.05(3).

The judgment was set aside and the matter directed to proceed as a trial of an action.

In complex construction deficiency litigation between a condominium corporation and related development entities, the court addressed whether certain claims previously identified in the plaintiff’s evidence as “resolved” could nonetheless remain alive pending cross‑examinations in a summary judgment process.

The plaintiff sought to preserve one remaining claim despite sworn evidence and expert reports indicating that the issue had been resolved.

The court held that a party cannot maintain a claim merely to explore potential evidence through cross‑examination after the evidentiary record and procedural timelines have long passed.

Emphasizing the need to avoid procedural gamesmanship and delay, the court dismissed the disputed claim along with several others previously identified as resolved.

Orders were directed dismissing specific items in the schedules to the statements of claim in two related actions.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the respondent's expert evidence on the interpretation of the commercial reasonableness standard under the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to accept the expert's opinion, especially since the appellants chose not to put forward any expert evidence of their own.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the expert's alleged bias.

A secured lender brought a motion for summary judgment seeking payment of accounts receivable assigned to it following borrower default.

The moving party relied on security agreements governed by Virginia law and the Uniform Commercial Code, asserting a right to collect accounts receivable directly from an account debtor.

The responding parties argued the lender’s decision to collect receivables rather than realize on other collateral was commercially unreasonable and raised triable issues.

The court accepted expert evidence on Virginia law and held the UCC’s commercial reasonableness requirement applied to the manner of collection, not the decision to pursue accounts receivable over other collateral.

The court further held that cause of action estoppel barred the applicants’ claims due to prior litigation in the United States.

Summary judgment was granted and the related application dismissed.