Neil A. Paris

The plaintiff, Ian McPherson, was hired as CEO and Ultimate Designated Person (UDP) of Global Growth Assets Inc. and Global RESP Corporation in August 2018.

His primary task was to bring the companies into compliance with Ontario Securities Commission orders following years of regulatory violations.

In January 2019, the board removed Ms. Hanane Bouji (chair and executive) from Mr. McPherson's supervision, reporting directly to the board instead.

Mr. McPherson repeatedly raised concerns that this decision interfered with his UDP obligations under Ontario securities law and violated the Commission's prior orders restricting Mr. Bouji's (the shareholder and Ms. Bouji's father) involvement in the company.

On February 28, 2019, the board terminated Mr. McPherson's employment without cause.

The court found that Global breached Part XXI.2 of the Ontario Securities Act by terminating Mr. McPherson's employment as a reprisal for his protected activity in expressing concerns about violations of Ontario securities law.

The court awarded Mr. McPherson $5,379,808.22 (two times his remuneration from termination to judgment date) plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant Alain Checroune arising from a failed share purchase agreement for an office building.

The defendant failed to comply with prior court orders and did not participate in the proceedings.

The court granted default judgment and awarded damages for breach of contract, return of deposit, and compensation under the Business Corporations Act for oppressive conduct.

The defendant's actions included harassment of tenants, interference with the transaction, and deliberate obstruction of the plaintiffs' interests.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and held Ontario courts lack jurisdiction over the claims against the Italian defendants.

The majority accepted the Ontario cardmember agreement as a presumptive connecting contract but found the presumption rebutted because the real and substantial connection to Ontario was weak given the tort occurred in Italy and the foreign defendants’ relationship to Ontario was remote.

The dissent would have restored the motion judge’s ruling and allowed Ontario jurisdiction.

The court considered a motion for summary judgment by Payam Bozorgi, who was added as a party to Shabnam Shokoufimoghiman’s family law application against her former spouse, Amir Ebrahim Bozorgi.

Payam sought to dismiss the claims against him and to be removed as a party.

The court found there was no genuine issue for trial regarding Shabnam’s trust claims against Payam, but there was a genuine issue for trial on the fraudulent conveyance claim.

Payam’s request to be removed as a party was denied, and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

The applicant sought release of her share of proceeds from a jointly-owned property to close a condominium purchase and pay legal fees.

The primary respondent sought preservation of these funds as security for equalization claims.

A third-party respondent sought security for costs against the applicant for a trust claim.

The court ordered a partial release of funds for the condominium closing, with the remaining proceeds and a portion of the condominium's future sale proceeds to be held in trust as security for the primary respondent's equalization claims and the third-party respondent's potential costs.

The court found the trust claim against the third-party was not frivolous enough to warrant security for costs in the amount sought, but ordered a smaller amount to be held as security from the condo sale.

The respondents were injured in a water taxi accident in Venice, Italy, and sued the foreign water taxi operators in Ontario, relying on their travel booking contract with Amex Canada to establish jurisdiction.

The motion judge found that the Ontario court had jurisdiction based on the fourth presumptive connecting factor from Van Breda (a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that even if the presumptive connecting factor was established, the foreign appellants successfully rebutted it because the Ontario contract had little or nothing to do with the subject matter of the litigation against them.

The applicants, a video game company and two of its employees, brought an urgent ex parte motion for a Norwich Pharmacal order against the respondent telecommunications provider.

The employees had been subjected to severe online harassment, doxxing, and racist threats by anonymous individuals using the respondent's services.

The court granted the order without notice to the respondent, finding that the respondent's policy of notifying customers about such requests could lead to further serious harm, including 'swatting'.

The court held that the test for a Norwich order was met, as the discovery was necessary to identify the wrongdoers for potential legal or police action.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action against the respondent, Ante Kegalj, following a summary judgment motion.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in applying the Hryniak v. Mauldin analytical framework by focusing too narrowly on the pleadings and the appellants' admissions, rather than broadly assessing the entire evidentiary record.

The motion judge failed to properly consider the full scope of the fraud allegations and the significant credibility issues raised by conflicting evidence regarding the respondent's alleged involvement in a fraudulent land development scheme and personal enrichment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal, and remitted the matter for trial, emphasizing the need for a fair process and just adjudication.

Following a trial where the respondent was completely successful, the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no bad faith or unreasonable conduct by the appellants.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $79,000, finding this to be a fair and reasonable amount.

This costs endorsement addresses three motions within a consolidated proceeding.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Adair parties (defendants) against the Pichelli parties (plaintiffs) for their successful summary judgment motions, finding that the allegations of fraud and malfeasance were unsubstantiated.

For the summary judgment motion brought by the Vuletic defendants against the Pichelli parties, costs were reserved to the trial judge due to unresolved factual disputes, including an allegation of forgery.

Finally, for a motion to vary a previous decision regarding Ante Kegalj, the Pichelli parties were awarded partial indemnity costs, significantly reduced from their claim, due to the straightforward nature of the motion and issues with their bill of costs.

This decision addresses a motion brought by the plaintiffs (Pichelli Parties and Caroti Parties) to amend previous summary judgment reasons and for the judge to recuse herself from re-hearing a specific summary judgment motion.

The original reasons had been released without oral submissions from the plaintiffs on the Kegalj summary judgment motion, which had been previously adjourned.

The court found it had jurisdiction to amend its decision before a formal order was entered, as the failure to hear oral submissions constituted a miscarriage of justice due to a violation of the *audi alteram partem* rule.

The court also determined that a different judge should hear the re-argued summary judgment motion due to a reasonable apprehension of bias, while the original judge would remain as the case management judge.

The corporate defendant brought a motion to adjourn the trial date after its counsel was removed from the record shortly before trial.

The plaintiff and defendants by counterclaim strongly opposed the adjournment, arguing the defendant's principal had delayed in retaining new counsel.

The pre-trial judge determined she had jurisdiction to hear the adjournment request under Rule 50.07.

Despite finding the defendant's principal largely responsible for the delay, the court reluctantly granted the adjournment to allow the unrepresented corporation to retain counsel, noting this was the first fixed trial date and there was no evidence of prejudice.

The adjournment was granted on peremptory terms with costs thrown away awarded to the opposing parties.

The defendants in multiple related actions brought motions for summary judgment against the Pichelli plaintiffs, who were investors in a real estate development project.

The plaintiffs alleged that the developers (the Vuletics), a title holder (Kegalj), and the developers' lawyers (the Adairs) engaged in fraudulent and improper conduct.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against the Adair defendants, finding that the lawyers owed no duty of care to the non-client investors.

The court also granted summary judgment dismissing the claims against Kegalj, finding no relationship or duty owed to the plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the Vuletics' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of credibility and conflicting versions of the lot purchase agreements required a trial.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking her claim under a Rule 21 motion without leave to amend.

The dispute arose from a collective agreement between unionized workers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the dispute was entirely regulated by the collective agreement and that the arbitrator possessed the necessary remedial powers to address the wrong.

The court also declined to grant leave to appeal the costs award.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

The plaintiff, Solar Income Fund Inc. (SIF), sued Jennifer Jackson (its former President and COO), Emerging Power Inc. (EPI), and 2427672 Ontario Inc. (242) for $1,000,000 in damages, alleging misrepresentation, breach of contract, and intentional interference with economic relations.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss SIF's action and grant their respective counterclaims.

Jackson counterclaimed for indemnification under SIF's by-laws, while EPI and 242 counterclaimed for outstanding invoices, termination pay, expenses, and commissions.

The court dismissed SIF's claims, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding Jackson's alleged bad faith or breach of duty as an officer/director, nor any evidence of damages.

The court granted all defendants' counterclaims, confirming Jackson's right to indemnification, EPI's entitlement to unpaid fees and termination pay, and 242's right to outstanding commissions, rejecting SIF's arguments of waiver or technical non-compliance.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis due to the inflammatory nature of SIF's unproven allegations of intentional misconduct.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to recover the balance of a purchase price under an asset purchase agreement for valve-related business assets.

The defendants alleged contractual ambiguity, misrepresentation, and unilateral mistake relating to the valuation of slow-moving inventory and argued that the purchase price should have been reduced.

The court held that the agreement unambiguously required valuation of inventory at the plaintiffs’ cost as verified through a joint count at closing, which the defendants’ representative confirmed in writing.

The defendants failed to produce evidence supporting their valuation or their representative’s position and attempted to retrospectively alter the agreed contractual process.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff, a black man, sued his former employer for constructive dismissal, alleging a poisoned work environment due to racism after a co-worker refused to attend mandatory training with him.

The trial judge found in favour of the plaintiff, concluding that the co-worker's refusal was racially motivated and that the employer's response was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employer's appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions regarding racism and a poisoned work environment were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The Court held that a single incident did not objectively establish a poisoned workplace, and the employer's actions in investigating the complaint and offering alternative positions did not constitute a repudiation of the employment contract.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rule 48.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the contextual approach to the Reid factors governing relief from dismissal for delay, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although there had been a period of more than three years with no steps taken to advance the litigation, the delay resulted from counsel’s inattentiveness and the failure to receive the Registrar’s status notice.

The motion was brought promptly once the dismissal was discovered, and the court found insufficient evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside subject to conditions including suspension of pre‑judgment interest during the delay period, a litigation timetable, and costs payable to the defendant.

Following reasons for decision in an employment dispute, the court addressed the issue of costs and interest.

The parties reached an agreement fixing costs payable to the plaintiff, with partial indemnity costs awarded up to a specified date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court ordered total costs of $72,715.11 including disbursements and HST.

The endorsement also amended a paragraph of the earlier reasons to align with the Courts of Justice Act regarding pre‑judgment and post‑judgment interest rates.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging racial discrimination in employment.

The applicant had also commenced a civil action against the corporate respondent arising from the same factual context, seeking damages for breach of employment contract.

The Tribunal found that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code bars an application where a civil proceeding seeking remedies for the same alleged Code infringement has been commenced.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.