Ian S. Wright

The applicant sought to prove the deceased's 2020 Will and inter vivos transfers, while the respondent filed a Notice of Objection alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence regarding both the 2016 and 2020 Wills, as well as the transfers.

The court reviewed the evidence, applying the minimal evidentiary threshold test for suspicious circumstances.

The court found that the respondent failed to meet this threshold for any of her grounds, and the applicant successfully addressed any potential concerns.

The respondent's Notice of Objection was struck.

The appellant tenants, who own homes on land leased from the respondent, challenged occupancy limitations in their long-term leases.

The Landlord and Tenant Board found the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 applied and that the limitations were a substantial interference.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that s. 22 of the Act did not invalidate agreed-upon provisions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, finding that the occupancy limitations were inconsistent with the Act's scheme of security of tenure and were therefore void under s. 4, regardless of the parties' agreement.

The defendants moved to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (COPL) registered against a property after the plaintiff corporation had been voluntarily dissolved.

The plaintiffs alleged the property had been fraudulently transferred prior to dissolution and sought to maintain the COPL, arguing that shareholders retained a beneficial interest or that the court should preserve the certificate on a nunc pro tunc basis pending revival of the corporation.

The court held that a dissolved corporation lacks capacity to commence or maintain proceedings and therefore cannot sustain a COPL.

Shareholders of a dissolved corporation also cannot assert personal claims for wrongs done to the corporation or step into its position to maintain the certificate.

The court declined to exercise nunc pro tunc discretion, finding that the alleged fraud and potential revival of the corporation were matters for trial and did not justify maintaining the encumbrance.

A law firm brought motions in two related civil actions seeking to be removed as solicitors of record for their former clients and requesting costs personally against another lawyer under rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving firm alleged that the other lawyer had undertaken to file notices of change of lawyer and failed to do so, thereby forcing the motions.

The court found that no undertaking had been given regarding one of the actions and that the undertaking in the other action was conditional upon file review and further information.

The court held that the evidence did not establish that the lawyer caused costs to be incurred without reasonable cause or through undue delay or negligence.

Applying the caution required before ordering costs personally against counsel, the court declined to impose personal liability.

A housing co‑operative applied under s.171.13 of the Co‑operative Corporations Act for a declaration that the respondents’ membership and occupancy rights were terminated and for a writ of possession.

The termination followed a confrontation between one respondent and another co‑op member, which the board and general membership concluded justified eviction.

The court held that the co‑op failed to comply with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness, including inadequate notice, expansion of allegations beyond the notice, denial of the respondents’ opportunity to respond to prejudicial allegations, and restricting voting options during the membership appeal contrary to the statute.

The court further found no reasonable basis to terminate the second respondent’s membership and occupancy rights.

Because the termination decisions were procedurally unfair and unsupported as to one respondent, the requested declaration and writ of possession were refused.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar’s dismissal of a wrongful dismissal action for delay under Rule 48.14(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered the contextual approach to the Reid factors governing relief from dismissal for delay, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

Although there had been a period of more than three years with no steps taken to advance the litigation, the delay resulted from counsel’s inattentiveness and the failure to receive the Registrar’s status notice.

The motion was brought promptly once the dismissal was discovered, and the court found insufficient evidence of actual prejudice to the defendant.

The dismissal order was therefore set aside subject to conditions including suspension of pre‑judgment interest during the delay period, a litigation timetable, and costs payable to the defendant.