Derek M. Sinko

The plaintiffs, Lee Anthony Delfino and Standing O Entertainment Group Inc., sued the Intercounty Baseball League and its commissioner, John Kastner, for breach of contract and negligence after their team, the Brantford Red Sox, was eliminated from the 2016 playoffs.

The claim arose from the commissioner’s decision to allow a Toronto Maple Leafs player, Mike Wagner, to participate in the playoffs despite allegations he was ineligible under league rules.

The court found that the league’s governance documents delegated final authority on eligibility to the commissioner, and that his decision was made in good faith and within his discretion.

The court dismissed the claim, holding that there was no breach of contract or negligence, and that the process followed was procedurally fair.

The court considered whether a United States gift tax liability arising from a 2009 transfer of Florida property by the deceased, Carolyn Alexander, was a just debt of her Ontario estate.

The applicant, Carrie Lynn Dyjack, sought the court’s direction after paying the tax and related expenses personally.

The court found that the U.S. Gift Tax was a proper liability of the estate, rejecting the respondent’s arguments that the tax was not intended to be paid from the estate, that it was a “charge” payable by the beneficiary under the Succession Law Reform Act, or that it was unenforceable in Canada.

The court ordered the estate to reimburse the applicant for the tax and related expenses.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and awarded costs to the appellants.

The court found that the motion judge erred in law by holding that the purchasers' requisitions regarding oil and gas leases were invalid because they did not go to the root of title.

The court was not satisfied that it could determine the validity of the requisitions on the record before it.

The court considered a motion by the Defendants to strike portions of the Plaintiffs’ amended claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claim for an easement for drainage.

The court found that while the Plaintiffs’ pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the easement claim.

The Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to define the easement with adequate specificity or to show that an easement of necessity or by common intention existed at the time of severance.

The claim for an easement for drainage was summarily dismissed.

The court determined costs following a simplified proceeding trial where both the plaintiff's claim (adverse possession, prescriptive easement) and the defendants' counterclaim (injunction, trespass damages) were dismissed.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $172,028.97.

The plaintiff argued for no costs due to divided success or the Rule 76.12.1(1) limit.

The court found the Rule 76.12.1(2) exception applied as the action commenced before January 1, 2020.

Considering mixed success, the defendants' more favourable offer to settle, and the principles of proportionality and cost minimization in simplified proceedings (Rule 76), the court awarded the defendants $75,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will clause granting an option to purchase "the farming business carried on by me." The testator had ceased active farming years prior to her death, instead leasing the land.

The application judge found the farming business had ceased, causing the option to lapse.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the application judge erred by not applying the presumption under s. 22 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which states a will speaks as if made immediately before death.

The Court found that the testator was still carrying on a farming business at the time of her death through leasing the land and declaring farm income, thus the option was valid.

The appellant obtained a British Columbia judgment against the respondent, which was registered in Ontario.

The appellant delayed enforcing the judgment for over six years because he believed there was little equity in the respondent's properties.

When the appellant sought leave to issue a writ of seizure and sale, the motion judge dismissed the motion, inferring that the appellant had waived his rights and that the respondent had detrimentally relied on the delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors.

The appellant's explanation for the delay was plausible, and the respondent could not have reasonably believed the appellant waived his right to enforce the $333,717.50 judgment, nor did she detrimentally rely on such a belief.

The applicants, Darshan Atwal and Balwinder Kaur Atwal, brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss a counterclaim by Amandeep Singh Manu.

The counterclaim alleged that Balwinder Kaur Atwal owed Amandeep Singh Manu $225,000 for a pizza restaurant interest, which was to be paid by November 20, 2012.

Amandeep Singh Manu claimed a $100,000 payment from Darshan Atwal in 2014 was a partial payment, leaving a balance of $125,000.

The applicants argued the counterclaim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found the counterclaim was indeed statute-barred as no action was commenced within the two-year limitation period, and the issue was severable from the main action.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing the counterclaim.

The plaintiff, Stephen Deak, brought an action against GreenMantra Recycling Technologies Ltd. concerning the validity of an overtime averaging agreement and a termination clause in his employment contract.

The court found the overtime averaging agreement invalid under section 22 of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, because it lacked an expiry date.

The court also found the termination clause unenforceable as it provided for a notice period less than the minimum prescribed by the ESA, thereby entitling the employee to statutory notice.