Derek M. Sinko

The appellant appealed a summary judgment holding it jointly liable with a related corporation for wrongful dismissal under the common employer doctrine.

The court held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test, made findings available on the record, and committed no palpable and overriding error in concluding that both corporations jointly ran the hotel and intended to create an employment relationship with the deceased employee.

The court also upheld the conclusion that res judicata and abuse of process did not bar the estate's subsequent claim against the appellant, because the appellant was not a defendant in the initial action and the corporate relationship was not easily discernable.

The appeal was dismissed with partial indemnity costs to the respondent.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Braid J. dated October 9, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The plaintiffs, Lee Anthony Delfino and Standing O Entertainment Group Inc., sued the Intercounty Baseball League and its commissioner, John Kastner, for breach of contract and negligence after their team, the Brantford Red Sox, was eliminated from the 2016 playoffs.

The claim arose from the commissioner’s decision to allow a Toronto Maple Leafs player, Mike Wagner, to participate in the playoffs despite allegations he was ineligible under league rules.

The court found that the league’s governance documents delegated final authority on eligibility to the commissioner, and that his decision was made in good faith and within his discretion.

The court dismissed the claim, holding that there was no breach of contract or negligence, and that the process followed was procedurally fair.

The plaintiff advanced $100,000 to the defendant, his nephew by marriage.

The plaintiff claimed the advance was a demand loan, while the defendant argued it was partial payment of a debt owed to him by the plaintiff's spouse under a separate business agreement.

The court found that the advance was a demand loan, as there was no written guarantee by the plaintiff for his spouse's alleged debt, and the business agreement lacked consideration and was not legally binding.

The court rejected the defendant's claim for equitable set-off and held, in the alternative, that the defendant was unjustly enriched.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff for $100,000 plus costs.

The court considered whether a United States gift tax liability arising from a 2009 transfer of Florida property by the deceased, Carolyn Alexander, was a just debt of her Ontario estate.

The applicant, Carrie Lynn Dyjack, sought the court’s direction after paying the tax and related expenses personally.

The court found that the U.S. Gift Tax was a proper liability of the estate, rejecting the respondent’s arguments that the tax was not intended to be paid from the estate, that it was a “charge” payable by the beneficiary under the Succession Law Reform Act, or that it was unenforceable in Canada.

The court ordered the estate to reimburse the applicant for the tax and related expenses.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal, set aside the summary judgment, and awarded costs to the appellants.

The court found that the motion judge erred in law by holding that the purchasers' requisitions regarding oil and gas leases were invalid because they did not go to the root of title.

The court was not satisfied that it could determine the validity of the requisitions on the record before it.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement over parts of the respondents' neighbouring cottage property, which he had historically used to access Lake Erie.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's use of the lands was with tacit permission as an act of good neighbourliness, rather than acquiescence, and that the easement was not reasonably necessary given alternative access routes.

The court also affirmed the dismissal of the adverse possession claim, as the appellant failed to establish an intention to exclude the true owners.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court considered a motion by the Defendants to strike portions of the Plaintiffs’ amended claim or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the Plaintiffs’ claim for an easement for drainage.

The court found that while the Plaintiffs’ pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the easement claim.

The Plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to define the easement with adequate specificity or to show that an easement of necessity or by common intention existed at the time of severance.

The claim for an easement for drainage was summarily dismissed.

The estate trustee appealed a costs order that denied her indemnification for legal expenses incurred while representing the estate in a dependent's relief application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred in principle and failed to provide adequate reasons for denying costs.

Applying the framework for blended costs in estate litigation, the court awarded the estate trustee full recovery of her costs on a substantial indemnity basis, with the majority payable by the respondent whose egregious conduct unnecessarily increased the litigation costs, and the balance payable by the estate.

The court determined costs following a simplified proceeding trial where both the plaintiff's claim (adverse possession, prescriptive easement) and the defendants' counterclaim (injunction, trespass damages) were dismissed.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs of $172,028.97.

The plaintiff argued for no costs due to divided success or the Rule 76.12.1(1) limit.

The court found the Rule 76.12.1(2) exception applied as the action commenced before January 1, 2020.

Considering mixed success, the defendants' more favourable offer to settle, and the principles of proportionality and cost minimization in simplified proceedings (Rule 76), the court awarded the defendants $75,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss the appellant's appeal of a zoning by-law amendment without a hearing under s. 34(25) of the Planning Act.

The appellant, a neighbouring resident, raised concerns regarding environmental contamination, heritage impacts, shadowing, and traffic, but failed to provide expert evidence or identify specific land use planning grounds.

The Tribunal found that the appellant's concerns were based on personal apprehensions and historical applications, and did not constitute genuine, legitimate, and authentic planning reasons.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The moving party, the Estate Trustee Without a Will, brought a motion for leave to appeal the costs orders of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court held that the impugned order was solely in respect to costs, requiring leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted leave to appeal the denial of costs to the Estate Trustee During Litigation payable by any of the parties or from the Estate.

The applicant sought an urgent mandatory interlocutory injunction requiring the respondent to remove sheds and underground hydro lines allegedly encroaching on its property and right-of-way.

The applicant argued the removal was necessary to allow heavy equipment to access and repair a berm on its wetlands.

Applying the modified test for mandatory injunctions, the court found the applicant established a strong prima facie case of trespass regarding recently constructed sheds on its property, and the balance of convenience favoured their removal.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding older sheds and underground hydro lines, finding insufficient evidence of irreparable harm and concluding those issues required a full evidentiary record.

The applicants appealed the County's refusal of a zoning by-law amendment and failure to make a decision on consent applications to create two new rural residential lots and reduce the Minimum Distance Separation setback from an adjacent horse barn.

Prior to the hearing, the parties reached a settlement.

Based on uncontested expert planning evidence, the Tribunal found the applications consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement, in conformity with the Growth Plan and the County's Official Plan, and in keeping with the Minimum Distance Separation Guidelines.

The Tribunal approved the settlement, allowing the appeals in part to amend the zoning by-law and grant provisional consent subject to conditions.

A case conference was held to determine the procedure for appealing a costs-only order made under Part V of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The appellant argued that s. 76 of the Act provides an appeal as of right, while s. 133 of the Courts of Justice Act requires leave to appeal costs orders.

The case management judge directed that any party seeking to appeal the costs order must bring a motion for leave to appeal in writing under Rule 62.02, where they may make submissions on the apparent statutory conflict.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a will clause granting an option to purchase "the farming business carried on by me." The testator had ceased active farming years prior to her death, instead leasing the land.

The application judge found the farming business had ceased, causing the option to lapse.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the application judge erred by not applying the presumption under s. 22 of the Succession Law Reform Act, which states a will speaks as if made immediately before death.

The Court found that the testator was still carrying on a farming business at the time of her death through leasing the land and declaring farm income, thus the option was valid.

Following the dismissal of both the plaintiff's action for constructive dismissal and the defendant's counterclaim for breach of restrictive covenants on summary judgment, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle, while the plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs for defending the counterclaim.

The court found the defendant's offer was an invitation to capitulate rather than a genuine compromise, and ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The plaintiff, a dental hygienist, resigned and sued her former employer for constructive dismissal after her hours were reduced.

The defendant counterclaimed for breach of non-competition and non-solicitation clauses.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court dismissed both the action and the counterclaim.

The court found the termination, non-competition, and non-solicitation clauses in the employment contract were unenforceable.

However, the court also found the plaintiff was not constructively dismissed, as the reduction in hours merely reverted her schedule to its historical norm and did not breach an essential term of the contract.

The appellant appealed the Committee of Adjustment's refusal of minor variances for a reduced rear yard setback and altered lot coverage percentages to permit an existing enclosed canopy at a mushroom farm.

An adjacent neighbour opposed the appeal, arguing the enclosure constituted an expansion of the operation that would exacerbate existing odor and drainage impacts.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the appellant's planner, finding the enclosure was an addition that improved worker safety without changing the footprint or use of the structure.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and authorized the variances subject to conditions, including requirements for a building permit, an approved grading and drainage plan, and registration of the site plan agreement on title.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of M.R. Gibson J. dated September 20, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.