Sabrina L. Seibel

The Court of Appeal allowed Her Majesty the Queen's appeal, remitting the case for a new trial due to insufficient reasons from the lower court.

In this costs endorsement, the Crown sought $25,000 in appeal costs, while the respondents requested no costs.

The court awarded no costs for the appeal, citing the regrettable outcome of a new trial and the respondent's limited resources compared to the state.

The costs of the first trial were remitted to the judge hearing the new trial.

This ruling addresses the issue of costs following a nine-day trial where Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was found liable to the plaintiffs, with Paul Bruno found 15% contributorily negligent.

The plaintiffs sought $407,074.81 in costs and disbursements, while the defendant proposed $166,365.99.

The court determined partial indemnity rates for counsel, made specific reductions for time spent on claims against dismissed defendants, resolved prior interlocutory motions, and travel time.

The court fixed fees at $210,900.00 plus HST, and disbursements at $105,000.00, for a total award of $343,317.00.

The court declined to reduce costs due to contributory negligence, finding the plaintiff's contribution minimal and not significantly increasing litigation costs or affecting settlement chances.

The defendants, Lauren Stephen (Son) and Brenda Stephen (Mother), brought separate motions for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The Son, who caused the collision, argued he was not civilly liable due to a mental disorder at the time.

The Mother argued she was not vicariously liable as the Son lacked her consent to possess her vehicle, and denied negligence in her supervision or control of the vehicle keys.

The court granted both motions, finding the Son met the Buckley test for mental illness in negligence, and the Mother was neither vicariously liable nor negligent, as she did not give consent and could not have foreseen the Son's actions.

This judgment addresses the determination of "costs thrown away" following the plaintiffs' successful request for a trial adjournment.

The court defined "costs thrown away" as wasted trial preparation expenses that would need to be repeated.

It applied an "intuitive" discount to the defendants' claimed costs, distinguishing between truly wasted efforts and preparation that would retain value for a future trial.

The court also deferred the assessment of costs related to the adjournment motion itself until after the trial, when the full context of disclosure issues would be clearer.

The defendants were awarded $6,225.33 in costs thrown away.