Cameron Malcolm

The defendant Kinark brought a motion for leave to issue a third-party claim and to compel the plaintiff to answer refusals from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for the production of a workplace investigation report over which Kinark claimed solicitor-client privilege.

The court first ordered the parties to obtain an order under the Youth Criminal Justice Act before further using youth records.

The court denied leave for the third-party claim, finding it was statute-barred and would prejudice the plaintiffs.

The court ordered the plaintiff to answer most of the refused discovery questions, subject to obtaining a YCJA order where applicable.

Finally, the court ordered the production of the workplace investigation report, finding it was not protected by solicitor-client privilege as the lawyer who authored it was not retained to provide legal advice.

The defendants, Lauren Stephen (Son) and Brenda Stephen (Mother), brought separate motions for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The Son, who caused the collision, argued he was not civilly liable due to a mental disorder at the time.

The Mother argued she was not vicariously liable as the Son lacked her consent to possess her vehicle, and denied negligence in her supervision or control of the vehicle keys.

The court granted both motions, finding the Son met the Buckley test for mental illness in negligence, and the Mother was neither vicariously liable nor negligent, as she did not give consent and could not have foreseen the Son's actions.

The minor plaintiff tripped and fell over a raised concrete edge of a buried metal transformer box owned by the defendant hydro company, located on a municipally-owned driveway apron adjacent to the moving defendants' properties.

The moving defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them, arguing they were not 'occupiers' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial as the moving defendants did not exercise sufficient control over the municipal property to be deemed occupiers under the 'special circumstances' exception, nor did the 'flow exception' apply.

The action and cross-claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

The appellant appealed from orders of the Superior Court striking her claims against Crown Defendants and dismissing them without leave to amend, and striking her claims against Ms. Santone with leave to amend to pursue only a breach of privacy claim.

The appellant's pleading alleged damages of $8.4 million arising from treatment by various state officials spanning from 1970 to 2011, including claims for conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, breach of trust, intentional infliction of mental distress, and various statutory violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action, lacked material facts to support the allegations, and that the Crown Defendants were protected by statutory and common law immunity.

The court also rejected the appellant's allegation of judicial bias.