Christopher I. R. Morrison

The applicant, West York Sales and Leasing Inc., sought a declaration that it was entitled to a defence under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by the respondent, The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company (Travelers Canada).

The dispute centered on whether a specific vehicle was covered by the policy at the time of an accident, given the operation of a monthly reporting fleet endorsement.

The court found that the vehicle was covered, that late reporting did not invalidate coverage, and that any breach of statutory conditions was subject to relief from forfeiture.

The application was granted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Carmela and Vincenzo Di Trapani from a costs order made after an 18-day civil jury trial regarding injuries sustained by William “Bill” Pye in a 2016 motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge awarded Pye costs of $995,854.50 and prejudgment interest at 3%.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to scrutinize fees and disbursements, did not apply reasonableness and proportionality, and erred in awarding a higher prejudgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding the costs and interest rate were reasonable and supported by the record.

The moving parties sought to review an order from a single judge of the Court of Appeal that dismissed their motion for a stay of two interlocutory orders from a Superior Court case management judge.

The interlocutory orders had vacated pre-trial and trial dates and allowed a motion for directions.

The Court of Appeal panel dismissed the review motion, finding no factual or legal errors by the motion judge, who correctly applied the RJR-MacDonald test for a stay.

The panel also noted that the stay motion was moot as the vacated dates were long past and the disputed motions had already been heard and were under reserve.

The plaintiffs sought a determination of rights under their insurance contract following damage to their property's water supply line and sewer pipe due to corrosion, which was exacerbated by the City of Thunder Bay's water treatment.

The insurer denied coverage, citing exclusions for corrosion and water damage.

The court, applying principles from *MDS Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company*, found the term "corrosion" in the policy unambiguous, applying regardless of its cause.

It also determined that the water damage did not fall within the policy's exceptions.

Consequently, the application for coverage was dismissed.

The moving parties sought a stay of interlocutory orders made by a case management/trial judge, which had set aside a pre-trial date and vacated a trial date to allow a motion for directions to proceed.

The moving parties had previously been denied leave to appeal these orders by the Divisional Court and were now seeking leave to appeal that denial to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the stay motion, finding that the moving parties failed to meet any prong of the RJR-MacDonald test, particularly noting that their motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was unlikely to succeed as the Divisional Court had not mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against TD Canada Trust, arguing errors regarding the availability of summary judgment in civil jury actions, the exclusion of expert evidence, and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Hryniak test for summary judgment applies equally to civil jury actions, the motion judge properly excluded the expert evidence, and the process was procedurally fair.

Electek Power Services Inc. sought full indemnity costs of $616,312.06 for an arbitration hearing and a subsequent court application to set aside an arbitral decision on jurisdiction.

The court had previously granted Electek's application, finding the arbitrators erred in assuming jurisdiction.

Greenfield Energy Centre Limited Partnership proposed a lower partial indemnity award of $145,000.

The court awarded Electek $425,000 in total, comprising $300,000 for the arbitration and $125,000 for the court application, both on a partial indemnity basis, finding no conduct warranting a punitive or full indemnity award.

This appeal concerned a medical negligence action where the appellant gynecologist failed to perform an endometrial biopsy on the deceased, Armineh Hacopian-Armen, in 2009, leading to a delayed diagnosis of Stage IV uterine leiomyosarcoma (uLMS) and her subsequent death.

The trial judge found the gynecologist liable for breaching the standard of care and for factual and legal causation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the findings on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's negligence caused the harm, emphasizing the deference owed to a trial judge's assessment of expert evidence and the foreseeability of the type of harm.

The appellants sought to overturn a jury verdict finding them negligent for a fatal fire and challenging the quantum of damages awarded for loss of care, guidance, companionship, mental distress, and future costs of care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the jury's findings of negligence based on fire safety violations and affirming the damages awards, finding they did not "shock the conscience of the court" despite being high.

The court also clarified that Section 76 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act does not immunize landlords from negligence related to fire safety precautions, even if the fire's origin is accidental.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant purchased land from the respondents with a vendor take-back mortgage.

The purchase agreement and mortgage provided that if the official plan was not amended to change the zoning designation to "Business Commercial" prior to June 17, 2018, the principal amount would be reduced by $600,000.

The mortgage also contained a standard charge term providing that if the lands were sold without the respondents' consent, all amounts owing plus a three-month interest bonus would immediately become due.

The appellant sold the property in February 2017 without consent and paid $600,000 into court, arguing the price reduction applied.

The application judge dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the plain language of the mortgage clearly stipulated the June 17, 2018 deadline and that the appellant's sale triggered the obligation to pay all monies owing including the interest bonus.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent challenged the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, arguing that the order was interlocutory and therefore required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant contended that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction because the parties had reached a settlement agreement that the motion judge lacked authority to decline to enforce, making it a final decision.

The Court of Appeal found the cases relied upon by the appellant distinguishable and determined that the order was interlocutory as it did not finally dispose of the action or finally determine any claim, defence, or substantive right.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction.