Dr. Barrett

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and profound brain damage following a Caesarean section delivery.

She brought a medical malpractice action against the obstetrical and anaesthesiology teams.

The court found that the obstetrical team met the standard of care.

While the staff anaesthesiologist breached the standard of care in three respects, the court concluded that these breaches did not cause the plaintiff's injuries.

The court accepted expert evidence that the cardiac arrest was caused by an unpredictable and unpreventable amniotic fluid embolism, rather than hemorrhagic shock.

The court also ruled that the claim against the anaesthesiologists was not statute-barred due to the discoverability doctrine.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a jury's finding of negligence and causation in a birth injury case, arguing the jury misapplied the "but for" test and that the verdict was unreasonable due to lack of evidence on timely delivery.

The appellant also claimed the trial judge improperly questioned witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the jury's application of the "but for" test, finding the verdict reasonable based on expert evidence, and concluding the trial judge's questions were proper clarifications within established judicial protocol.

The appellant physician appealed a jury verdict finding him liable for negligent management of a twin pregnancy, which resulted in premature birth and brain damage to one of the twins.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict on causation was unreasonable due to a lack of evidence that the required treatment, amnioreduction, was available at the referral hospital in 1991.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding adverse inferences, the characterization of expert evidence, and the failure to instruct on loss of chance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an evidentiary basis for the jury's conclusion on causation and that the jury charge was fair, balanced, and legally correct.

Following an obstetrical malpractice trial where the jury found the defendant obstetrician 32% liable for the infant plaintiff's severe cerebral palsy, the defendant brought a motion under Rule 52.08 to dismiss the action or order a retrial.

The defendant argued the jury gave conflicting answers on causation and that there was no evidence to support their findings on the standard of care and delay in delivery.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the jury's use of the word 'contributed' did not conflict with the 'but for' causation test, and that there was ample expert evidence supporting the jury's conclusion that the defendant's failure to promptly prepare for an emergency c-section caused the infant's brain damage.

Judgment was ordered to be entered in accordance with the jury's verdict.

The defendant obstetrician, Dr. Jackiewicz, was sued for negligence by the Woods family, alleging that his breach of standard of care in managing a twin pregnancy led to Kelsey Woods incurring cerebral palsy.

During the trial, the defendant objected to the plaintiffs' closing address, which invited the jury to find causation even if the pregnancy prolongation from amnioreduction was less than the five weeks testified to by experts.

The defendant requested an instruction that the jury *must* find against the plaintiffs on causation unless a five-week prolongation was proven.

The court declined this additional instruction, finding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer causation with a shorter prolongation, consistent with the principles from *Benhaim v. St-Germain* regarding the use of statistics and inferences in medical malpractice causation.

The plaintiffs, twin brothers born prematurely who developed cerebral palsy, sued their mother's obstetrician for negligence.

The trial judge found the obstetrician breached the standard of care by failing to assess the mother when she reported leaking fluid, resulting in a failure to administer a full course of antenatal corticosteroids (ACS).

The trial judge concluded this failure caused the twins' cerebral palsy and awarded damages.

The obstetrician appealed the causation finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, with the majority holding that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in applying a robust and pragmatic approach to the expert evidence and concluding that the failure to administer ACS caused the injuries.

The appellant obstetrician appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in the forceps delivery of an infant who suffered catastrophic brain injuries due to an umbilical cord prolapse.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by disengaging the fetal head during the procedure.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in discharging the jury, finding negligence, and assessing causation.

The respondents cross-appealed the future care costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge's decision to discharge the jury was reasonable, his factual findings on negligence were supported by the record, and the damages award was fair.

The applicant sought her expenses of the arbitration following a successful claim for statutory accident benefits.

The insurer did not dispute entitlement but challenged the disbursements claimed for the attendance of two expert witnesses.

The arbitrator found the legal fees reasonable and reduced the expert witness attendance fees to comply with the maximum hourly rate prescribed by the Expense Regulation under the Insurance Act.

The applicant was awarded total expenses of $11,526.32.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action against an obstetrician following a birth injury that resulted in the infant suffering from cerebral palsy.

The appellants argued the obstetrician breached the standard of care by failing to prepare for an immediate caesarean section before attempting a mid-forceps delivery, and by failing to deliver the baby within ten minutes of declaring a dire emergency.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the standard of care only required an operating room to be immediately available, and that the obstetrician acted as expeditiously as possible under the circumstances.