Daniel Girlando

The plaintiffs requested an urgent case conference after the hospital defendants unexpectedly delivered a summary judgment motion and sought to have it heard concurrently with the scheduled class action certification motion.

The plaintiffs argued there was insufficient time in the existing timetable to respond.

Applying section 4.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court held it was compelled to order the summary judgment motion to be heard concurrently with the certification motion, as it could dispose of the proceeding in whole or in part.

A further case conference was ordered to revise the timetable.

The moving parties' anti-SLAPP motion was previously dismissed.

The responding party sought costs of $100,000.

The court found that costs were warranted under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act because the moving parties' motion lacked merit and the impugned expression was largely unrelated to the public interest.

Applying principles of proportionality and the screening purpose of anti-SLAPP motions, the court awarded costs of $50,000 to the responding party.

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The decision concerns a medical malpractice action brought by Scott Graham against Dr. Sheldon Berger and others, arising from care received at Bridgepoint Health following a motorcycle accident.

The plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to diagnose and treat osteomyelitis, resulting in prolonged recovery.

The court found that Dr. Berger met the standard of care, relying on expert evidence and the contemporaneous medical records, and that the infection was likely seeded before the plaintiff came under Dr. Berger’s care.

The action was dismissed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal three decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner to the Divisional Court.

The respondents requested the court initiate the process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the proceeding.

The court found that there is no statutory right or jurisdiction to seek leave to appeal from a decision of the IPC to the Divisional Court.

The proceeding was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal from the dismissal of their certification motions in two proposed class actions, the parties consensually resolved the issue of costs.

The Divisional Court ordered costs payable by the plaintiffs/appellants to the various defendants/respondents in the total amount of $92,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their certification motions in two proposed class actions arising from a privacy breach at two hospitals.

Rogue hospital employees accessed the contact information of maternity patients and sold it to RESP salespeople.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the accessed information (names, addresses, phone numbers, and basic hospital visit details) was personal but not highly private, and that the intrusion would not be regarded by a reasonable person as highly offensive causing distress, humiliation, or anguish.

Although the motions judge erred in his class definition, the appeal was dismissed because the elements of the tort of intrusion upon seclusion were not met.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to extend the time to set down the action for trial and for a new timetable.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and relying on the presumption of prejudice.

The court applied the two-part test from Faris v Eftimovski, finding that the plaintiffs provided an adequate explanation for the delay in the context of seeking further discovery and expert reports.

The court also found that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice, as clinical records were available, discoveries had been conducted, and expert reports exchanged.

The motion was granted, and a new timetable was established.

Following a 42-day medical negligence trial where damages were agreed at $12 million, the plaintiffs sought costs of over $4.5 million.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the high hourly rates of senior counsel, and the defendants' stout denial of liability.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $4,218,052.00 in partial indemnity costs and disbursements, payable two-thirds by the unsuccessful physicians and one-third by the hospital.

The court declined to make a Sanderson Order, instead ordering the plaintiffs to pay $250,000 in costs to the two successful defendant physicians.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order dated April 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The defendants appealed a decision certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion.

The claim arose after a hospital nurse improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal narcotics from an automated dispensing unit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that the nurse's fleeting access to limited health information for the sole purpose of stealing drugs did not meet the 'highly offensive' threshold required for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay by a motion judge, who had also dismissed their motion to extend the timetable.

The action, commenced in 2014, faced significant delays, primarily due to the appellants' failure to obtain written consent from the City of Ottawa (to whom the action was subrogated under the WSIA) for several years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay and did not rebut the presumption of prejudice to the respondents, given the lack of progress in the litigation.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding Rule 20 summary judgment motions and a class action certification motion.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with respect to the Rule 20 motions and the certification criteria under section 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Costs of the leave motions were fixed at $2,500 to the successful party on the appeal.

The plaintiff, who was rendered paraplegic following spinal surgery, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to add his former family doctor and chiropractor as defendants, and to add new allegations against the defendant surgeon.

The surgeon brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action for delay.

The court dismissed the cross-motion, finding the delay was not contumelious and caused no actual prejudice.

The court denied the plaintiff's request to add new allegations against the surgeon, ruling they were statute-barred new causes of action.

However, the court allowed the addition of the family doctor and chiropractor, finding the claims against them were not reasonably discoverable until the plaintiff's counsel obtained and reviewed the family doctor's medical chart.

The defendants in a medical malpractice action brought a motion for the production of documents from the plaintiffs' lawyer's file prior to cross-examinations on affidavits.

The affidavits were filed in support of the plaintiffs' pending motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs waived privilege by referring to the lawyer's steps to advance the litigation.

The court found a limited waiver of litigation privilege regarding the fact and timing of the lawyer's communications with medical experts, but held that the plaintiffs were not required to produce the corroborating documents prior to the cross-examination.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the plaintiffs ordered only to have redacted corroborating documents available at the cross-examination.

The court issued a costs endorsement following mixed results on related motions, which included certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion, dismissing a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff, granting summary judgment for the defendants on a negligence claim, and dismissing the defendants' summary judgment motion on the intrusion upon seclusion claim.

Given the mixed outcomes, the novelty of the intrusion upon seclusion tort in this context, and the potentially modest damages, the court ordered that costs of these motions shall be in the cause of the common issues trial.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against a hospital and a former nurse who improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal Percocet.

The defendants opposed certification and moved for summary judgment, arguing the privacy breach was fleeting and caused no compensable harm.

The court certified the class action for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, finding that even a minimal intrusion into highly private health records could be considered 'highly offensive'.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim, as the plaintiffs suffered no actual compensable harm.

The plaintiff's motion to substitute a new representative plaintiff was also dismissed due to the proposed representative's unsuitability.