Daniel Girlando

The court dismissed a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) by three siblings (Normand Quesnel, Rachelle Paquette, and Marc Quesnel) to dismiss a defamation action brought by their brother, Gilles Quesnel.

The moving parties argued the action was a SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation).

The court found that while some of the impugned statements related to matters of public interest (communications to authorities and professionals), others (communications to friends and family) did not.

The court held that the action had substantial merit, that the moving parties had no valid defence, and that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The moving party sought leave to appeal from a Divisional Court order that dismissed his motion for leave to appeal under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner.

The Court of Appeal found it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a dismissal of a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed as an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The decision concerns a medical malpractice action brought by Scott Graham against Dr. Sheldon Berger and others, arising from care received at Bridgepoint Health following a motorcycle accident.

The plaintiff alleged negligence in failing to diagnose and treat osteomyelitis, resulting in prolonged recovery.

The court found that Dr. Berger met the standard of care, relying on expert evidence and the contemporaneous medical records, and that the infection was likely seeded before the plaintiff came under Dr. Berger’s care.

The action was dismissed.

The respondents brought a medical malpractice action after the plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest during a caesarean section.

The trial judge found the primary obstetrician (Dr. Padmore), the anesthesiologist (Dr. Jamensky), and the hospital liable for negligence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeals of Dr. Padmore and the hospital, finding the trial judge erred in his legal causation analysis regarding their respective pre-delivery acts and omissions.

The Court dismissed Dr. Jamensky's appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that he breached the standard of care by prematurely converting the patient to a general anesthetic and that this negligence caused the cardiac arrest.

Dr. Jamensky was held solely liable for the agreed $12 million in damages.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to extend the time to set down the action for trial and for a new timetable.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and relying on the presumption of prejudice.

The court applied the two-part test from Faris v Eftimovski, finding that the plaintiffs provided an adequate explanation for the delay in the context of seeking further discovery and expert reports.

The court also found that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice, as clinical records were available, discoveries had been conducted, and expert reports exchanged.

The motion was granted, and a new timetable was established.

Following a 42-day medical negligence trial where damages were agreed at $12 million, the plaintiffs sought costs of over $4.5 million.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the high hourly rates of senior counsel, and the defendants' stout denial of liability.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $4,218,052.00 in partial indemnity costs and disbursements, payable two-thirds by the unsuccessful physicians and one-third by the hospital.

The court declined to make a Sanderson Order, instead ordering the plaintiffs to pay $250,000 in costs to the two successful defendant physicians.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay by a motion judge, who had also dismissed their motion to extend the timetable.

The action, commenced in 2014, faced significant delays, primarily due to the appellants' failure to obtain written consent from the City of Ottawa (to whom the action was subrogated under the WSIA) for several years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay and did not rebut the presumption of prejudice to the respondents, given the lack of progress in the litigation.

The defendants in a medical malpractice action brought a motion for the production of documents from the plaintiffs' lawyer's file prior to cross-examinations on affidavits.

The affidavits were filed in support of the plaintiffs' pending motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial.

The defendants argued the plaintiffs waived privilege by referring to the lawyer's steps to advance the litigation.

The court found a limited waiver of litigation privilege regarding the fact and timing of the lawyer's communications with medical experts, but held that the plaintiffs were not required to produce the corroborating documents prior to the cross-examination.

The motion was largely dismissed, with the plaintiffs ordered only to have redacted corroborating documents available at the cross-examination.

The court issued a costs endorsement following mixed results on related motions, which included certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion, dismissing a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff, granting summary judgment for the defendants on a negligence claim, and dismissing the defendants' summary judgment motion on the intrusion upon seclusion claim.

Given the mixed outcomes, the novelty of the intrusion upon seclusion tort in this context, and the potentially modest damages, the court ordered that costs of these motions shall be in the cause of the common issues trial.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against a hospital and a former nurse who improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal Percocet.

The defendants opposed certification and moved for summary judgment, arguing the privacy breach was fleeting and caused no compensable harm.

The court certified the class action for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, finding that even a minimal intrusion into highly private health records could be considered 'highly offensive'.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim, as the plaintiffs suffered no actual compensable harm.

The plaintiff's motion to substitute a new representative plaintiff was also dismissed due to the proposed representative's unsuitability.

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action requested an urgent case management conference to seek an extension of time to deliver their expert reports on income loss and liability.

The defendants opposed the extension, arguing the plaintiffs should be barred from delivering the reports due to their breach of the existing timetable.

The court granted the extension, finding that the timetable could be varied to allow the plaintiffs more time without reducing the time afforded to the defendants to deliver their responding reports, thereby preserving the scheduled trial date.

The appellants appealed an order from the motion judge dismissing a certification motion for class proceedings.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's order was clear and unequivocal in dismissing only the certification motion, not the underlying claims.

Under section 30 of the Class Proceedings Act, an appeal from an order refusing to certify a proceeding lies to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

Accordingly, the appeal to the Court of Appeal was quashed without prejudice to the appellants proceeding with the appeal in the Divisional Court.

The court conducted a case management conference in a medical malpractice action initiated in 2011.

The plaintiffs' renewed request to schedule a partial summary judgment motion against one physician defendant on liability was denied due to its partial nature, previous dismissal, and the plaintiffs' breach of an order to set the action down for trial.

The court provided specific directions for the action's progression, including allowing the plaintiffs to file a motion to extend time for setting down for trial, noting the discontinuance against Nurse Defendants, and scheduling further discussions on a de bene esse examination and expert report deadlines.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a declaration that Rouge Valley Health System was estopped from denying liability for various statutory and common law causes of action, based on an Order from the Information and Privacy Commissioner (PHIPA Order HO-013).

The court dismissed the motion, exercising its discretion under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

It found that applying issue estoppel would be procedurally and substantively unfair given the magnitude of the class action ($400 million) against a public institution, and the informal, discretionary nature of the administrative tribunal's proceedings, which focused on its privacy law mandate rather than complex civil law.

The court also noted that such an application would be inimical to the due administration of justice by discouraging settlements with the Commissioner.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a medical negligence action on the basis that it was res judicata and statute-barred under s. 38(3) of the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs had previously commenced an essentially identical action arising from the same death, which had been dismissed as out of time and unsuccessfully appealed through the Divisional Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Supreme Court of Canada.

In the present action, the plaintiffs again alleged negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraudulent concealment.

The court held that the allegations had already been fully considered in the prior proceedings and raised no triable issue.

Allowing the claim to proceed would constitute an abuse of process and the limitation period under the Trustee Act applied.

In a wrongful dismissal action, the plaintiff previously succeeded on a Rule 21 motion declaring a termination clause in the employment contract void for non‑compliance with the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court addressed the quantum of costs arising from that motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the indemnity principle, the court held that partial indemnity costs were appropriate because any settlement offer relating to the broader litigation could not yet be considered.

While most hours and rates claimed were reasonable given the complexity and importance of the issue, some adjustments were warranted.

The court fixed the plaintiff’s costs of the motion and determined a conditional additional amount should substantial indemnity later be awarded by the trial judge.

A motion raised a question of law concerning the enforceability of a termination clause in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The clause limited termination compensation to base salary and excluded commissions and the continuation of benefits.

The court held the clause violated statutory minimum standards because it attempted to exclude the employer’s obligation to maintain benefit contributions during the statutory notice period under ss. 60 and 61 of the Act.

The court further interpreted s. 64 of the Act and held that an employer’s payroll for severance eligibility includes the wages of all employees, not only those in Ontario.

The termination clause was declared void and the employer remained liable to pay statutory severance.

The plaintiff employee brought a motion to determine two questions of law following his dismissal without cause.

First, he argued that the termination clause in his employment contract was void because it excluded the continuation of group insurance benefits during the statutory notice period, contrary to the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

Second, he argued he was entitled to statutory severance pay because the employer's global payroll exceeded $2.5 million, even though its Ontario payroll did not.

The court agreed on both issues, finding the termination clause null and void for violating the Act's minimum standards, and ruling that the calculation of an employer's payroll under section 64 is not restricted to wages paid in Ontario.