Emilie Bruneau

The applicant bank sought an order for possession and power of sale of a mortgaged condominium unit.

The respondent Singh claimed to be the beneficial owner of the property pursuant to a trust declaration with the registered owner, Andrade, and raised various defences including claims of fraud, knowing assistance to breach of trust, equitable mortgage, and equitable subordination.

The court found that Singh had failed to comply with court orders requiring him to pay the mortgage and granted the bank's application for possession and a writ of possession, stayed for 30 days to allow Singh to vacate.

In this putative securities class action arising from alleged misconduct by the former CEO of Endeavour Mining, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring defendants to deliver statements of defence and produce insurance information by November 21, 2025.

The defendants opposed both requests, arguing that no statement of defence is required before leave to proceed is granted under the Securities Act, and that insurance information disclosure is premature.

The court dismissed both aspects of the motion, finding that prior to OSA leave being granted, the statutory claim is a nullity and therefore no defence is required, and that insurance disclosure is premature absent settlement discussions or leave being granted.

The appellant, William Daniel Lewis, appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing a class action against Uber entities.

The core issue was whether the action, seeking a rebate of GST remitted to the government, was prohibited by the Excise Tax Act (ETA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that section 312 of the ETA prohibits such actions, as the ETA provides a complete statutory framework for GST rebates, with exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Tax Court.

The court also agreed that section 224.1 of the ETA reinforces this statutory bar, extending protection from civil liability to tax collectors acting in compliance with the ETA.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought certification of a class action alleging that Uber improperly calculated Goods and Services Tax (GST) on pre-discounted Uber Eats orders, claiming violations of the Excise Tax Act (ETA), provincial consumer protection legislation, the Competition Act, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment.

The court dismissed the certification motion, primarily finding that the claim was barred by ss. 224.1 and 312 of the ETA.

The court characterized the action as an attempt to recover tax outside the comprehensive statutory scheme provided by the ETA, which includes a rebate mechanism.

Additionally, the court identified other deficiencies, including inadequate pleadings for certain causes of action, issues with class identifiability due to varying promotional language, and a lack of commonality among proposed issues, concluding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action for delay by a motion judge, who had also dismissed their motion to extend the timetable.

The action, commenced in 2014, faced significant delays, primarily due to the appellants' failure to obtain written consent from the City of Ottawa (to whom the action was subrogated under the WSIA) for several years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay and did not rebut the presumption of prejudice to the respondents, given the lack of progress in the litigation.

During a legal strike, graduate student teaching assistants engaged in picketing and protests.

Following the strike, the university disciplined them under the Student Code of Conduct.

The students sought judicial review, arguing that under the Back to Class Act and the Labour Relations Act, a labour arbitrator had exclusive jurisdiction over discipline related to strike activities.

The Divisional Court agreed and quashed the university tribunal's decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the university's appeal, confirming that the specific, strike-ending legislation mandated that any dispute concerning discipline for activities during the strike be determined through grievance arbitration.

The moving defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the medical malpractice action against him, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to correct a misnomer, seeking to replace 'John Doe' with the moving defendant.

The court found that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the moving defendant's potential liability for delayed care.

Both the summary judgment motion and the misnomer cross-motion were dismissed, with the issues left to be determined by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of criminal harassment, arguing that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence by placing a higher burden on his testimony than on the complainant's.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's reasons, which relied on the W.(D.) and J.J.R.D. frameworks for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt.

The court found that the trial judge properly instructed herself, gave considered reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence, and did not engage in uneven scrutiny.

The appeal was dismissed.