Jillian Mary Evans

The appellant appealed an application judge's decision to rectify his mother's will by adding a remainderman clause that gifted two properties to his niece and nephew upon the termination of his father's life interest.

The drafting solicitor admitted to accidentally omitting the clause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge did not exceed his jurisdiction as a court of construction, as the will could be interpreted to achieve the same result without adding words.

The Court also held that the application judge did not err in his application of the corroboration requirement under s. 13 of the Evidence Act or in his reliance on admissions against interest as extrinsic evidence of the testator's intentions.

The cross-appeal challenging the remedy and costs was also dismissed.

The court granted the applicant trustee’s request to pass accounts, dispense with a formal passing for a subsequent period, approve compensation, remove herself as trustee, and appoint CIBC Trust as successor.

The court found the trustee’s compensation reasonable, the objections of the respondent Michael Wilson unsubstantiated, and awarded increased costs against Michael due to his conduct.

The decision addresses the administration of a testamentary trust, the entitlement to compensation, and the allocation of costs in estate litigation.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian prison needle exchange program (PNEP), specifically its "threat risk assessment" (TRA) feature, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying effective access to essential health care.

The court dismissed the application, finding it premature due to the ongoing PNEP rollout and evolving design.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to establish that professionally accepted standards required a health services-centered model without security staff involvement, or that the PNEP/TRA model breached Charter rights by being arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate, or by discriminating on enumerated grounds.

The defendant, Dr. Vaidyanathan, brought a motion to strike portions of the Plaintiffs' Statement of Claim, specifically allegations of a pattern of misconduct (similar fact pleadings) and claims for exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the similar fact pleadings, finding they possessed significant probative value, particularly in relation to claims concerning the defendant's knowledge, skill, experience, and fiduciary duty, which outweighed any added complexity.

However, the court granted the motion to strike the claims for exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages due to insufficient pleading, granting the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim within 60 days to provide a proper basis for these damages.

The plaintiff was injured after colliding with an unlit street light pole on a sidewalk.

She initially sued the City of Toronto, believing it owned and maintained the pole.

Years later, she learned the City had sold the street lights to Toronto Hydro.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct the defendant's name on the basis of misnomer.

The Master found that the 'litigating finger' was clearly pointed at the entity responsible for the pole, and granted the misnomer correction, awarding substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, although noting the decision was practically moot as a parallel appeal had already added Toronto Hydro as a defendant.

The moving defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the medical malpractice action against him, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion to correct a misnomer, seeking to replace 'John Doe' with the moving defendant.

The court found that there was a genuine issue for trial regarding when the plaintiffs reasonably could have discovered the moving defendant's potential liability for delayed care.

Both the summary judgment motion and the misnomer cross-motion were dismissed, with the issues left to be determined by the trial judge.

The plaintiff appealed an order dismissing her motion to amend her statement of claim to add a utility company as a defendant after the expiry of the presumptive two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff alleged she walked into a light pole and initially sued the municipality, only later discovering the utility company owned the pole.

The Divisional Court found the Master erred in law by failing to make specific findings on when the plaintiff actually knew or reasonably ought to have known of her claim against the utility company.

The Court set aside the Master's order and granted leave to add the utility company as a defendant, noting that a trial was required to determine the limitations issue.

The defendant, Dr. Nicholas Peter Plaskos, moved for summary judgment to dismiss a medical malpractice action, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs, Ms. Lewis and her sons, alleged delayed diagnosis due to a failure to order an MRI.

The court found that the plaintiffs' counsel did not exercise objective reasonable diligence in reviewing hospital records, leading to a delayed discovery of Dr. Plaskos's potential involvement.

Consequently, the claim against Dr. Plaskos was deemed statute-barred and dismissed.

The respondents in a Charter application brought a refusals motion seeking to compel three expert witnesses retained by the applicants to re-attend cross-examinations and produce draft affidavits and notes of communications with counsel.

The respondents argued that counsel's assistance in drafting the experts' affidavits raised reasonable grounds to question their independence, thereby waiving litigation privilege.

The court applied the principles from Moore v. Getahun and White Burgess, finding that consultation between counsel and experts is a necessary part of the adversarial process.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding there was no factual foundation to support a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly influenced the experts.

Thelma Rycroft died of septic shock after a gastroscopy performed by Dr. Dean Chen.

Her spouse and son brought an action for negligence, alleging inadequate pre-operative preparation and negligent continuation of the procedure despite retained food in her stomach, leading to aspiration pneumonia.

The court found Dr. Chen liable for breaching the standard of care by failing to instruct Mrs. Rycroft on an extended clear liquid diet and by proceeding with the gastroscopy after encountering food and liquid in her stomach.

The court concluded that Dr. Chen's negligence caused Mrs. Rycroft's death and awarded damages to her spouse and son under the Family Law Act, along with OHIP's subrogated claim.

The plaintiffs in a medical negligence action moved under Rules 5.04(2) and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to amend their statement of claim to add additional physicians as defendants and to substitute certain doctors for fictitiously named defendants on the basis of misnomer.

The court considered the discoverability principles under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the evidentiary threshold required to add parties where the limitation period may have expired.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence of due diligence in identifying several proposed defendants prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The court also rejected the misnomer argument for certain physicians because the pleadings did not clearly point to them as the intended defendants.

Leave was granted only for two physicians whose addition was uncontested, while the balance of the requested amendments was refused.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario brought an application regarding an ongoing tribunal hearing involving the Sleep Disorders Centres.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that no significant harm or breach of natural justice would occur by refusing to decide the issue, especially since the report in question had already been disclosed.

The Court concluded that all related issues should be determined by the tribunal based on a full and complete record.