Nadia Marotta

Following a successful appeal in which the appellants had the summary judgment motion dismissed (2026 ONCA 121), the court addressed costs of the motion below.

The appellants sought substantial indemnity costs of $96,158.17 based on two pre-hearing offers to settle, or alternatively partial indemnity costs of $66,575.44.

The court found neither offer met the criteria under rule 49.10(1) because both expired before the motion hearing, and declined substantial indemnity costs on a discretionary basis.

The court reduced the fees to $40,000 plus HST on a partial indemnity basis, finding the associates' hours excessive and factoring in the appellants' failure to raise the partial summary judgment issue at scheduling.

Costs of $51,600 inclusive of disbursements and HST were awarded with post-judgment interest from the date of the motion decision.

The appellants sued the City of Toronto after one of them fractured her ankle stepping into a hole in a ditch within the municipal road allowance on a road with no sidewalks.

The City obtained partial summary judgment on the basis of the statutory bar in s. 42(4)(b) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, pertaining to untraveled portions of a highway.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by proceeding to decide the partial summary judgment motion despite his own conclusion, applying the Malik v. Attia factors, that the case was not appropriate for partial summary judgment.

The court held that once the motion judge found the Malik factors weighed against partial summary judgment, he ought to have dismissed the motion.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as moot.

The plaintiff, Gabriela Lucuta, sought to set aside a 2019 consent order dismissing her medical malpractice action against Dr. David Stevens, Dr. Peter Stevenson, and Grand River Hospital, arguing that her agreement to settle was obtained under duress and unconscionability.

The court found no evidence of threats, coercion, or improvident bargain, and held that the settlement was fairly negotiated.

The motion was dismissed.

The City of Toronto sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, relying on section 42(4)(b) of the City of Toronto Act, which bars actions for damages caused by the condition of an "untravelled portion of a highway." The court found that the area where the plaintiff was injured was not intended for ordinary or normal use, nor commonly or additionally used by the public, and therefore fell within the statutory bar.

The action against the City of Toronto was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

This is an appeal from a medical malpractice judgment where the trial judge found the appellant physician negligent in treating a stroke victim, leading to permanent injuries.

The core issue on appeal was causation: whether the trial judge erred in finding that the physician's negligence caused the injuries, specifically by not requiring the plaintiff to establish precisely which treatment option would have prevented the unfavourable outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's robust and pragmatic application of the "but for" causation test, particularly in the context of an evidentiary gap created by the defendant's negligence.

A police officer and her children sued the Durham Regional Police Service (DRPS) and several officers, as well as a lawyer designated to prosecute her, for civil conspiracy, misfeasance in public office, negligence, defamation, and abuse of non-criminal proceedings.

The DRPS defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration due to a collective agreement.

The lawyer defendant (Johnstone) moved to strike the claim against him for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, among other grounds.

The court dismissed the DRPS defendants' motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute, involving alleged police misconduct targeting the plaintiff and her family in their private capacities, transcended the collective agreement.

However, the court granted Johnstone's motion to strike, finding the pleadings against him did not disclose a reasonable cause of action and refused leave to amend.

The plaintiff initiated a civil action against the Town of Ajax after tripping and falling on a sidewalk discontinuity.

While the parties settled the quantum of damages, the issue of liability remained.

The court found that the sidewalk was in a state of non-repair, establishing a prima facie case of liability against the Town.

However, the Town successfully invoked the statutory defence under section 44(3)(a) of the Municipal Act, 2001, by demonstrating it did not know and could not reasonably have been expected to know about the specific state of repair of the sidewalk before the accident.

Consequently, the action against the Town was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to a community treatment plan and antipsychotic medications.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the Board committed a palpable and overriding error.

The treating psychiatrist could not recall informing the appellant of the benefits and consequences of the proposed treatment during the assessment, meaning the presumption of capacity was not displaced.

Furthermore, the community treatment plan was fatally defective because it was signed before the appellant was examined.

The plaintiff attended the emergency department with symptoms of dizziness, nausea, and facial weakness, and a referral note from his family doctor requesting to rule out a stroke.

The defendant emergency physician diagnosed peripheral vertigo and Bell's Palsy, and discharged the plaintiff without conducting a gait assessment or consulting a neurologist.

The plaintiff returned the next day with a severe basilar artery occlusion, resulting in catastrophic long-term disabilities.

The court found the defendant breached the standard of care and that, but for this breach, the plaintiff would have received timely recanalization treatment with a successful outcome.

The defendant's request for a 25% discount on the agreed damages was dismissed.

The defendant trampoline park moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury claim based on a signed waiver of liability.

The plaintiff suffered a knee injury while playing trampoline dodgeball and alleged the defendant was negligent in failing to supervise the game and follow its own injury policies.

The court found that the plaintiff had explicitly signed a waiver that clearly excluded liability for negligence, including the failure of employees to give complete instructions or protect participants from risks.

The court held the waiver was enforceable and dismissed the action.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses a summary judgment motion brought by the defendants, seeking to dismiss the action based on a two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff's counsel, LawPro, sought to file supplementary responding material, including medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental capacity.

The court set a timetable for the plaintiff to deliver supplementary materials and for the defendants to state any objections.

A subsequent case conference was scheduled to address the admissibility of the new evidence and to establish the timetable for the remaining steps of the summary judgment motion.

The defendant, Dr. Vaidyanathan, brought a motion to strike portions of the Plaintiffs' Statement of Claim, specifically allegations of a pattern of misconduct (similar fact pleadings) and claims for exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the similar fact pleadings, finding they possessed significant probative value, particularly in relation to claims concerning the defendant's knowledge, skill, experience, and fiduciary duty, which outweighed any added complexity.

However, the court granted the motion to strike the claims for exemplary, punitive, and aggravated damages due to insufficient pleading, granting the Plaintiffs leave to amend their Statement of Claim within 60 days to provide a proper basis for these damages.

The defendants were completely successful on a motion for third-party production of documents from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU).

They sought costs of $4,826.85 on a partial indemnity scale.

The SIU argued there should be no costs but conceded the quantum was reasonable.

The court awarded the requested costs, noting the documents were highly relevant and the SIU had opposed production based mainly on its own policies rather than the specific relevance to the litigation.

The plaintiff commenced a personal injury action against a police officer and the police services board alleging unreasonable use of force.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 30.10 for production of interview records and notes from the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) regarding four civilian witnesses.

The SIU opposed the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding that the documents were highly relevant to the issue of reasonable force and that it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without them, especially since two witnesses could not be located and two refused to consent to production.

The plaintiffs brought two motions in a medical malpractice action: one to compel defendant physicians Dr. Fadie Amin and Dr. Anton Helman to answer refusals from discovery, and another for leave to amend their statement of claim to include additional differential diagnoses.

The court analyzed the principles governing hypothetical questions in discovery and the test for amending pleadings.

The refusals motion was largely granted against Dr. Helman, with several questions ordered to be answered or clarified, while largely dismissed against Dr. Amin.

The motion for leave to amend the statement of claim was granted, allowing the plaintiffs to specify additional serious conditions the defendants allegedly failed to consider.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against the police services board and an officer for missing and damaged property that had been seized.

The appellants argued their action was an enforcement of a court order under section 16(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, which has no limitation period.

The Court of Appeal held that the appellants' true cause of action was for monetary damages based on allegations of neglect or refusal to return goods and damage to property, not enforcement of the original order of disposition.

Since the action was commenced more than two years after the appellants knew the property had been forfeited to the Crown, it was barred by the two-year limitation period under section 4 of the Limitations Act.

A minor plaintiff catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2007 sought to add a municipality as a defendant in 2015.

The municipality argued the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and that notice was not given within the required ten-day period under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The motion judge allowed the amendment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the two-year limitation period did not bar the claim (as it began running when the mother held herself out as litigation guardian in June 2014), the ten-day notice requirement was not satisfied.

The mother, as litigation guardian, had no reasonable excuse for failing to give notice within ten days of the accident, and the claim against the municipality was therefore barred.

The plaintiff sought to add an orthopaedic surgeon as a co-defendant to a medical malpractice action nearly ten years after the surgery, alleging that the surgeon fraudulently concealed an intraoperative event.

The Master granted the motion to add the surgeon with leave to plead a limitation period defence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice set aside the Master's order, finding that the plaintiff and his counsel knew or ought to have known of the potential claim against the surgeon shortly after the surgery.

The court held that there was no fraudulent concealment and that the claim against the surgeon was statute-barred.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend the statement of claim to add a surgeon as a defendant in a medical negligence action after the action had already been set down for trial.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion on the basis that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that there were genuine issues of fact and credibility regarding discoverability, including allegations that the proposed defendant failed to disclose an intra‑operative complication and may have misled the plaintiff’s counsel.

Applying the approach in Wong v. Adler, the court determined that such factual disputes should not be resolved on a motion to amend.

The surgeon was therefore added as a defendant with leave to plead a limitation defence.