Sydney Nicole Hodge

The plaintiff, The Guarantee Company of North America, sought an extension of time to serve a statement of claim or to validate service in a construction indemnity action.

The court reviewed the lengthy delay in service, the explanations provided, and the resulting prejudice to the defendants.

The motion was dismissed, with the court finding the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would be prejudiced in their ability to defend the action due to lost records and faded memories.

The Plaintiffs/Defendants by Counterclaim brought a motion under Rule 59.06 to vary a prior judgment, alleging errors in the calculation of rental damages and pre-judgment interest.

The court found a manifest error in its reasons regarding the date used for rental damage calculation, clarifying that the awarded amount was for rent up to November 3, 2022, not June 15, 2023.

However, the court declined to vary the pre-judgment interest calculation, finding it was not a slip or manifest error but an amount agreed upon by counsel.

The motion to vary the judgment itself was dismissed, with the court providing a direction to clarify the reasons.

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement in Ontario of a default judgment granted by a Belgian court against the respondent for unpaid invoices.

The court found that the Belgian judgment met the criteria for recognition (competent jurisdiction, final, definite sum).

The respondent attempted to raise defenses of lack of natural justice (improper service, no opportunity to defend due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and lack of notice of rescheduled hearing), fraud, and public policy.

The court dismissed these defenses, finding that adequate notice was given and that the respondent failed to prove fraud or that the Belgian law was contrary to Canadian public policy.

The application for recognition and enforcement was granted.

The plaintiff, Krista Saarinen, brought a motion to compel the defendant, Rogers Communications Ltd., to answer refusals from discovery regarding termination packages of other employees and the defendant's HR practices for without-cause terminations.

Rogers initially refused based on relevance, arguing the plaintiff was terminated for cause and that other employees' packages were irrelevant to Bardal factors.

The court found the questions relevant because the plaintiff's claim extended beyond common law notice to implied contractual terms based on company policy/practice.

Rogers then asserted settlement privilege, but the court rejected this argument, finding that Rogers failed to provide any evidence to support the claim of privilege.

The motion was granted, compelling Rogers to answer the questions and pay costs to the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that set aside a Registrar's administrative dismissal of the respondent's action for delay.

The respondent law firm had commenced an action alleging wrongful solicitation of clients by the appellants.

The action was dismissed five years later under Rule 48.14.

The Superior Court found that the Master made several legal and palpable and overriding errors in applying the Reid factors, including equating delay with the litigation not advancing at all, lowering the bar for what it means to prosecute an action, and improperly shifting the burden of proving prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's decision was set aside, and the Registrar's dismissal was upheld.

The Appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to enforce a settlement in a failed real estate transaction.

The Appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to exercise discretion not to enforce the settlement, claiming new expert evidence changed the case and their new counsel was unaware of the outstanding offer.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding he properly exercised his discretion by considering all relevant factors and concluding it was not a "rare case" warranting non-enforcement.

The appeal was dismissed.

This endorsement from a case conference addresses a summary judgment motion brought by the defendants, seeking to dismiss the action based on a two-year limitation period.

The plaintiff's counsel, LawPro, sought to file supplementary responding material, including medical evidence regarding the plaintiff's mental capacity.

The court set a timetable for the plaintiff to deliver supplementary materials and for the defendants to state any objections.

A subsequent case conference was scheduled to address the admissibility of the new evidence and to establish the timetable for the remaining steps of the summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing its action for delay and sought leave to maintain the action under the Business Names Act.

The action had been automatically stayed because the plaintiff had failed to register its business name.

The court held that the registrar still had jurisdiction to dismiss the action for delay despite the statutory stay.

However, applying the Reid test, the court set aside the dismissal order, finding that the delay was caused by the inadvertence of the plaintiff's former counsel and that the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice.

The court also granted leave to maintain the action, as the failure to register the business name was an innocent oversight that had since been rectified without misleading the public.

Jitesh Bhalla, a defendant by counterclaim, moved to strike the amended amended statement of defence and counterclaim against him without leave to amend, pursuant to rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.11(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs by counterclaim, Evgueni Poltavets and Svetlana Poltavets, opposed the motion.

The court found that the allegations of negligence and ethical breaches did not disclose a reasonable cause of action against Bhalla, as a lawyer generally does not owe a duty of care to a non-client, and ethical breaches are not actionable in civil litigation.

The court also found that the conspiracy claim was a bald allegation lacking material facts and that a lawyer acting within the scope of retainer cannot conspire with their client.

The motion to strike the counterclaim against Jitesh Bhalla was granted without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to extend the deadline for setting the action down for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014 to enforce a 2013 default judgment, had seen no steps taken by the plaintiffs for 30 months between 2016 and 2019.

Applying the conjunctive test for delay, the Master found that while the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice, the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The appellant, a homeowner, sought indemnification under her property insurance policy for damage to her log house caused by a contractor's restoration work.

The trial judge found coverage existed but dismissed her claim due to late notice of the loss, denying relief from forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal but varied the costs awards, finding the trial judge had expanded the scope of issues beyond those directed by the appellate court in its prior decision, thereby increasing the appellant's reasonable cost expectations.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his professional negligence action against a lawyer and an accounting firm on summary judgment.

The appellant had sold his software company to Microsoft in 1999 and received approximately $4.8 million through a family trust.

The Canada Revenue Agency reassessed him for approximately $2.4 million in taxes, interest and penalties, claiming section 75(2) of the Income Tax Act applied.

The appellant obtained rectification orders and ultimately had his tax liability reduced to approximately $57,000 after the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that section 75(2) did not apply.

The appellant claimed damages from the respondents for professional negligence, alleging they failed to advise him of the CRA's position and the likely expenses of disputing it.

The motion judge dismissed the claim against the lawyer for lack of evidence of retainer regarding the trust, and dismissed the claim against the accounting firm for failure to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the expert evidence requirement for professional negligence claims.

The appellants Cadesky & Associates and Barry Seltzer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The cross-appellant George Jones abandoned the cross-appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs in the amount of $3,750.00 for each of the cross-respondents.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master dismissing their action for delay following a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The litigation, which commenced in 2000, involved allegations of mortgage mismanagement by the defendants.

The Master found an unacceptable explanation for at least seven years of delay, primarily related to document scanning, and concluded that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice due to the unavailability of key witnesses.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's contextual analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set a timetable for trial, while the defendants sought to dismiss the action for delay.

The plaintiff's lawyer cited medical and practice issues to explain the delay, which the court found lacked particularity.

Furthermore, a key defendant who provided independent legal advice had suffered a stroke and severe memory loss during the delay, causing non-compensable prejudice.

The court applied the Faris test and dismissed the action for delay.