Derrick Mathew Fulton

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal of Lori Gallant, who sought a court order to fix the rental rate for a renewed term of a commercial lease with Sherril Johnson and Fitzroy Johnson.

The court held that the lease’s renewal clause was merely an agreement to agree, providing no basis for the court to set a rental rate or imply a method for doing so.

The court also found no breach of good faith by the respondents in the rental negotiations.

The respondents were awarded costs.

The applicant, Veronica Ann Balkisson, sought a declaration that her son, Stefan Sandy, held title to a property as a bare trustee for her, claiming a resulting trust.

The respondents, Stefan and his wife Andrea, argued that the property was a gift from Veronica to Stefan and his sister Heaven, as an advance on their inheritance.

The court found that Veronica intended to make, and did make, a gift of the property to Stefan and Heaven, and that her later change of mind did not alter the legal effect of the gift.

The application was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario addressed the test for bad faith under s. 57(1)(b) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (RTA) and the potential liability of purchasers in "own use" evictions.

The Landlord and Tenant Board (Board) and Divisional Court had erred by unduly narrowing the bad faith assessment to the landlord's knowledge at the time of notice and by failing to consider the purchaser's good faith.

The Court held that the Board must consider all relevant evidence, including events after the notice, and assess the good faith of both the landlord and the purchaser.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted to the Board for redetermination.

The applicant, a condominium unit owner, brought an application seeking two orders regarding an upcoming Annual General Meeting: (1) the appointment of a neutral chair for the meeting, and (2) a ruling that the respondent condominium corporation's requirement for owners to obtain physical proxy forms from the condominium office (rather than downloading them) was unlawful.

The applicant's principal was running for election on a platform to repeal a special assessment.

The court dismissed the application, finding no proven serious risk of illegality or harm to warrant a neutral chair, and that the requirement for physical proxy forms, while potentially inconvenient, did not constitute oppression or a clear statutory/regulatory non-compliance issue, especially given the corporation's security concerns.

The court emphasized that the application was premature, as any issues could be addressed after the meeting with a full factual matrix.

The appellants commenced a motor vehicle accident action in December 2010 following a collision in December 2008.

The action was administratively dismissed as abandoned in August 2011 pursuant to rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants moved to set aside the dismissal in February 2014, more than two years after the dismissal order.

A master granted the motion to set aside, but the Superior Court judge allowed the respondents' appeal and reinstated the dismissal.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the master erred in considering the repeal of rule 48.15 as part of the contextual analysis, erred in assigning fault to the respondents for not filing a defence, erred in finding that the appellants always intended to prosecute the action without evidence to support this finding, and critically erred in failing to consider the finality principle in assessing prejudice to the respondents.

Following competing applications under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998 regarding the validity of a requisition seeking removal of condominium board members, the court had previously declared the requisition invalid, granted injunctive relief restraining meetings and dissemination of related allegations, and dismissed the owners’ application.

The condominium corporation sought substantial indemnity costs of $41,000.

The court held the applications were properly brought under s. 134 and that mandatory mediation and arbitration under s. 132 did not apply.

Although the owners had made false and misleading representations, the conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible to justify substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis and fixed at $18,000 as a fair and reasonable amount.

The moving defendants sought leave under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to amend their joint statement of defence, counterclaim, crossclaim, and third party claim by delivering separate pleadings and adding additional allegations and claims.

The court reaffirmed that leave to amend should generally be granted unless non-compensable prejudice would result, but scrutinized the proposed amendments for improper pleadings, including arguments, evidence, irrelevant matters, and procedural history that should instead be addressed through motions.

Numerous proposed paragraphs were rejected for pleading evidence, lacking particularity, or raising issues relating to pre-trial disclosure.

Leave was granted in part for both moving parties to amend their pleadings and third party claims, subject to extensive limitations and corrections.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to one set of responding defendants for part of the motion.

The appellant appealed a master's order granting the plaintiff leave to amend her notice of action and statement of claim to add a private clinic as a defendant in a medical malpractice action despite the expiry of the presumptive two‑year limitation period.

The court considered whether pleadings and correspondence from the hospital constituted a triggering event under the discoverability provisions of s. 5 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the hospital’s defence and cross‑claim, which alleged that treatment occurred in a private clinic, clearly pointed to another potential defendant and triggered the limitation period.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate reasonable diligence in identifying the clinic despite available information and prolonged inaction by counsel.

The master erred in law by allowing the amendment while leaving the limitation issue to be determined later.