Sonja Turajlich

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to amend its statement of claim to add allegations regarding a delay claim and punitive damages arising from a construction subcontract dispute.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendments pleaded a new cause of action that was statute-barred and improperly pleaded evidence.

The court granted leave to amend, finding the amendments largely provided particulars of allegations already pleaded and did not assert a fundamentally different claim.

The court also held that even if it were a new cause of action, there was a genuine factual dispute regarding discoverability that should not be resolved on a pleadings motion.

The plaintiffs, Pilbro III Inc. and E.D. Carpenters Ltd., sought leave to bring a motion to compel the defendants to answer refused questions from examination for discovery.

This motion was brought after the action had been set down for trial and past multiple court-ordered deadlines for interlocutory motions.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to combat the "culture of complacency" in civil litigation and enforce scheduling orders, despite acknowledging the defendants' own delays in providing undertakings.

The applicant, Carol Bellamy, a co-Estate Trustee, brought an application for the passing of accounts for the Estate of Jean Ann Ruston.

The respondent, Carolyn Thompson, the sole beneficiary and co-Trustee, raised numerous objections regarding excessive payments to Carol and her husband, Ron Bellamy, and mismanagement of estate funds, including speculative investments.

The court dismissed Carol's defenses of laches and acquiescence, finding her fiduciary duties to the sole beneficiary paramount.

The court ordered Carol to repay $318,918.27 to the Estate for excessive compensation and reimbursements, and directed several other objections to proceed to trial due to insufficient documentation and credibility issues.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer two refused questions during discovery and to produce environmental documents (Environmental Site Assessments and Risk Assessment Documents) related to alleged property contamination.

The defendant argued these documents were relevant to the pleaded issue of contamination in the Fresh as Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim.

The plaintiff argued the documents were not relevant or that sufficient documents had already been produced.

The court found the requested documents relevant to the issue of contamination and granted the defendant's motion, ordering production of the documents and re-attendance for discovery, with costs awarded to the defendant.

Following a summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff developer regarding a defaulted agreement of purchase and sale, the plaintiff sought costs.

The court noted the defendants pursued a defence and counterclaim identical to one recently dismissed by the Court of Appeal in a related case.

Despite this, the plaintiff only sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $49,500 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The plaintiff vendor brought a summary judgment motion against the defendant purchasers for failing to close on a luxury home.

The defendants argued they did not understand the agreement due to a language barrier and were misled about environmental issues on the property.

The court rejected these defenses, finding the defendants were experienced buyers who had a bilingual real estate agent and declined legal advice.

The court granted judgment for the plaintiff for the loss on resale and proven carrying costs, totaling $584,306.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel the defendant to answer certain questions refused during examination for discovery, primarily concerning solicitor-client privilege.

The core issue was whether the defendant had waived privilege by pleading a lack of awareness or understanding regarding a real estate waiver he signed, thereby putting the legal advice he did or did not receive into issue.

The court found that the defendant had impliedly waived privilege by making his knowledge and understanding of the waiver a material element of his defence.

Consequently, the defendant was ordered to answer one specific question related to legal advice received *before* signing the waiver and to request relevant cell phone records for a limited period.

The motion was dismissed for other questions deemed unrelated to the specific period of implied waiver.

The applicant, 1605041 Ontario Limited (160), and the respondent, 2424033 Ontario Ltd. (242), were involved in a dispute concerning a property and a joint venture agreement. 160 sought to discharge 242's second mortgage, while 242 counter-applied for specific performance of its right of first refusal (RFR) to purchase the property and a determination of the mortgage amount owing.

The court found that 242 had a valid and enforceable RFR, which 160 had breached by attempting to sell the property to a third party without proper notice or honouring the RFR terms.

The court ordered specific performance, requiring 160 to transfer the property to 242 for $1,560,000.

The court also determined the amount required to discharge the second mortgage, disallowing several penalty fees claimed by 242 under the Interest Act, and denying 160's claimed set-offs for legal costs and first mortgagee default proceedings.

The joint venture agreement was terminated upon completion of the transfer.

The plaintiff, Silani Sweet Cheese Limited, brought a motion under Rule 51.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to withdraw deemed admissions under Rule 51.03 and for an order extending the time to serve a response to a request to admit.

The defendant, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, opposed the motion.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing admissions, finding that there was a triable issue, the failure to respond was inadvertent, and the withdrawal would not result in uncompensable prejudice to the defendant.

The motion was granted, allowing the withdrawal of deemed admissions and extending the time for the plaintiff to serve a proper response, with no costs awarded.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision finding they had partially waived solicitor-client privilege during an examination for discovery.

The underlying dispute involved whether the plaintiff was entitled to shares or stock options upon termination of employment.

During discovery, the individual defendant stated he had told others his lawyer 'botched' the documents.

The Master ruled this waived privilege over the instructions given to the lawyer.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that solicitor-client privilege is a substantive rule of law and that a partial waiver based on a discovery answer must be voluntary, informed, and clear.

The court found the defendants had not put their state of mind or reliance on legal advice in issue in their pleadings, and thus no implied or partial waiver occurred.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused and taken under advisement during examinations for discovery of two individual defendants, Alan G. Fickett and Aaron T. Morrison, and their associated corporate entities, Ecolight LED Systems, LLC and Ecolight International, LLC.

The underlying action alleged misrepresentation, unpaid loans, and diversion of inventory by a co-defendant through a scheme involving the Ecolight companies.

The court assessed the relevance of each refused question based on the pleadings and the scope of discovery, compelling answers for some questions related to inventory suppliers, financing, and bank statements, while refusing others concerning corporate records and marketing plans.

Co‑owners of real property held as tenants in common disputed whether a prior agreement for one co‑owner to purchase the other’s interest remained binding after the closing date passed without financing.

The respondent sought specific performance of the original agreement and argued that her solicitor had negligently failed to request a further extension and had consented to judgment without authority.

The court found the agreement had lapsed because time was of the essence and payment was not tendered by the extended closing date.

It further held that the parties’ consent judgment permitting the property to be listed and sold was valid and enforceable because the solicitor had apparent authority and enforcement would not create injustice.

The moving party was granted leave to accept a higher third‑party offer and bind both co‑owners.

The defendant mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim for possession and the amount due under a mortgage.

The plaintiff mortgagor argued it was no longer in default, the notice of sale omitted some property, and the defendant failed to provide notice under s. 244 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the plaintiff was in default, the court should not interfere with the lawful realization of security, and the plaintiff was not an 'insolvent person' requiring s. 244 notice.