Fraser Joshua Dickson

This decision addresses costs following a trial concerning easement rights and property interference.

The plaintiffs' (Paiva) claims against the Town of Newmarket were dismissed, and their claims against the Buckley defendants were largely dismissed, except for a limited injunction.

The Buckley defendants' counterclaim for an injunction was granted.

The court, applying the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, awarded costs to the Town of Newmarket and the Buckley defendants as the overall successful parties, while reducing their claimed amounts due to excessive hours billed and, for the Buckley defendants, instances of breaching court orders.

The defendants moved to set aside a noting of default entered by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff opposed and brought a cross-motion for the recovery of personal property.

The court found it unreasonable for the plaintiff to have noted the defendants in default without prior notice, given that the plaintiff's counsel knew the defendants were in the process of retaining litigation counsel.

The court also found the defendants' delay in responding to be reasonable and that they had an arguable defence.

Consequently, the noting of default against both defendants was set aside.

The court further exercised its discretion to stay the plaintiff's action pending the adjudication of a related bankruptcy application, deeming it the most efficient way to resolve accounting issues between the parties.

The defendants were awarded substantial indemnity costs.

This trial concerned a long-standing dispute over an easement (right-of-way) through a tunnel between adjacent commercial properties at 247, 253, and 255 Main Street South, Newmarket.

The plaintiffs, owners of 255 Main Street, alleged that the defendants, owners of 247 and 253 Main Street, substantially interfered with their easement rights through increased use, physical alterations, and parking.

The plaintiffs also sued the Town of Newmarket for enabling the interference.

The defendants counterclaimed, asserting the plaintiffs illegally parked on their property.

The court found that while increased use and minor alterations did not constitute substantial interference, the defendants' parking in the tunnel did.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for damages and against the Town of Newmarket, but granted an injunction preventing parking in the tunnel.

The court also granted the defendants' counterclaim, enjoining the plaintiffs from parking on the 253 Main Street parking pad, finding no ancillary right or prescriptive easement for parking.

The respondent law firm brought a motion for security for costs against the applicant, citing the applicant's non-residency and the alleged frivolous and vexatious nature of the application, coupled with insufficient assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an order for security for costs would not be just.

The court emphasized the respondent's unreasonable delay in bringing the motion and the protective purpose of the Solicitors Act, which facilitates client assessment of solicitor accounts.

The court also found merit in the applicant's assessment claim.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) over a commercial development property, claiming a 10% beneficial interest based on alleged oral agreements and financial contributions.

The defendants opposed, disputing the existence of a binding agreement or trust.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim to an interest in the property, satisfying the initial low evidentiary threshold for a CPL.

However, after balancing the equities, the court exercised its discretion to deny the CPL.

The court reasoned that the property was acquired for profit, making damages a satisfactory and calculable remedy, and that the property was not unique.

Furthermore, the CPL would act as an injunction, causing greater harm and inconvenience to the defendants by delaying development and sale while they remained responsible for carrying costs.

The plaintiff, Paul Wilson, sought costs following a successful summary judgment motion against Stephen McNeill and Cannabis Innovation Group Ltd. (CIG) for a loan, and an unsuccessful motion against Argentia Gold Corporation (AGC).

Wilson sought full indemnity costs from McNeill and CIG due to fraudulent misrepresentation.

AGC sought substantial indemnity costs from Wilson.

The court awarded Wilson partial indemnity costs from McNeill and CIG.

It also awarded AGC partial indemnity costs from Wilson, finding it reasonable for Wilson to have sued AGC given McNeill's role as CEO.

The court then issued a Bullock order, making McNeill and CIG responsible to Wilson for the costs he owed AGC, finding it fair given their actions led to AGC's involvement.

A Sanderson order was deemed inappropriate due to McNeill and CIG's financial resources.

The plaintiff, Paul Wilson, sought summary judgment against Stephen McNeill, Cannabis Innovation Group Ltd. (CIG), and Argentia Gold Corporation (AGC) for an unpaid $100,000 loan.

The court found that McNeill, as the directing mind of CIG, made fraudulent misrepresentations regarding AGC's financial projections, inventory, and valuation, which induced Wilson to make the loan to CIG.

The court granted summary judgment against CIG and pierced the corporate veil to hold McNeill personally liable due to the fraudulent conduct.

However, the claim against AGC was dismissed, as it was not a party to the loan agreement, and there was no evidence of unjust enrichment or oppressive corporate acts by AGC.

The appellants brought a motion to set aside, amend, or vary the Court of Appeal's previous order regarding trial costs, arguing procedural unfairness, inconsistency with costs principles, and insufficient reasons.

The motion was brought under rules 59.06(1) and (2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the relief sought was not available under rule 59.06, as it was an attempt to reargue issues already adjudicated.

The court clarified that challenges to discretionary orders, procedural fairness, or adequacy of reasons are typically grounds for seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court also addressed and dismissed belated arguments regarding the order settlement procedure under rule 59.04 and the inapplicability of rule 37.14.

The appellants, former portfolio managers, appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for over $1.3 million in performance fees and a discretionary bonus from their former employer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellants were not contractually entitled to performance fees directly from the respondent, as their entitlement was structured through a side agreement with a lead portfolio manager.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred in precluding the appellants from arguing their entitlement to a discretionary bonus, as this claim was sufficiently pleaded.

The Court awarded each appellant $115,000 for the discretionary bonus, determining that the employer's discretion in awarding bonuses was not exercised fairly and reasonably given the fund's exceptional performance and bonuses paid to similarly situated employees.

The appellant sought an extension of time to bring a motion to a three-judge panel of the Ontario Court of Appeal to appeal a motion judge's decision.

The motion judge had dismissed the appellant's request to set aside a registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and awarded costs.

The original appeal concerned a dispute over legal fees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's request for an extension of time, finding no valid reason for the delays in perfecting the original appeal or in appealing the motion judge's decision.

The court emphasized that the justice of the cause favoured the respondent.

Mark Couper appealed a judgment ordering him to pay legal fees and disbursements to Rueters LLP.

The appeal was based on three grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the applications judge, an alleged error in finding Rueters had good reason to withdraw as counsel without court approval, and the invalidity of a compromise compensation agreement (CCA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, that Rueters had good reason to withdraw (client caused breakdown, no prejudice, no court approval needed as client agreed), and that the CCA was valid and enforceable (new issue not raised below, and found fair and reasonable).