Ronald Sleightholm

The moving party defendants sought an extension of time to deliver their Notice of Appeal from a trial decision finding personal liability for fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with a real estate investment.

The motion judge applied the well-settled test for extensions of time, focusing on the merits of the proposed appeal as the central issue.

The moving parties failed to identify any error of law or palpable and overriding error of fact in the trial judge's findings, which included adverse credibility findings based on the failure to call a key witness and the failure to preserve business records.

The motion was denied with costs.

Appeal from summary judgment granting declaratory relief regarding a mortgage registered as security for a $300,000 consulting fee contingent on the receipt of a cannabis cultivation licence from Health Canada.

The motion judge found that the fee was conditional on licence issuance and, since no licence was ever obtained, the payment obligation never crystallized.

The appellate court upheld the finding that the mortgage was not a standalone unconditional obligation but security for a contingent payment, and that the motion judge properly considered the factual matrix including the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Transfer and Consultancy Agreement.

This decision concerns the allocation of costs following a trial regarding the estate of Edward Malcolm LaFrance.

The court considered submissions from both parties, each seeking costs on different bases, but ultimately determined that no costs should be awarded to any party due to the divided success at trial and the nature of the family estate dispute.

Each party is to bear their own costs.

This addendum corrects a factual error in the reasons for decision released February 5, 2025, regarding the date on which shares were given to the parties.

The court clarifies that the shares were given at Christmas 1996, not Christmas 2019, as previously stated in paragraph 169.

This was a fraudulent conveyance action concerning the transfer of a property from Punit Lala and Pawan Lala to Pawan Lala and Rani Lala.

The transfer occurred after Punit Lala was served with a motion for summary judgment in a fraud action by the applicant, Infolink Technologies Corp. The court found that Punit Lala conveyed the property with the intent to defeat Infolink's ability to collect on a potential judgment, and that the other defendants (Pawan, Rani, and Kishore Lala) either knew about this intent or were wilfully blind to it.

The court also determined that Rani and Pawan Lala were not bona fide purchasers for value, as they did not act in good faith and the property was not transferred at fair market value.

The transfer was declared void as against Infolink, allowing them to execute against Punit Lala's ¼ interest in the property.

Infolink's claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

The applicant sought to enforce an arbitral award requiring the respondent to sell shares to the applicant.

A third-party judgment creditor of the respondent opposed the application, arguing her writ of seizure and sale gave her a prior interest in the shares.

The court held that under section 50(3) of the Arbitration Act, enforcement is mandatory unless specific exceptions apply.

Furthermore, applying equitable principles, the respondent had no remaining interest in the shares to which the writ could attach once the applicant's contractual right to acquire them arose.

The arbitral award was enforced.

The Estate of Joseph Zabukovec appealed a trial judge's decision granting Judith Tomek and Joseph Zabukovec Jr. joint beneficial ownership of 75% of a property based on unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel.

The Estate argued the trial judge erred in valuing the land and failed to consider Joseph Sr.'s contributions to the house construction.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the land valuation but declined to interfere with the remedy, citing the broad discretion in crafting equitable remedies for proprietary estoppel.

The court affirmed the trial judge's order as consistent with the parties' original intention for the house and house lot to be conveyed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Litigation Administrator, Edward Waters, was personally ordered to pay costs due to acting in his own interest.

The applicant Wife and respondent Husband, married in 1983 and separated in 2011, sought a beneficial interest in a 15-acre property owned by the Husband's late father (Joseph Sr.), who died intestate.

The Husband and Wife had built and continuously improved a house on the property, believing they would inherit it.

The court addressed claims of oral agreement, resulting trust, unjust enrichment, and proprietary estoppel against Joseph Sr.'s Estate.

The court found no oral agreement or resulting trust but established unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel regarding the house, but not the entire acreage.

The claims were not statute-barred.

The court awarded the Husband and Wife a joint beneficial ownership of 75% of the property via a constructive trust, with the Estate retaining 25%, and granted the divorce.

The applicant moved for an interim order for the partition and sale of a jointly owned property and for interim spousal support.

The parties cohabited for several years, during which the respondent financially supported the applicant while he obtained his degrees.

The court dismissed the motion for partition and sale, finding that a trial was necessary to determine the parties' respective beneficial interests in the property, especially given the imminent trial date.

The court granted the motion for interim spousal support on a needs basis, ordering the respondent to pay $1,458 per month retroactive to the date the application was served, but declined to order the respondent to secure the support with a life insurance policy.

The defendants moved to vacate a noting of default and default judgment totaling $275,238.36, which arose from their failure to repay promissory notes related to a real estate investment.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside default judgment, considering promptness, plausible excuse, arguable defence, prejudice, and the administration of justice.

The motion was dismissed, as the defendants failed to demonstrate promptness, provide an adequate explanation for delay, or establish an arguable defence, particularly due to their failure to provide requested documentation.

Setting aside the judgment would prejudice the plaintiffs and undermine the integrity of justice.

The applicant brought a motion seeking interim spousal support, security orders against the respondent's estate, and an order for non-depletion of her equalization claim, citing urgency due to the respondent's terminal illness.

The court granted the motion to proceed before a case conference due to urgency and awarded interim spousal support of $547.00 per month, binding on the respondent and his estate.

However, the court declined to grant the additional security orders, noting the uncertain strength of the applicant's claims regarding spousal support delay and equalization limitation periods.

The interim support order was made reviewable in four months.

This endorsement addresses costs following a judgment where the plaintiff was largely successful.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiff against Mushtaq Raja, Minaj Transport Inc., Maryat Investments Inc., and Direct Ex Logistics Inc. The decision to award substantial indemnity costs was based on Mushtaq Raja's fraudulent conduct prior to and during the litigation, and the defendants' unproven allegations of fraud against the plaintiff.

The court declined to award costs to Munaza Raja and Janish Raja, despite their successful dismissal from the action, due to their minor roles and the lack of separate costs incurred on their behalf.

Specific cost amounts were determined for each paying defendant, with minor adjustments for Maryat Investments Inc. and Direct Ex Logistics Inc.

This was a motion for leave to appeal two costs decisions.

The appellant sought leave to appeal the motion judge's decision not to award costs against the applicant personally, citing her financial inability to pay, and not to award costs against her former counsel for allegedly initiating a frivolous application or being in a conflict of interest.

The court denied leave, finding that while there might be doubt about the correctness of denying costs based solely on inability to pay, the matter was not of sufficient importance given the applicant's circumstances.

The court also deferred to the motion judge's findings that the application was not frivolous or vexatious and that counsel was not in a conflict of interest warranting personal costs.

Following the withdrawal of a spousal support application, the estate trustees of the deceased respondent sought a costs order jointly and severally against the applicant and her former lawyer.

The trustees alleged the proceeding was frivolous and vexatious and argued the lawyer had acted in conflict of interest and improperly initiated litigation despite knowing the claim had no chance of success.

The court considered Rules 12(3) and 24(9) of the Family Law Rules and the principles governing personal costs orders against counsel.

The court held the support claim was not clearly devoid of merit because statutory provisions permit setting aside domestic contracts in cases of unconscionability or lack of disclosure.

As the lawyer had acted on instructions and did not run up costs or abuse the court’s process, no personal costs order was warranted.

The applicant sought an order discharging a lien registered by Legal Aid Ontario against a matrimonial home that had later vested in her pursuant to a family law judgment.

She argued the lien was void ab initio because it did not state a specific monetary amount, contrary to s. 48 of the Legal Aid Services Act, 1996 and provisions of the Land Titles Act.

The respondent maintained that the lien properly described the obligation as securing the full and actual cost of legal aid services provided pursuant to a contribution agreement with the applicant’s former spouse.

The court held that the contribution agreement contemplated payment of the full actual costs of services, with $5,000 being merely an estimate rather than a cap, and that the lien’s description therefore complied with the statutory requirements.

As the lien predated the vesting order and was validly registered, it could not be removed absent satisfaction of the debt.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as an abuse of process, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court had previously determined that the action constituted a collateral attack on earlier decisions of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal and that allegations of conflict of interest and improper conduct against counsel were unsupported by evidence.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious and unfounded allegations impugning the professional integrity of a lawyer and effectively advanced a conspiracy claim without evidentiary foundation.

Given the abusive nature of the proceeding and the seriousness of the unsupported allegations, substantial indemnity costs were warranted.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in significant amounts inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging misconduct related to the loss of a company’s role as general partner of hotel-related limited partnerships.

The plaintiff alleged inducing breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of corporate opportunities after a replacement general partner associated with one defendant was elected following the winding up of the original corporate general partner.

The court held that the claims constituted a collateral attack on earlier court orders confirming the liquidation and the process for electing a new general partner, rendering the action res judicata and an abuse of process.

The court also found no evidence of wrongdoing by the defendants and no proof of damages arising from their conduct.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing an oppression claim brought by shareholders of a corporation operating hospitality assets through related partnerships.

The responding parties alleged that refusal to appoint one shareholder as a director and unilateral management decisions constituted oppression and unfair prejudice.

The court applied the summary judgment framework articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch and considered the reasonable expectations analysis for oppression claims under corporate legislation.

It held that the evidence disclosed no reasonable expectation that the shareholder would be appointed as a director and no conduct amounting to oppression.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a corporate transaction involving the acquisition of a golf course company.

The plaintiffs alleged oppression under the Alberta Business Corporations Act, breach of directors’ duty of good faith, misrepresentation concerning the adjusted cost base of shares, and reimbursement of legal fees.

The court held that the claim relating to legal fees was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and constituted an abuse of process given earlier appellate findings.

On the merits, the court found no oppression, breach of duty, or misrepresentation, noting that the relevant share cost base was disclosed in the transaction circular and the defendants’ dual roles were known and approved by shareholders.

Applying the summary judgment framework from Combined Air Mechanical Services v. Flesch, the court concluded the action was entirely without merit.