Christine Fotopoulos

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order dismissing their $3 million professional negligence action against two law firms for delay at a status hearing.

The Master found three years of unexplained delay and concluded the plaintiffs failed to show the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice if the action proceeded.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, confirming that the 'Faris test' for dismissal for delay is a strict two-step conjunctive test and rejecting the plaintiffs' argument for a third 'contextual' or 'just result' step.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Applicants brought an application challenging the validity of sections 3, 4, and 5 of the 2002 Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Roadways under the Municipal Act, 2001, asserting that the regulation was ultra vires.

The challenge arose in the context of a personal injury action alleging negligent winter road maintenance.

After the Court of Appeal’s decision in Giuliani limited the scope of the regulation and the municipality withdrew reliance on it as a defence, the respondents moved to strike the application as moot.

The court held that no live controversy remained between the parties and declined to exercise discretion to hear the matter, emphasizing judicial economy and the limited relevance of the impugned provisions following amendments and appellate guidance.

The plaintiffs appealed a Rule 21 motion decision determining that where a plaintiff is involved in two motor vehicle accidents and the actions are tried together, the statutory deductible under s. 267.5(7) of the Insurance Act applies to each action individually.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the plain meaning of the provision requires the court to determine general damages for each action and then reduce that amount by the statutory deductible.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the action as an abuse of process, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court had previously determined that the action constituted a collateral attack on earlier decisions of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal and that allegations of conflict of interest and improper conduct against counsel were unsupported by evidence.

The court found that the plaintiff made serious and unfounded allegations impugning the professional integrity of a lawyer and effectively advanced a conspiracy claim without evidentiary foundation.

Given the abusive nature of the proceeding and the seriousness of the unsupported allegations, substantial indemnity costs were warranted.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in significant amounts inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action alleging misconduct related to the loss of a company’s role as general partner of hotel-related limited partnerships.

The plaintiff alleged inducing breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of corporate opportunities after a replacement general partner associated with one defendant was elected following the winding up of the original corporate general partner.

The court held that the claims constituted a collateral attack on earlier court orders confirming the liquidation and the process for electing a new general partner, rendering the action res judicata and an abuse of process.

The court also found no evidence of wrongdoing by the defendants and no proof of damages arising from their conduct.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision striking out their Amended Notice of Application against a notary public for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellants alleged they unknowingly signed powers of attorney revoking their interest in foreign property, which were notarized by the respondent notary in their absence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the notary owed no duty of care to the appellants when she affixed her signature, knowing the legal effect it would carry in the foreign jurisdiction.

Following a successful appeal, the respondents requested to make submissions on the costs of the lower court proceeding, arguing the motion judge made no costs award due to the novelty of the issues.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its decision to award the appellants costs of both the appeal and the lower court motion, applying the general principle that costs follow the event and noting that the appellants were entirely successful in being permitted to continue their actions against new defendants.

The plaintiff, who suffered severe brain damage at birth rendering him mentally incompetent, commenced a medical malpractice action in 2002 against his mother's obstetrician and the hospital.

In 2006, a second action was commenced against the doctors who treated him post-birth.

The motion judge struck the second action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the transition provisions in s. 24, the former limitation period applied because the claim was discovered by the litigation guardian before January 1, 2004.

Under the former Limitations Act, the limitation period was suspended due to the plaintiff's mental incompetence, meaning the second action was commenced in time.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted the appellants leave to amend their statement of claim in accordance with the Notice of Appeal.

Costs were awarded to the appellants in the cause on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to add defendants after the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellants relied on the discoverability principle.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master's decision was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The court agreed that the motion could be dealt with at the motion stage without requiring a trial on credibility, and upheld the Master's exercise of discretion.

The purchaser of a home discovered structural defects and toxic mould after closing.

She sued the vendors, who had built the home themselves, for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misstatement, failure to disclose defects, and negligent construction.

The trial judge found the vendors liable for the cost of demolition and reconstruction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the findings of fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misstatement, and failure to disclose, finding no evidence of knowledge or reliance.

However, the Court upheld liability for negligent construction, as the vendors owed a duty of care to subsequent purchasers and the defects rendered the house dangerous.

Damages were reduced to the cost of repairing the dangerous defects rather than demolition.

The appellants represented a class of individuals victimized by a gold delivery fraud, having deposited funds into a solicitor's trust account.

They alleged the Law Society of Upper Canada breached a duty of care by failing to properly investigate and monitor the solicitor's trust account after being notified of irregularities.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Anns/Kamloops test and held that the Law Society did not owe a prima facie duty of care to the appellants, who were not clients but participants in a third-party business promotion.

The Court further noted that even if a duty existed, it would be negated by residual policy considerations and the statutory immunity provided under the Law Society Act.