Allan Rouben

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

This appeal concerned a defamation action where the motion judge struck out claims.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by taking an overly technical approach to pleadings, specifically regarding the pleading of special damages for one appellant and failing to grant leave to amend for the other appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order striking out claims was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to file a further amended statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed her spousal support claim, ordered a trial for child support, and dismissed both parties' property claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding the statutory definitions of "spouse" and "parent" distinct.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the property claims, concluding that the motion judge erred in dismissing them without sufficient factual findings or legal application.

The issues of child support and property damages were ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant sought to purchase a residential property under an Option to Purchase Agreement or, alternatively, the return of a $25,000 downpayment.

She appealed the dismissal of her application by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Option Agreement had clearly expired by its terms, the appellant failed to establish a causal link between the respondent's alleged failure to provide rent receipts and her inability to secure mortgage financing, and the application judge did not err in declining to convert the application into an action.

The Defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff, ordinarily resident outside Ontario and lacking sufficient assets in Ontario, was ordered to post security for costs.

The court applied Rule 56.01(1) holistically, considering factors such as the plaintiff's residence, lack of assets, and the merits of the claim, which were not found to have a good chance of success.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument of delay by the defendants.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application seeking an accounting of her late mother's estate.

The application judge had dismissed the application on two grounds: that a 2019 consent order concluded the matter, and that further litigation would constitute an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decision, upholding the interpretation of the consent order and the finding of abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) investigated a cheating scandal involving the November 2021 licensing exams.

Based on statistical anomalies, the LSO voided the applicants' exam results and their registration in the licensing process without holding a hearing.

The applicants sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court held that while voiding the compromised exams was a reasonable administrative measure, voiding the applicants' registration and imposing regulatory sanctions without a hearing breached procedural fairness.

The court quashed the punitive sanctions and remitted the matters to the LSO.

The appellant defaulted on a $15,000 business loan guaranteed by the Province of Ontario under an economic development program.

Ontario repaid the bank and later successfully sued the appellant in Small Claims Court for indemnification.

On appeal, the appellant argued the action was barred by the two-year limitation period and the doctrine of laches.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that Ontario sued as a guarantor exempt from limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that laches did not apply because Ontario had actively pursued collection.

The moving party sought an extension of time to appeal Small Claims Court decisions finding him liable for a 1996 government business loan.

Although the moving party failed to demonstrate an intention to appeal within the time limit and provided a weak explanation for the significant delay, the court found the appeal had potential merit regarding whether the Crown, as an assignee of the debt, could avoid the limitation period that would have applied to the original private lender.

Given the lack of prejudice to the respondent, who waited 23 years to commence the action, the court granted the extension of time to appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment recognizing and enforcing a US$1.6 million New York judgment.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the Ontario enforcement action was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had not raised its limitation period argument before the motion judge and had previously agreed that the limitation period began when the New York appeal was dismissed, in accordance with established precedent.

The court declined to reconsider its prior jurisprudence on when the limitation period for enforcing foreign judgments commences.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing her duty of fair representation application against her union.

The OLRB had dismissed the application partly due to delay and partly for failing to establish a prima facie case that the union acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith regarding her termination grievance.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found no error in the OLRB's conclusions regarding delay or the lack of a prima facie case.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The moving party, Lifeline, sought an order under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence an action against LawPRO to recover on a judgment against the bankrupt lawyer.

Lifeline also sought an order that any recovery belong exclusively to it.

Another creditor, Bridgepoint, supported the section 38 order but opposed the exclusivity term, arguing it should be allowed to participate and share in the proceeds.

The court granted the section 38 order but refused the exclusivity term, holding that Bridgepoint was entitled to participate in the action and share in any recovery under the responsive insurance policies, subject to proving its claim.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action against the Regional Municipality of Durham for failing to keep a roadway in a reasonable state of repair, following a motor vehicle accident that caused life-altering injuries to the plaintiff.

The trial judge found the road was not in a state of non-repair and did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver, also noting the driver's excessive speed and distraction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law in the trial judge's analysis.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the four-part test for municipal negligence, considering the driver's conduct as one factor among others in assessing the road's condition relative to an ordinary reasonable driver, without conflating the driver's negligence with the road's state of non-repair.

The plaintiff litigation loan company moved for summary judgment against the defendant lawyer for outstanding loans made to his former law firm.

The loans were intended to fund client litigation, but another partner of the firm had forged client signatures and misappropriated the funds before passing away.

The defendant lawyer took no position on the motion and was currently in bankruptcy, though the stay of proceedings had been lifted.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the defendant liable for the firm's debts under the Partnerships Act despite his lack of involvement in the fraudulent acts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants, including a former CEO, from attending within 500 metres of their premises or communicating with staff, and for leave to amend their Statement of Claim.

The court granted the unopposed request to amend the pleadings.

However, the court dismissed the request for injunctive relief, finding that the injunction was not anchored to any pleaded cause of action such as trespass or intimidation.

Furthermore, even if trespass had been pleaded, the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm under the RJR-MacDonald test.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that summarily dismissed their complaint regarding a failure to provide sign language interpretation during a private prosecution.

The Divisional Court upheld the dismissal against the private prosecutor and the individual who laid the information, finding they did not provide a 'service' under the Human Rights Code.

The Court also dismissed the application against the Justices of the Peace due to judicial immunity.

However, the Court found the Tribunal's dismissal of the complaint against the Ministry of the Attorney General was unreasonable, as the Tribunal ignored explicit allegations that requests for interpretation were made to the court clerk.

The matter against the Ministry was remitted to the Tribunal.

The plaintiffs sought costs for their successful Fresh Evidence and Mareva Injunction motions against the Grillone Defendants, and the defendant Lisa Gatto sought costs for the Mareva Injunction motion that was withdrawn against her.

The court awarded Gatto $7,500 in partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found the Grillone Defendants engaged in dishonourable conduct deserving of censure and awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs totaling $44,500, which included the amount the plaintiffs were ordered to pay Gatto.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order of Kimmel J. dated October 20, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $3,500.

The plaintiff moved to strike the jury notice in a motor vehicle accident action due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant did not oppose the relief but requested a conditional order.

The court applied the 'middle ground' approach, conditionally striking the jury notice so the trial could proceed as a judge-alone trial, but allowing the jury notice to be automatically reinstated if jury trials resume in Peel Region by the time the case is called.