Allan Rouben

The husband appealed a family law judgment made following an uncontested trial in which he did not participate due to his failure to comply with court orders regarding financial disclosure and pleadings.

The wife brought a motion to quash the appeal based on the husband's ongoing non-compliance with support and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, finding it more appropriate to hear the appeal on the merits.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in proceeding with an uncontested trial given the husband's repeated breaches of court orders and failure to provide financial disclosure.

This appeal concerned a defamation action where the motion judge struck out claims.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by taking an overly technical approach to pleadings, specifically regarding the pleading of special damages for one appellant and failing to grant leave to amend for the other appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the motion judge's order striking out claims was set aside, and the appellants were granted leave to file a further amended statement of claim.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment order that dismissed her spousal support claim, ordered a trial for child support, and dismissed both parties' property claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding the statutory definitions of "spouse" and "parent" distinct.

However, it allowed the appeal regarding the property claims, concluding that the motion judge erred in dismissing them without sufficient factual findings or legal application.

The issues of child support and property damages were ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant sought to purchase a residential property under an Option to Purchase Agreement or, alternatively, the return of a $25,000 downpayment.

She appealed the dismissal of her application by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Option Agreement had clearly expired by its terms, the appellant failed to establish a causal link between the respondent's alleged failure to provide rent receipts and her inability to secure mortgage financing, and the application judge did not err in declining to convert the application into an action.

The Defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff, ordinarily resident outside Ontario and lacking sufficient assets in Ontario, was ordered to post security for costs.

The court applied Rule 56.01(1) holistically, considering factors such as the plaintiff's residence, lack of assets, and the merits of the claim, which were not found to have a good chance of success.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument of delay by the defendants.

This appeal concerned a severe brain injury sustained by Megan Desrochers in an ATV accident.

The trial judge found Patrick McGinnis liable for negligence, with 10% contributory negligence by Megan, but dismissed claims against Grant and Catherine McGinnis.

Patrick appealed his liability.

The Desrochers cross-appealed the dismissal of claims against Grant and Catherine, both in tort and under s. 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed Patrick's appeal, upholding his liability.

It also dismissed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Catherine's tort liability.

However, the Court allowed the Desrochers' cross-appeal regarding Grant's liability under HTA s. 192(2), finding that "negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle" includes the negligent transfer of care and control of the vehicle to an unfit person.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application seeking an accounting of her late mother's estate.

The application judge had dismissed the application on two grounds: that a 2019 consent order concluded the matter, and that further litigation would constitute an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's decision, upholding the interpretation of the consent order and the finding of abuse of process.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondents.

The moving party, Lifeline, sought an order under section 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence an action against LawPRO to recover on a judgment against the bankrupt lawyer.

Lifeline also sought an order that any recovery belong exclusively to it.

Another creditor, Bridgepoint, supported the section 38 order but opposed the exclusivity term, arguing it should be allowed to participate and share in the proceeds.

The court granted the section 38 order but refused the exclusivity term, holding that Bridgepoint was entitled to participate in the action and share in any recovery under the responsive insurance policies, subject to proving its claim.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action against the Regional Municipality of Durham for failing to keep a roadway in a reasonable state of repair, following a motor vehicle accident that caused life-altering injuries to the plaintiff.

The trial judge found the road was not in a state of non-repair and did not pose an unreasonable risk to an ordinary reasonable driver, also noting the driver's excessive speed and distraction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no extricable error of law in the trial judge's analysis.

The appellate court affirmed that the trial judge correctly applied the four-part test for municipal negligence, considering the driver's conduct as one factor among others in assessing the road's condition relative to an ordinary reasonable driver, without conflating the driver's negligence with the road's state of non-repair.

The plaintiff litigation loan company moved for summary judgment against the defendant lawyer for outstanding loans made to his former law firm.

The loans were intended to fund client litigation, but another partner of the firm had forged client signatures and misappropriated the funds before passing away.

The defendant lawyer took no position on the motion and was currently in bankruptcy, though the stay of proceedings had been lifted.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the defendant liable for the firm's debts under the Partnerships Act despite his lack of involvement in the fraudulent acts.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants, including a former CEO, from attending within 500 metres of their premises or communicating with staff, and for leave to amend their Statement of Claim.

The court granted the unopposed request to amend the pleadings.

However, the court dismissed the request for injunctive relief, finding that the injunction was not anchored to any pleaded cause of action such as trespass or intimidation.

Furthermore, even if trespass had been pleaded, the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm under the RJR-MacDonald test.

The plaintiffs sought costs for their successful Fresh Evidence and Mareva Injunction motions against the Grillone Defendants, and the defendant Lisa Gatto sought costs for the Mareva Injunction motion that was withdrawn against her.

The court awarded Gatto $7,500 in partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found the Grillone Defendants engaged in dishonourable conduct deserving of censure and awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs totaling $44,500, which included the amount the plaintiffs were ordered to pay Gatto.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction against the defendants to freeze their assets pending the resolution of an action for recovery of nearly $1.9 million in loan monies.

After the motion was argued, the plaintiffs sought leave to introduce fresh evidence regarding the defendants' attempts to sell property and hide assets.

The court granted leave to admit the fresh evidence, finding it could not have been discovered with due diligence and was highly relevant to the risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted the Mareva injunction in part, ordering a freezing of the defendants' assets and disclosure of their worldwide assets, finding a strong prima facie case of misrepresentation and misappropriation.

Appeal from a trial judgment in a fraudulent conveyance action.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for participating in a civil conspiracy to defraud the respondent and to prevent her from realizing on a judgment against one of the defendants.

The trial judge awarded judgment against one defendant in the amount of $175,000 and against two other defendants in the amount of $60,000.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings regarding the scope of the proceedings, the facts concerning monies received, and their distribution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the conspiracy finding was supported by the record and that the trial judge had broad remedial authority under the applicable legislation.

This costs endorsement follows a motion brought by House concerning the distribution of insurance proceeds, the application of the equitable doctrine of marshalling, and the garnishment of settlement funds.

The court had previously dismissed House's request for marshalling, ordered pro rata distribution of State Farm funds, and allowed House to garnish 20% of Baird's settlement.

Baird was deemed more successful than House on the garnishment issue and was entitled to costs.

The court awarded Baird $20,000 in partial indemnity costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, but excluded costs for an affiant who did not act as counsel or make submissions.

This is a supplementary decision addressing outstanding issues following the Court of Appeal's partial allowance of both the defendant's and plaintiff's appeals in a personal injury case.

The respondent, a minor, suffered serious injuries when pushed onto a roadway by the appellant, also a minor.

The case involved complex issues regarding statutory accident benefits deductions, prejudgment interest rates, and costs awards.

The court addressed whether the defendant should pay costs of the plaintiff's statutory accident benefits recovery, the appropriate prejudgment interest rate, costs of the trial, costs of the appeal, and the deductibility of management fees and out-of-pocket expenses.

This motion concerned the distribution of insurance funds and the right to garnish a settlement following a motor vehicle accident.

The applicant, Tyler House, sought directions on the interpretation of the Insurance Act regarding priorities and entitlement to insurance monies, a declaration applying the equitable doctrine of marshalling to prioritize his claim, and confirmation of his right to garnish Donald Baird's settlement funds.

The court found that the doctrine of marshalling was not applicable, affirming the pro rata distribution of first-loss insurance funds under section 277 of the Insurance Act.

The court also interpreted ambiguities in Baird's settlement and determined that 20% of Baird's settlement funds, specifically from the income loss portion, were subject to garnishment, applying principles from the Wages Act.

The plaintiff was pushed by the defendant Saywell, causing him to stumble into the path of a truck driven by Cloutier.

He suffered brain damage and became incapable of managing his own affairs.

He settled his statutory accident benefits (SABs) claim and his tort claim against Cloutier (a Pierringer settlement) prior to trial.

At trial, the jury apportioned liability equally among the plaintiff (contributory negligence), Saywell, and Cloutier.

The trial judge adopted the "silo" approach to deducting SABs from tort damages, rather than the strict "apples to apples" matching approach.

The trial judge also held that the non-settling defendant was only entitled to deduct 50 per cent of the SABs from his share of damages.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the silo approach and the proportionate deduction of SABs, overruling prior precedent requiring strict matching.

The defendant Carlos Sosa brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him following a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff, Frank Clarke, opposed the motion, arguing that issues of contributory negligence, including Sosa's speed, lookout, and potential alcohol consumption, required a trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that complex factual disputes, conflicting expert evidence requiring detailed mathematical assessment, and credibility issues could not be justly and fairly determined on a paper record, especially given the presence of a jury notice.

The appellant sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a costs order in a family law matter.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the proposed appeal and determining that the trial judge had properly applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the trial judge's findings of bad faith against the appellant were fully supported by the record and that the costs order was justified under the mandatory language of Rule 24(8).